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This thesis ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ŝƐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ
system, analysing the impact of this putative change on the construction of kinship, death and the 
legal.  Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it engages with socio-legal and cultural analyses of 
death; family and kinship scholarship; and critical legal scholarship on death and the state.  In doing 
so it reveals the richness of the inquest as an area of law which has hitherto attracted relatively little 
attention but which merits extended exploration. Drawing on historical and jurisprudential materials 
in the first section, it provides an analysis of the changing historical form of the inquest, and argues 
that legislative and judicial reconfiguration of the inquest process since 2003 has fundamentally 
changed the nature of the system, most importantly in relation to the engagement of family prior to 
a final hearing.  It argues that this engagement of the family affects the jurisdiction and form of an 
individual inquest, and developing this analysis, it explores a series of interviews undertaken with 
Coroners and officers in England.  This empirical work deepens the earlier analysis, drawing insights 
from reflections on a set of vignettes which trouble the edges of ideas of family; emphasising the 
ways in which images of family and kinship are conceptualised and materialised through the 
unfolding of an individual inquest. 
dŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?is a negotiated and constitutive feature of the inquest system; 
charged with overseeing dignity in a bureaucratic process, making substantive and transparent that 
which may be otherwise impenetrable and formal, and simultaneously determining the edges of the 
private and intimate.  The thesis contends that an emphasis on meaningful connections to the 
deceased leads to a fluid construction of kinship, and a reimagination of the politics of both death 
and family.  It argues that the inquest system, without narratives of kinship and connection, risks 
existing in a sŽůĞůǇƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĨŽƌŵŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-makers using objective, 
rationalist and universalised forms of knowledge justify decisions that are communicated in an 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?DŽƌŐĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇďƌŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚĂĐŝƚĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞƚŚĂt underpins shared 
experiences, values, symbols, identities and understandings, [providing] the tenor or texture of 
debate [that] transmits and generates a community because of its capacity to defy routinisation and 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĐŽĚĞƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?(Morgan 2006, 259).  Working through the inquest process 
and unpicking these contrasting forms of expertise, this thesis reveals the way in which an individual 
inquest is constructed through an endeavour to combine contrasting tensions; to blend a 
contingent, contextual, participative and meaningful process with the ceremony of a mini state 
funeral (Davis et al 2002), the collection of statistical information, and the setting of standards to 




Table of Contents 
Looking for justice: the family and the inquest ...................................................................................... 1 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 5 
Common abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... 5 
Table of Legislation Cited .................................................................................................................... 5 
Enactment in alphabetical order .................................................................................................... 5 
Page(s) ............................................................................................................................................. 5 
Table of Cases Cited ............................................................................................................................ 7 
Cases in alphabetical order ............................................................................................................. 7 
Page(s) ............................................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter One: Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 9 
The contemporary inquest system ................................................................................................... 11 
Focusing on the family: blending methods ....................................................................................... 13 
Key literature .................................................................................................................................... 25 
From a promise to control risk to the inquest hearing: chapter guide ............................................ 29 
Chapter Two: A promise to control risk - the abolition of the deodand and the rise of the family ..... 33 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
The deodand  W flexible, contingent and anti-modern ...................................................................... 34 
The deodand as financial relief ......................................................................................................... 37 
From financial relief to cause of action ............................................................................................ 39 
From an unruly community to governing through the family .......................................................... 44 
From contingent matter to the promise of law ................................................................................ 48 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 53 
Chapter Three: Combining accountabilities.......................................................................................... 55 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 55 
Accountability and the historic social welfare inquest ..................................................................... 55 
Accountability in the contemporary inquest  W case studies of the social welfare inquest .............. 62 
Welfare benefits & the death of Malcolm Burge.............................................................................. 66 
Housing & the Lakanal House fire ..................................................................................................... 69 
Care Homes & the death of Walter Powley ...................................................................................... 72 
Serious Case Reviews following the death of a child ........................................................................ 73 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 75 
Chapter Four: Accountability, legitimacy, authority and jurisprudence............................................... 77 




Rival authorities ................................................................................................................................ 77 
Family at the centre .......................................................................................................................... 84 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter Five: first contact, the next of kin and framing ....................................................................... 96 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 96 
Decision-making in the inquest system ............................................................................................ 96 
Routinisation and typification ......................................................................................................... 101 
Sequential decision-making ............................................................................................................ 106 
Materiality ....................................................................................................................................... 110 
Wider concerns ............................................................................................................................... 112 
&ƌĂŵŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ................................................................ 112 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 119 
Chapter Six: the family, the body and dignity ..................................................................................... 121 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 121 
The disappearance of the body ...................................................................................................... 121 
Jurisdictions of conscience and jurisdictions of civility ................................................................... 122 
The family and the body: from recipient to active supervisor ....................................................... 126 
Dignity and the post-mortem examination .................................................................................... 131 
Shifting dignities .............................................................................................................................. 134 
Dignity and disposal ........................................................................................................................ 137 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 139 
Chapter Seven: Investigating  W in the driving seat ............................................................................. 141 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 141 
Interested persons .......................................................................................................................... 141 
Investigating and disclosing ............................................................................................................ 158 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 163 
Chapter Eight: the inquest hearing ..................................................................................................... 165 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 165 
A public hearing .............................................................................................................................. 165 
An enabled family, in an orderly hearing ........................................................................................ 169 
 ‘ůĂǁǇĞƌĞĚƵƉ ?ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ .................................................................................................................. 175 
A more public hearing: the family and the jury .............................................................................. 177 
A less public hearing ....................................................................................................................... 180 
A hearing with meaningful revelation, explanation, and closure? ................................................. 183 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 188 




The politics of death: the conclusion of the inquest ...................................................................... 190 
The place of kin-family .................................................................................................................... 192 
Looking for justice: the possibilities of law ..................................................................................... 194 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 197 
Official Publications ........................................................................................................................ 197 
Academic works cited ..................................................................................................................... 200 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge and thank those Coroners and officers who agreed to take part in my 
research.  I would also like to thank the many individuals I have discussed my research with over the 
past three years for their insights, and while there are too many to name, I would like to specifically 
thank Stephen White and Michael Bax, former High Sheriff of Kent, for their assistance, Prof. James 
Martel for his reflections on an earlier draft of Chapter Two and my second supervisor Prof. Didi 
Herman for her comments and encouragement.  Particular acknowledgement must go to Prof. Helen 
Carr whose provocations and enthusiasm have played a critical role in this project, and finally to 
Polly Roberts for all her support including (but extending far beyond) brilliant proofreading. 
Common abbreviations 
HRA = Human Rights Act 1998 
CJA = Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
ECHR = European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
2013 Rules = Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616 
2013 Regulations = Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, SI 1629/2013 
1953 Rules = Coroners Rules 1953, SI 1953/205 
1984 Rules = Coroners Rules 1984, SI 1984/552 
Table of Legislation Cited 
Enactment in alphabetical order Page(s) 
1. An Act abolishing the Deodand 1846 9&10 Vict. c.62 42 
2. An Act to provide for the attendance and remuneration of 
medical witnesses at Coroners Inquests 1836 
37 
3. Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836 37 




5. Burials Act 1874 85 
6. Burials Act 1880 85 
7. Constitutional Reform Act 2005 128 
8. Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926 59, 85, 122 
9. Coroners (Amendment) Rules 1977, SI 1977/1881 59 
10. Coroners (Amendment) Rules 1980, SI 1980/557 14, 50, 59-60, 85, 
122 
11. Coroners (Amendment) Rules 2005, SI 2005/420 86 
12. Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616 14, 18, 84, 89, 
93, 165, 166 
13. Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, SI 1629/2013 87, 96, 97, 111, 
127, 128 
14. Coroners Act 1887 37, 59, 81, 85 
15. Coroners and Justice Act 2009  14-18, 64, 74, 86, 
90, 94-99, 145, 
147, 158, 165 
16. Coroners Rules 1953, SI 1953/205 59, 85, 87, 127 
17. Coroners Rules 1984, SI 1984/552 85-89 
18. County Coroners Act 1860 37 
19. Criminal Law Act 1977  59 
20. De Officio Coronatoris, AD 1275-6, 4 Edward I. 35, 79 
21. &ĂƚĂůĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?>ŽƌĚĂŵƉďĞůů ?Ɛ Act) 9&10 Vict. c.93 33, 42, 53 
22. Fines Act 1833 3&4 Wm IV c.99  35 
23. Human Rights Act 1998 / ECHR 15, 64, 87, 91, 
227 
24. Human Tissue Act 1961 88 
25. Human Tissue Act 2004 88 
26. Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 2013 128 
27. Local Government Act 1888 36, 37, 59 
28. Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006, SI 2006/90 73 





Table of Cases Cited  
Cases in alphabetical order Page(s) 
1. Allman v. HM Coroner for West Sussex [2012] EWHC 534 (Admin) 149 
2. Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp. 493, 170 ER 1033 42 
3. Brown v Norfolk Coroner and another [2014] EWHC 187 (Admin) 117-118 
4. Dobson v. North Tyneside Health Authority & Another [1997] 1 
W.L.R. 596 
127, 128 
5. In re Blagdon Cemetery [2002] Fam. 299 123-126 
6. Jordan v. United Kingdom (2001, App.no. 24746/94) [2003] 37 
E.H.R.R. 2 
93 
7. Kasperowicz v. HM Coroner for Plymouth [2005] EWCA Civ 44 87 
8. LB Southwark v. Robinson, 23/6/2014, FTTPC Case Ref: 
LON/00BE/LSC/OO10 
71 
9. Leeds and Selby Railway, R. v. Midland Railway Company (1844) 8 
QB 587  
45 
10. Malhous v. Czech Republic (2001) (Decision, unreported, 
application no. 33071/96) 
100 
11. Platts v. HM Coroner for South Yorkshire [2008] EWHC 2502 142-145 
12. R (Amin) v SSHD [2003] UKHL 51 12, 91-92 
13. R (Bicknall) v. HM Coroner for Birmingham [2007] EWHC 2547 
(Admin) 
72 
14. R (Goldstein) v. HM Coroner for Inner London North [2014] EWHC 
3889 
128, 133 
15. R (HM Coroner for East London) v. Secretary of State for Justice & 
Susan Sutovic [2009] EWHC 1974 
125 
16. R (Humberstone) v. Legal Services Commission [2010] EWCA Civ 
1479 
92-93 
17. R (on the application of Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner 
[2004] UKHL 10 
12, 64 
18. R (Smith) v Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire [2008] EWHC 
694 (Admin) 
158 
19. R v Greater London Coroner, ex parte Ridley [1986] 1 All ER 37 85, 88 
20. R v Skidmore [2008] All ER 146 127 




22. R v. HM Coroner for the Southern District of Greater London, ex 
parte Driscoll (1993) (1995) 159 JP 45: 1994 COD 91: Independent, 
November 22, 1993 
90 
23. R v. North Humberside Coroner, ex p. Jamieson [1995] 1 QB 1 77, 78, 81, 90 
24. R. (on the application of Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2013] EWHC 2941 (Admin) 
93 
25. R. (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department) v Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London 
[2010] EWHC 3098 (Admin) 
93 
26. R. (Rudewicz) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 499 123-126 
27. R. v Hunter [1974] QB 95 127 
28. Z ?ǀ ?ŽƌŽŶĞƌŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ,ŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚĞǆƉĂƌƚĞů&ĂǇĞĚ (2001) 
58 B.M.L.R. 205; [2000] Inquest L.R. 50 
102, 149 
29. R. v. Great Western Railway Company 3 A & E, N.S. 333 40, 45 
30. R. v. William West (1841) 1 QB 826, 1 A & E  826,  40, 45 
31. Re T (Adoption) [2010] EWHC 964 (Fam); [2011] 1 F.L.R. 1487 143 
32. Roach v. Home Office [2009] EWHC 312 175 
33. Scherer v. Switzerland (1994) (unreported, application no. no. 
17116/90) 
100 
34. The Queen v. The Grand Junction Union Railway Company 113 Eng 
Rep 362 (1839) 
40 
35. Thevenon v. France (2006) (Decision, unreported, application no. 
2476/02) 
100 
36. Worcestershire County Council and Worcestershire Safeguarding 
Children Board v. HM Coroner for the County of Worcestershire 







Chapter One: Introduction  
First, the public, especially the bereaved, family and friends, need to know what happened, 
ŚŽǁƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚĐĂŵĞďǇŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ? QdŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?
It is natural justice, public justice and justice to be done in public, openly and transparently, 
for all to see, particularly the family.  The family has now become, quite rightly, the focus for 
this public process, to give them answers, where that is possible. They are at the heart of the 
process as the Charter for Coroner Services makes clear. (Thornton, 2012a). 
I formally began this research in September 2012.  The focus, driven by my experience in practice, 
was on the deployment of human rights strategies by families.  I was keen to examine the 
ambivalence, progressive possibilities and paradox generated by families speaking for the dead, the 
incapacitated or the missing.  However, in late October 2012 the Chief Coroner for England and 
Wales gave the speech quoted above, with legislative change following the next summer.  The shift 
prompted a new and provocative line of investigation.  The critical socio-legal question of the 
meaning and impact of the family in law remained central to my research, but the change promised 
new possibilities for the family; not simply rights to engage, but a place at the heart of the inquest in 
a fundamental reconstitution of an eight hundred year old legal jurisdiction.1  Acutely aware of the 
range of ways in which the putative change could be resisted or dismissed  W as politically convenient 
window dressing, as governance-through-therapy, as a neoliberal retreat of the State, as 
incompatible with public health objectives, as impossible because of resourcing  W I resolved to take 
the claim of the now-central family seriously and to seek to understand its implications.  My 
objective in this thesis is to do this: to provide a critical analysis of the family in the inquest as part of 
a wider discussion of the inquest and its constituent parts in liberal (post) modernity, focusing on 
understanding what the centrality of the family might do for inquest law, and the ways in which the 
family and the bereaved are constructed in the inquest system.   
My approach to this research is interdisciplinary, employing a range of different academic tools and 
approaches to examine my central questions: What does it mean for the inquest to describe family 
as being at the heart of the process? How did the inquest get to this contemporary formulation? 
Who does the system perceive to be family and the bereaved, and how does their construction and 
engagement in the process interact with conceptions of law?  Underlying these questions is a 
concern with exploring justice: an interrogation of what justice can be in a particular context by 
looking at the place of the family in the inquest.  I approach this question of justice through a broad 
                                                          
1 The office of Coroner was founded in 1194, see Hunnisett (1958), and one of the earliest responsibilities was 




concept of accountability in an endeavour to open up justice, ĂŶĚƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ŽƉĞŶ
ĞŶĚĞĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?WĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶŵǇĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ, but it is central to my thesis that this search for 
justice is my task and is not necessarily why a family is involved in an inquest.  It is also critical to my 
argument that I am not seeking to posit a fixed conception of family or to solidify a label of family, 
but instead seek to explore how conceptions of family emerge and are deployed in the contexts of 
the inquest system.   
I set out some of the areas of scholarship I engage with below, but my key audience is the legal 
academy and the conceptually interested practitioner, particularly those with an interest in 
interrogating the interface between the practice and the theory of law.  I see my work as situated in 
that scholarship, drawing on insights from different theoretical traditions where I found their 
reflections useful to illuminate or unpack my concerns. 
My central argument is that putting the family at the centre of the inquest reveals the way in which 
the inquest system and the law of the inquest jurisdiction seek to combine contrasting tensions, in 
an endeavour to enable the blending of a contingent, contextual, participative and meaningful 
process, with the ceremony of a  ‘ŵŝŶŝƐƚĂƚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂů ? ?Ăǀŝs et al 2002), the collection of statistical 
information and the setting of standards to prevent future deaths.  My contention is that the inquest 
is an unfairly overlooked site in doctrinal, critical and socio-empirical legal scholarship,2 and also in 
the wider academy.  As a practitioner and an academic, I have long found this lack of interest in the 
inquest odd.  It is a site and a system which engages with some of the most fundamental questions 
for critical law and society scholars; from the law/fact divide, the impact of representation, the 
proper place and limits of discretionary power, and the interplay of legal and medical knowledge, to 
questions of the creation of legal subjects, the meaning and possibilities of justice and the ways in 
which we account for life and death.  It is both newly formed and ancient, operating across and 
between different scales and jurisdictions (Valverde, 2011) with narratives of legitimacy and critique 
flowing from a wide array of sources.  And ultimately  W most importantly  W it is a space irrevocably 
bound up with lived experiences of grief and bereavement, which both personal and professional 
experience has taught me must be approached with great care and respect.   
This introductory chapter is in four parts: I start with a brief outline of the contemporary inquest 
jurisdiction, and then set out some details of my methodological approach. In the third part I outline 
                                                          
2 Other than work referenced in this thesis, there has been little legal scholarly attention on the inquest, 
perhaps because of the widespread perception that the Coroners court is only about establishing facts;  ‘we 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽĂŶǇůĂǁŚĞƌĞ ? as I was told by a volunteer at one Coroners court I visited.  A notable recent exception 
is the comparative UK/Australia work being undertaken and published by Carpenter, Tait and associates (see 
various citations).  It is also similarly overlooked in legal practice, and often  W driven mainly by funding 




of some of the key areas of scholarship I draw on, and close with a summary of the chapters in the 
rest of this thesis.  
The contemporary inquest system 
A Coroner must conduct an investigation when they are made aware that a body is within their area 
and they have reason to suspect the death was violent or unnatural,3 from an unknown cause or was 
while the individual was in detention.4  Such an investigation will conclude with a public inquest 
hearing unless it is discontinued.5  The legislative rules for the conduct of that investigation and the 
inquest at the conclusion of it are set out in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (CJA 2009) and the 
rules and regulations put in place when the CJA 2009 was brought into effect in 2013.6  The inquest 
closes with a declaration of findings of fact, and a conclusion (previously a verdict), which can be 
either a short form (and there are suggested although not prescribed words) or a narrative account 
of the circumstances of death. 
My focus is on the contemporary jurisdiction, but in order to explore that jurisdiction, my research 
investigates the family in the historical and modern inquest systems.7  I use these periods as a 
shorthand (of my own creation), not in order to make definitive claims about conclusive moments of 
rupture or a comprehensive uniformity across the inquest system at a particular historical moment, 
but rather to characterise critical shifts in the form of the inquest.  As such, and drawing on Burney 
(2000), I argue that the period 1846-1926 can be seen as a transition period between the historic 
and the modern inquest.  Furthermore, this modern inquest, characterised by medical and legal 
expertise and a dearth of community8 or family participation, transitioned into the contemporary 
inquest in the period 1998-2013.  My account is attentive to the shifting relationships of conceptions 
of public in the inquest, from a hearing which could be characterised as a public investigation, to an 
                                                          
3 Unnatural is not defined in legislation and there are differing interpretations of what it means, see discussion 
in Matthews 2014, 99-101 which highlights that it is a matter for an individual Coroner, subject to review on 
grounds of irrationality, and see discussion in Prior 1989. 
4 S.1 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In 2014 there were 223,841 deaths reported to Coroners (Ministry of 
Justice, Coroners Statistics 2014).   
5 Where, for example, the cause of death was unknown and was established to be natural causes by a post-
mortem, and the Coroner does not believe there are reasons to continue the investigation; S.4 Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009. There were 25,889 inquests opened in 2014, a reduction of 14% on the previous year. 
6 Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 SI 1629/2013; Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616. 
7 I recognise the extent to which describing the operations of Coroners and inquests as a system is potentially 
problematic, given some wide geographic varieties including different types of Coroner, and given the 
interconnectedness of the office of Coroner at different times with other legal and administrative structures, 
including revenue collection and criminal and medical responses to death, but contend that there are systemic 
elements, including a bundle of distinct legal responsibilities attributed to Coroners.   
8 dŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĚĚƌŝĚĞƌƐ ?ŶŽƚĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚƵŶƚŝů ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?




investigation undertaken by experts which concludes in a public hearing, to the contemporary 
process, in which the investigation prior to the final hearing has been opened up to include the 
family. I argue it is this role of the family which characterises the contemporary inquest, and my 
particular interest is on the ways in which the family are engaged in shaping and constructing the 
inquest.  While innumerable ingredients have contributed to this reformulation,9 two key legal 
developments bookend the shift and are of particular importance for my account.  The first is the 
development of human rights jurisprudence. 
Coming into force in October 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 provided that the right to life in 
Article 2 ECHR would be directly enforceable in English law for the first time.  A central feature of 
Article 2 is the requirement for structures for the investigation of all deaths, and for an enhanced, 
detailed investigation where the State was somehow implicated in that death.  It also emphasises 
the importance of family participation in the investigation.  As outlined in Chapter Four in relation to 
the family, and as discussed in various practitioner texts10 in relation to other changes, it has had 
(and continues to have) a dramatic effect on inquest law, beginning with the key House of Lords 
decisions in Amin11 and Middleton.12   
If there was to be a bright line marking the end of the modern inquest and the foundation of the 
contemporary inquest, it would fall in 2003, the same year in which Amin was decided.13  In that year 
two vast official reports were published which imagined a fundamental restructuring of the inquest: 
the Luce Review (Luce 2003) and the 3rd Shipman report (Smith 2003).  The review headed up by 
Tom Luce had come about as a result of general concerns about the failings in the certification of 
deaths following a series of scandals.  These included the actions of GP Dr Harold Shipman, which 
also provoked a parliamentary inquiry lead by Janet Smith, producing five separate reports into the 
systemic failures which had allowed him to murder so many of his patients. 
There was a great deal of common ground in the conclusions of the reports (as well as some 
significant differences) and both rejected the wholesale scrapping of the inquest system, with Janet 
Smith writing that  ‘I think that the tradition of the Coroner ?ƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝƐƐŽǁĞůůƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
                                                          
9 Not least the critical role of campaigning organisations like INQUEST, set up in the 1980s, see Scraton & 
Chadwick 1987 and also see criticism of the system arising out of mass fatalities like those who died in 1989 at 
Hillsborough football stadium or on the Marchioness pleasure cruiser, see inter alia Wells 1991, Scraton et al 
1995, Scraton 2013.  
10 See, inter alia, Simor (2015), Thomas et al (2014), Matthews (2014), Dorries (2014). 
11 R (Amin) v SSHD [2003] UKHL 51. 
12 R (on the application of Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 10. 
13 dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƵĐŚďƌŝŐŚƚůŝŶĞŝƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŝŶ





that most members of the public would regret its loss, even though they are critical of the way it is 
operated at present. ?14  Both emphasised the ways in which the system was not responding to the 
needs of families, and the Shipman inquiry in particular framed the family as key participants in 
oversight of procedures for investigating death.  It argued that had family members been involved in 
certification procedures, it would have been a real deterrent to Shipman, and would have increased 
the chances of his crimes being detected.15 The Luce Review was more cautious, emphasising the 
involvement of family where suitable, and the need for informed participation, in line with other 
public services,16 but proposing, in its consultation document, that family should be at the centre of 
the inquiry. 
Neither set of recommendations were implemented in full.  Instead, in a stop-start negotiated 
process,17 they framed the possibilities for reform, organising and informing the policy debate which 
resulted in the coming into force of the CJA 2009 and associated secondary legislation in 2013. 
Focusing on the family: blending methods 
To explore my key questions I combine historical, jurisprudential and empirical approaches.  Whilst 
my chapters are nominally divided into the distinct approaches adopted, my analysis developed 
along the three linked but distinct paths simultaneously, and insights from each approach provoked 
continual reassessment of my research materials as my thesis developed.  This is important because 
/ĚŽŶŽƚƐĞĞŬƚŽŵĂŬĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?in the inquest, but rather set out an interpretation of the 
subjects I research.  The three approaches enabled me to reflect on and develop this theoretical 
engagement, as themes emerged through one mode of analysis which could then be brought to bear 
on another approach; to challenge and expose assumptions, limitations and commonalities.  This 
included the development of my key themes of the role of risk and the possibility of forms of 
accountability, but other themes are also evident in my narrative.  For example, a critical aspect of 
my historical analysis is the relationship of law and contingency, and an examination of how a 
deodand gave form to a particular response to the issues posed by this relationship.  These 
reflections raised questions and initiated my reflections on the relationship between the family and 
contingency in the contemporary inquest, and the place of law in that relationship. 
I open with a historical perspective, which, drawing on Foucaldian scholarship, examines the way in 
which the inquest has arrived at its contemporary formulation.  As Douzinas explains,  ‘The job of the 
historian is to examine not the ethereal sources and linear paths but the contingent conditions and 
                                                          
14 Smith (2003), para 19.11. 
15 Smith (2003), summary, para 51, and see discussion at para 19.39. 
16 Chapter 8, pg 143, para 7-8. 




unforeseen circumstances out of which values grow ? (Douzinas 2007, 27).  As such, it is an anti-
Whiggish endeavour, eschewing an emphasis on progress in favour of examining reformulations; 
arguing that engagement of the family was a critical factor in endeavours to control risk, and that 
the involvement of the family has revived the possibility of forms of accountability18 in the 
contemporary inquest. 
In the context of these themes of risk and accountability, I turn to examine accounts of law; to 
consider how a jurisprudence of the contemporary inquest might engage with the conception of the 
central family.  My account of law is a broad one, and draws on a combination of my experience in 
practice, my empirical research and phenomenological socio-legal and critical reflections on the 
need to view law in its  ‘particular, and thus variable, material and historical manifestations ? (Ewick & 
Silbey 1998, 18).    
Thus this thesis does not make any universal claims about the character of law, but characterises the 
inquest as a site constructed by, engaged with and constructive of law.  My account of law 
encompasses the authoritative announcement of a legislative or judicial figure and also the 
representation of law, and engages with questions of how law  ‘ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ? ?WĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? exploring 
the shaping and constitutive role of the tacit, procedural and unstated in law.  I approach this in two 
stages; drawing on a jurisprudential engagement with jurisdiction through the work of Dorsett and 
McVeigh (2012, and see McVeigh et al 2007), and using their insights and a range of other 
scholarship to undertake an empirically grounded exploration of the contemporary inquest as a 
system in which themes of risk and accountability are in continual productive interaction.  My 
argument is that what happens before the public hearing of the inquest is not just critical to any 
understanding of that hearing, but is critical to an understanding of the way in which law is engaged, 
authorised and represented in the hearing and in the final conclusion of the inquest.  My analysis of 
the contemporary inquest does not draw explicitly on governmentality methodologies (Foucault 
1991; Pavlich 2007), but returns to consider the links between conceptions of governance and my 
approach in the conclusion, while my narrative seeks to draw out the complexity and power of 
choice, freedom and empowerment, described by Larner as the tenacity of neoliberalism (Larner 
2000, 9). 
To give context to my approach, I briefly set out an example of the role of disclosure (dealt with in 
more detail in Chapter 7). 
                                                          




Family at the centre: situating theory through disclosure  
A key change in the CJA 2009 and associated secondary legislation is the introduction of a right to 
disclosure to an interested person of all relevant materials on request.19  Different research 
strategies might be deployed to consider this change.  A doctrinal research strategy might analyse 
the narrowing of the Coroner ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶand query the lack of duty on the Coroner to tell 
interested persons what documents they hold.20  A socio-legal empirical study could examine how 
many Coroners now provide disclosure who did not do so previously, or how their approach to the 
range and content of disclosure differs.  A critical cultural-focused enquiry could draw on the work of 
the Hillsborough Independent Panel as a case study in which non-state scrutiny of documentary 
evidence was key in resisting official narratives.  An ethographically oriented approach might 
examine the meaning of disclosure for family members, how they responded to the documents they 
received and how they used the information to resist or subvert the official discourses of the 
inquest.   
There is value in all of these approaches, and I draw on aspects of them in my analysis.  However, in 
all of them the family is only one actor amongst others,21 and none would provide an account in 
which the family was the centre of the law of the inquest, with most of these approaches envisaging 
law in positivist terms, with a focus on the legal authority of the Coroner and the family as rights 
holders making claims against that authority.  As such, the central family would be implicitly 
dismissed by the choice of research method.  Drawing on Dorsett & McVeigh (2012), my approach 
avoids starting from an assumption of the authority of the Coroner and the law, exploring instead 
how that authority is represented, and how law is inaugurated and authorised in a particular 
context.  To examine this, Dorsett & McVeigh argue that attention should be focused on 
 ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐŽĨũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? W those devices or strategies which are oriented towards establishing 
legal relationships within a jurisdiction.  I argue that the key technologies which establish the 
jurisdiction of the inquest are those of notification and enabling participation of the family (see 
Chapter 4), and that disclosure of documents is a critical part of the way in which family are enabled 
to participate.  In this way, disclosure to the family is part of constructing the authority of the 
inquest jurisdiction and thus the law of the inquest.  
I combine this approach with an analysis of naturalistic decision-making, drawing on the insights of 
Hawkins (2002).  He argues against a positivistic account of decision-making which overemphasises 
                                                          
19 The rules are contained in R.12-16 Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 SI 2013/1616. 
20 See Matthews 2014, 7-25, and see 7-24 to 7-32 for discussion of the disclosure provisions. 
21 Not that the family is a single actor, as all would recognise that families can be split and there can be 




rational sorting of factors in individual cases.  Instead he focuses on the systemic, recognising the 
role of a series of actors making sequential decisions in a particular context.  Drawing on this and on 
Lukes (1974) enables me to attend to the tacit and contingent shaping processes in the inquest 
system, including the critical role of materials in resisting accounts of law as external, disembodied 
and instrumental (Riles 2006; Bennett 2009; Jacob 2012).  
Taking these two approaches together  W combining jurisprudential reflections on the construction of 
a space for law and a naturalistic account of systems of decision-making  W I explore what those 
decisions (or lack of decisions) suggest about the meaning of disclosure to the family as a 
constitutive part of inquest law.  Often portrayed as questions of fact, procedure, convenience and 
common sense, my assertion is that these are decisions of law, not simply when they are challenged 
or when they are made by a Coroner, but when they are made by officers22 (Atkinson 1978; 
Carpenter et al 2015a), administrative staff and crucially, by family themselves.  They are specific to 
a particular context but are linked to a set of broader concerns about the purpose of the inquest 
process, and they shape subsequent legal actions.  Regarding disclosure as a technology of 
jurisdiction enables a focus on family participation as a lawful relationship, and a systemic 
understanding of how actors perceive that engagement is critical to exploring how disclosure 
represents law, engages the family as legal actors and gives authority to inquest law.   
Finally, reflecting on these insights from the perspective of my critical historical analysis reveals the 
ways in which disclosure reformulates conceptions of public in the inquest.  This is developed in my 
analysis below, and includes the ways in which, reminiscent of the deodand, the disclosure 
materialises and empowers the family and gives authority to the law of the contemporary inquest.   
The historical and jurisprudential approaches I adopt are discussed further in Chapters Two to Four, 
and I turn now to briefly explain my approach to collection of my empirical data. 
Empirical research 
I interviewed eight senior Coroners and five officers.23  My focus was on analysing how these actors 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?ƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞthe meaning that these actors give to the role of this construction in 
the inquest system, and to explore the relationship between this construction and the themes I 
explored in my jurisprudential and historical analysis of the inquest.   
                                                          
22 For the sake of brevity, I refer to those officers who work for the Coroner (who may be employed by the 
police or the local authority) as officers throughout. 
23 Of, at the time, 91 Senior Coroners across 97 Coroner areas, together with 450 officers (Chief Coroner 2015, 




I employed a purposive sample to contact potential interviewees (Bryman 2012, 418), and the 
Coroners I interviewed acted as gatekeepers to the officers (Bano 2005, Kindle Location 2460-61).24  I 
had sent out my CV with the letters to Coroners, and it was clear that the Coroners I interviewed 
were aware of my background as a solicitor representing family members.  Three Coroners made 
direct reference to my former firm, two positively and the other negatively.  Others alluded to my 
experience, stating that I would of course know the law in relation to a particular point.  I believe it is 
likely that my background made access to Coroners easier, but my presentation was as both an 
insider, with some insider knowledge and experience, and as an outsider, as an academic and former 
solicitor for family members who could sometimes provide a challenge to the coronial system (Hage 
2006).  However, rather than presuming anything in relation to the way in which my interviewees 
positioned me, I sought to take my cue from the person I was interviewing (Ribbens 1989).  As Bano 
notes, drawing on Anderson (1993), the result of my standpoint is that my interviewees may not 
have told me things that they would have reported to another interviewer, but perhaps they told me 
things they would not have told a researcher who was focused, for example, on questions of public 
health or the law in relation to dependency claims for bereaved individuals. 
Influenced by Hawkins (2002) (although with some significant differences in approach as discussed 
below), my interviews were loosely structured, and  ‘made to seem as much like natural 
conversations as possible ? (Hawkins 2002, 453).  Where possible (in all but two interviews) I closed 
with a discussion of individual vignettes, which were designed to raise questions of legal and cultural 
definitions of family.  In one interview I did not have time to discuss the vignettes at the end, whilst 
in another I was told there was little time to conduct the interview and so opened with the vignettes 
(and the interview in fact went on for an hour and ten minutes).  My general approach was to open 
each interview with scene setting questions about the experience and background of my 
interviewee, before moving onto a series of semi-structured questions (Bryman 2012, 468-496), 
ending with the vignettes.  My decision to end with the vignettes in this way in the majority of my 
interviews was to avoid foreclosing areas and channelling responses in particular directions (Barter & 
Renold, 1999).  The vignettes enabled my interviews to engage more deeply in exploring the 
                                                          
24 As gatekeepers they made it possible for me to interview some officers, but it was not clear to me whether 
they had encouraged or obliged their officers to be interviewed.  It was clear that they did not seek to curtail 
access to their officers in any way; the interviews were held separately and I assured the officers that their 
answers would be anonymous with no feedback to their respective Coroner.  Conscious of the particular 
importance of ongoing informed consent where questions of access provided by gatekeepers arises (see Miller 
& Bell, Chapter 4, Miller et al 2012), I emphasised at the beginning and end of interviews that they were not 
obliged to take part, giving them time to read the consent form and information, and stating that if they 
wished, their statements could be withdrawn at any juncture in the future.  All my interviewees presented as 




meanings my interviewees attributed to particular circumstances (Barter & Renold, 1999).  They 
were a particularly important part of my methodology, and so I set out further details of them here. 
Vignettes 
Spalding and Phillips note that vignettes have been productively used in social science research since 
the late 1970s (Spalding & Phillips 2007, 954) and Finch uses vignettes to examine kinship 
relationships, noting that interviewing using vignettes invites statements about normative beliefs in 
a contextualised set of social circumstances (Finch 1987, 105).  Finch also argues that, rather than 
depicting extreme situations, the vignette should focus on the mundane, although it can be 
advantageous to include some unusual features (Finch 1987).  They also acted as miniature case 
studies, allowed the participants to explore holistic issues (Yin, 1994, 12) and encouraged 
participants to describe their own experiences (Barker & Renold 1999).  I was clear that the vignettes 
were my creations, drawing on caselaw as well as my experience from practice, and as such, 
contained something of me (Spalding 2007, 958).25  Therefore, rather than relying on methodological 
approaches which emphasise the desirability of the controlled experiment and the isolated objective 
feature (Epstein & Martin 2014, 4-7), I explored the responses of the interviewees and my role in 
constructing those vignettes, drawing from critical reflections on the dynamic instability of law and 
society and seeking to explore how that dynamic instability might play out in the forum of the 
inquest (Pavlich 2011).  In my analysis of the answers, rather than testing the responses against each 
other and against doctrinal law to establish truths, I used the vignettes and my interviews to develop 
and deepen contextually grounded theoretical insights (Yin 1994, 13).   
                                                          
25 Keenan (2009) shows how race, class and gender can be reinforced by systems which self-describe as 
neutral, and in an analysis of the ways in which the inquest process can be revelatory of patriarchy she notes 
the importance as a researcher of recognising your own standpoint.  My identification as a white male with 
professional qualifications and some experience in representing families in inquests (as a solicitor rather than 
as an advocate) impacted in particular in relation to the construction of my vignettes.  Although I had reflected 
on some aspects of gender in my work, in particular seeking to ensure that I had a gender mix amongst my 
interviewees as far as possible, I did not reflect on the gender make-up of the vignettes until after my 
interviews.  I created the vignettes drawing from reported cases and from my own experience, and on further 
reflection was struck by the gender bias within them, with 3 of 4 deceased being male, and 5 of 7 family 
members identified as female.  My experience in practice was overwhelmingly in situations where the 
deceased was male and I was instructed by a female.  This gendering in the system is borne out to some extent 
in the literature, with a higher rate of inquests amongst men (accounting for 67% of inquest conclusions in 
2013, see Coroners Statistics 2013, 19), with a large amount of scholarship on the higher prevalence of self-
inflicted deaths amongst men (see for example Murphy 1998; Scourfield et al 2012) while Maple et al (2014) 
ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŽǀĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞƐŝŶƐƵŝĐŝĚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?DĂƉůĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? I have thus 
subsequently reflected on the responsibility of a researcher to avoid reinforcing gendered cultural 
assumptions about death (see, for example Canetto 1993, in the context of suicide, and the discrepancy 
between deaths of women reported to a Coroner (46% of references) and inquests held (33% of inquests were 




One reflection on the vignette as a tool for research is that whilst my research design envisaged that 
the vignettes would provide more detailed substantive reflections on definitional questions about 
who constituted family and the opening questions would enable the interview to engage in wider 
systemic questions, in fact many of the most interesting systemic insights came through 
consideration of the vignettes.  This was perhaps because of a common law-style preference for 
working from cases to principles, or perhaps was because the vignettes provided some hard cases 
which potentially challenged some of the broader assertions in the earlier stages of the interviews 
(and which enabled me at times to return to those broader assertions and to interrogate them in the 
light of the vignettes).  Whatever the explanation, there is some irony in the fact that it was the 
examples of individual cases which provoked some of the most interesting systemic responses.   
Vignette 1: the non-adopted daughter and the missing wife 
A tree alongside a public footpath falls onto a pedestrian, killing them.  The pedestrian is a 65 year 
old male.  The police attended his address and informed the occupant, who identified herself as 
his daughter.  After initial contact with her, she tells your office that she does not think she was 
ever formally adopted by him but lived with him as his daughter from the age of five (for the last 
35 years).  She says she thinks he was married once, and she thinks he would not have got 
divorced because he was a staunch Catholic.  
In follow up questions, I teased out further explanation, for instance whether officers would permit 
the daughter to be involved, whether they would seek details of the wife and how they would go 
about seeking those details.  With this, as with the other vignettes, I asked Coroners how they would 
expect their officers to act, how they would decide what to do, and how they would respond if their 
officers came and discussed this scenario with them.   
Vignette 2: the girlfriend  
A soldier in a barracks in your district is found shot dead.  Internal Army investigations suggest the 
gun shot was self-inflicted. His girlfriend contacts your office.  She had been going out with him for 
ten months at the time. 
Follow up questions included testing how additional information would affect the decision, including 
details that she is pregnant with his child, they lived together and he was an orphan with no other 
relatives.  I was surprised to discover that for many participants, the fact that it was a soldier with a 
boyfriend/girlfriend relationship suggested it was either possible or even likely that the deceased 




Vignette 3: the mother, biological father and the new partner 
The school bus which should have picked up a five year old girl was cancelled at the last minute, 
but no-one informed her parents, and she walked home from school.  On the way she was run 
over and killed.  The police have informed her mother and her partner.  The mother informs you 
that the father is not on her birth certificate and she had an old (now expired) non-molestation 
order against him after he was violent towards her.  He has had no contact with the child, who 
was born after she left him.  She says her new partner has effectively been the father, and she 
wants him to be treated as such in the inquest.   
With this vignette, I sought to raise further questions about the extent to which Coroners and their 
officers would expect to search for further possible next of kin, once they had identified an obvious 
next of kin, as well as questions about the way in which decisions were made about interested 
persons.  
Vignette 4: the long lost sister 
A man dies in police custody.  He was homeless, and police were unable to find any next of kin.  
After the post-mortem, his sister contacts your office.  She says she has had no contact with her 
brother for 30 years after a family dispute, but wants to be involved. 
My attention in this scenario focused on two areas; what evidence, if any, might be needed to 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƐŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŝŵĞƐŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶŽƵƚŽĨĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŚĞƌ
brother would make any difference in the way she was approached.   
The vignettes produced insights which run through my chapters on the contemporary system 
(chapters 5-8), and as shorthand I refer to the individuals in these scenarios using the titles of the 
vignettes as the non-adopted daughter and the missing wife (Vignette 1), the girlfriend (Vignette 2), 
the mother, biological father and the new partner (Vignette 3) and the long lost sister (Vignette 4). 
The lack of information in the vignettes was deliberate; as Finch (1987) notes, ambiguity forces 
interviewees to invent factors which would help them decide, and in so doing, I hoped they would 
reveal ways in which they would understand and frame the situation.  I selected the ways in which 
the deaths had occurred from real cases to ensure they would be believable for the participants.  In 
relation to the relationships, these were invented by me as possible scenarios which might arise and 
which could require an exercise of discretion on the part of the Coroner (i.e., not falling into the 
automatic categories of family in the legislation) or might raise questions about the differences 




Barker & Renold (1999) emphasise the importance of plausibility of vignettes, and as with Spalding & 
Phillips (2007, 959) I experienced validation of my vignettes in some of my interviews, with 
interviewees stating they had had a case like this, or asking if these were examples taken from their 
jurisdiction.  However, one officer described the circumstances in Vignette 3 as implausible.  As 
discussed in chapter 7, this officer stated that this set of circumstances would not happen  W the new 
partner would not be treated as the father because the mother was available to be next of kin.  
Here, the very implausibility of the scenario was itself revealing, as this response revealed the way in 
which the officer would play a part in tacitly ensuring these circumstances would not arise.   
My interviews 
Taken together, the interviews provided over 17 hours of discussion.26  My officer interviewees had 
been in post for an average of five years, while the Coroners I interviewed had an average of 13 
years coronial experience (both full and part time).27  The CoronerƐ ? experience spanned the whole 
of England (not Wales), from north to south and east to west, and their jurisdictions varied widely, 
from heavily populated urban districts, to areas incorporating medium sized towns/suburban areas, 
to far more geographically spread out and less populated rural areas.  Their support and place of 
work varied widely as a result, from full time Coroners with a large staff of officers to part time 
Coroners with few officers.  I conducted interviews in offices based in police stations, in council 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƐ ?ŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƐŝŶĂƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚŝŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞďƵŝůƚCoroners courts (a diversity highlighted 
by Thornton, 2014). 28  Five interviewees were female (3 of 5 officers) and eight male (6 of 8 
                                                          
26 The interviews with Coroners each lasted 100 minutes on average, while the interviews with officers were 
an average of 1 hour and 20 minutes.   
27 Although these averages do not include some examples of lengthy relevant experience before becoming a 
Coroner or officer. 
28 Most of my interviews took place in busy offices surrounded by inquest files.  In relation to these individual 
inquest files, I draw on valuable academic work reflecting on inquest files (Atkinson 1978; Langer, Scourfield & 
Fincham 2008) and consider that documents can provide and ground theoretical richness (Riles 2006; Jacob 
2012), but reluctantly concluded on grounds of time and not to seek access to inquest files as part of this 
study.  /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ>ĂŶŐĞƌĞƚĂů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ ?/ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨ
files to examine which would illuminate my specific questions, and a general review of files might tell me very 
little about the key questions I sought to examine.  In particular, as my interviews demonstrated, many 
decisions were taken tacitly, and I considered that the average file would be unlikely to reveal the insights that 
I obtained in the answers to the non-adopted daughter in Vignette 1 for example.  This approach is in contrast 
to Hawkins (2002, 448), who argues that reviewing files was an essential part of establishing whether the 
accounts his interviewees gave of how they made decisions was reflected in practice, but I was not concerned 
ǁŝƚŚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨŵǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚƵĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?/ĚŝĚŶŽƚĞ,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ
that without engaging with files there is a risk that individuals will spout an official line and will exaggerate the 
extent to which decisions are thought through.  However, my interviews demonstrated the opposite  W they 
illustrated how many decisions were tacit or left to others to decide, and there was also a very broad range of 
responses differing from official lines about the role of the family, perhaps reflecting the less hierarchical 




Coroners), but drawing on Chilvers (2012) I refer to all interviewees in gender neutral terms in my 
write up for reasons of anonymity.29   
Despite this diversity, I did not endeavour to produce a systematic sample of the Coronial areas 
across England and Wales, and have not sought to produce generalizable results.30  One critical 
finding across all of my interviewees was that they considered that the family had achieved greater 
importance in in the contemporary inquest and had more involvement in it, but as with all my 
findings, this can only be said to be true for those Coroners and officers who agreed to take part in 
my research.  My methodology draws from ethnographic preference for the thick and rich account 
over an emphasis on statistical proportions, and as such adopts a qualitative approach, seeking to 
develop theory rather than purporting to provide an accurate representation of a larger world 
(ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?ƐĞĞdĂǇůŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶtŝůůŝƐ ?
Trondman).  I do still make knowledge claims, to the extent that I claim that an individual Coroner or 
officer made the statements I report, and at the time they stated it, they appeared to mean for me 
to believe it was true.  However, I am not engaged in establishing the truth or falsity of those claims, 
but rather seeking to explore how those accounts represent the world.  What can however be said, 
drawing on Platts (1988, cited in Roseneil & Budgeon 2004, 153), is that if these practices are 
possible in the examples I give, then they are possible in other cases and must be taken into account 
when thinking about general propositions.  Importantly, my focus does not seek to compare the 
statements that Coroners and officers made to the way they act in particular circumstances, by 
seeking to consider their statements of what happened in particular cases alongside ƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?, but 
rather engages with how they understood, represent and give meaning to their actions.31   
                                                          
29 For reasons of anonymity I have deliberately not identified my interviewees as Coroner A, B, C etc to avoid 
the possibility of cross-identification through analysis of their answers.  Some answers were edited for length 
and where interviewees have referred to features of specific cases I have changed aspects of those cases to 
ensure anonymity, whilst seeking to maintain the essence of the account I was given. 
30 I had reflected in advance on a concern that I would emerge with a particular bias towards the family, given 
the ability of Coroners to refuse to engage and the potential for social desirability bias in the answers I 
received (Grimm 2010).  In the event I was able to secure interviews with Coroners with a broad range of 
approaches to the role of the family (as I believe my quoted excerpts demonstrate), but additionally while I 
have endeavoured to reflect the range of answers I received, I do not seek to draw quantitative findings from 
my research. 
31 This is one reason that I decided not to engage with observations of inquests, but I was also concerned 
about the possible impact of my presence on the hearing and the ethical issues around the consent of 
participants to inquests nominally held in public but where the only attendees other than myself are 
connected to the deceased.  Furthermore, as my work progressed I became increasingly interested in the 
investigation before the inquest hearing, and was concerned that observation of formal hearings would mean 
my work lost this focus on the role of kin in shaping the hearing, and could instead reinforce the production of 
reality found in the hearing, ignoring the people and issues which had been excluded, included or remoulded 
before that stage.  In this context, I also decided that observation of officers at work was unlikely to be a 




As the selected group is not designed to be representative (Finch and Mason 1993, 30), I did not 
seek to explore how common it is for Coroners and officers to respond in a particular way, and I do 
not suggest in most scenarios how common a particular approach was (although where it is 
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ/ŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƐĞĞŬƚŽ ‘ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞďƌŽĂĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐĂŶĚ
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
As discussed below, I had developed two broad themes from my historical and jurisprudential 
research; a focus on risk and a concern to engage different forms of accountability, and I was keen to 
explore how there arose in my interviews.  Both themes were evident in all of my interviews, albeit 
in different ways (as my analysis below shows), and my initial intention was to draw on conceptions 
of framing drawn from Hawkins (2002), including the surround/field/frame model.  This is a 
methodology which explores the ways in which the wider socio-political context (the surround) and 
the institutional framework (the field) impact on the way in which decision-makers interpret and 
classify the circumstances they are faced with.  The crucial question is not what items of information 
(or factors) are part of making a decision, but rather how the decision-maker understands and 
organises the information they are presented with (the frame).  Hawkins argues that the frame, as a 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?ŝ ĂůǁĂǇƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚĂŶĚǁŝůů ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂ 
decision-ŵĂŬĞƌŚŽǁƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂĐĂƐĞ ?ĂƉƌŽďůĞŵŽƌĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ?32 
I found the use of framing as a way of undermining a positivistic reliance on factors helpful (and see 
ŵǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŽŶƚŚŝƐ ? ?ďƵƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚĂƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶ,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ?analytical approach 
for four  reasons.  Firstly, the analysis of my empirical work does not seek to develop a universal 
theory of decision-making, but rather examines how my interviews challenge and bring additional 
nuance to my theoretical insights about the place of family in law.  Secondly, I found that the 
field/frame relationship did not lend itself to my research context; I argue the institutional structure 
of the inquest is itself radically constituted and reconstituted by the engagement of family, and I 
seek to open up questions and links rather than conclusively determine relationships.  Most 
fundamentally, my account is one in which frames remain ways of organising a scenario but can be 
seen to be deployed strategically, rather than instructing a decision-maker how they should respond.  
                                                          
much of the work of officers is on the telephone or by email, and they are extremely busy.  I considered there 
would be a great deal of complexity in obtaining consent from individuals, particularly bereaved individuals, 
and it would take considerable time (and would be very difficult) to penetrate and understand their work in 
these circumstances (Hawkins 2002, 448).   
32 See Hawkins 2002, 53- ? ? ?,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŝƐĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵ'ŽĨĨŵĂŶ ? ? ?    ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞDĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?
Hawkins (1992) for a fuller explanation of the way in which he develops framing.  Also see Jameson (1976) and 




/ĚƌĂǁŚĞƌĞŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌŬŽŶůĞŐĂůĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇĂŶĚŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ<ĞůƐĞŶĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?33 but 
draw my account of what constitutes law more broadly than in that work.34  In my analysis, the 
frames are drawn from the themes I identified in my historical analysis and link to the ways in which 
the jurisdiction of the inquest is given authority, and as such are deployed in order to combine forms 
of accountability or to respond to concerns about risk.  Finally, and more prosaically, I found that 
division of my analysis into a series of chapters discussing distinct frames lost the fluidity I 
encountered in the inquest system and the ways in which framing of a particular scenario could 
shift. 
In various ways as I engaged with the implications of my research, my experience as a lawyer for the 
family and entrenched faith in the role of lawyers, legal rights and legal technicalities protecting 
families was exposed and challenged.  One example of this was the response from some Coroners 
that families without lawyers might have more opportunity to ask questions outside of the scope of 
the inquest.  Another was that, upon reflection on the vignettes, I had envisaged that as potentially 
complex cases with scope for subsequent civil claims, Coroners might be more cautious in relation to 
interested person status and might challenge claims that individuals were entitled to engage.  As my 
experience as a lawyer had often been seeking to push Coroners to go further than they might 
otherwise have wished, with some Coroners apparently keen to narrow the scope of the inquest 
wherever possible, I had not reflected on the value that the system might put on the engagement of 
family, and that in more complex cases, they might be more likely to want interested persons to be 
involved. 
 
The process of transcribing interviews and exploring the insights from those interviews at the same 
time as engaging in critical historical research and jurisprudential reflections provoked me to 
continually reimagine my approach to my thesis.  Most importantly, it encouraged me to develop a 
nuanced account of law, encompassing not just rules which structure the space of the inquest, 
preventing or enabling, excluding or legitimising, but the ways in which each inquest emerges, and 
the inquest system has emerged, as a contingent process, constructed by and constructing 
representations of law.  It has encouraged me to reflect on law as other than an exercise of 
                                                          
33 As well as Kennedy 1997.  
34 Kennedy argues that legal work comes into play after the work of investigators and parties in establishing 
the facts (Kennedy 2008, 158-159), while I seek to draw out the law in the initial procedural interlocutory 




sovereign power; not focusing on questions of authority, and how family might be being given 
authority, but instead on the integral place of the family in authorising law. 
Key literature 
In addition to the literature discussed above, there is some specific literature which I draw on and 
which I discuss in this section, as well as three broad areas of work which I summarise below.   
In relation to accountability, I define accountability broadly as the requirement to reveal, explain and 
justify, and ĚƌĂǁŽŶDŽƌŐĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĐŽŶǀŝǀŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨ
accountability.  Convivial accountability emphasises methods of achieving meaningful revelation, 
explanation and justification to produce a contextual, nuanced and contingent accountability 
founded in a tacit participating community.  It is defined as distinct from technocratic accountability, 
which may be a judicial, democratic or administrative based approach to accountability, but is based 
on rule-formation and technicalities, emphasising neutrality, objectivity and expertise.35  My analysis 
seeks to explore the appearance and arrangement of these forms of accountability in the inquest.  I 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶǀŝǀŝĂů ?ĂƐĂƚĞƌŵŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚcould be insensitive and 
inappropriate from the perspective of bereaved individuals ?ďƵƚ/ƵƐĞŝƚŚĞƌĞŝŶDŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐƚŽ
maintain theoretical consistency and not to denote geniality or good cheer.  
Another area of literature which underlies my analysis is a developing body of literature on the 
inquest as a site of therapeutic jurisprudence.36  Advocates of therapeutic approaches to the inquest 
emphasise the limited nature of this perspective (Freckelton 2008), resisting paternalism and 
focusing on the need for the inquest to minimise harm to the bereaved, with some success (as 
consideration of the 2009/2013 reforms in light of the recommendations in Freckelton 2007 
demonstrates).  A ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĂƐƐŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĂƉǇĐĂŶƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?
(Tait & Carpenter 2013; Carpenter et al 2015b), with a perception that grief is a process to work 
through; a perspective Butler characterises ĂƐŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞWƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŶƚĞƚŚŝĐǁŚĞŶŝƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŽůŽƐƐ ?
(Butler 2006, 21).  To the extent that I have a normative project in this work, I seek to develop a 
critical analysis which opens up space for kin and of kin.  As such, my approach is cautious of the 
possibility of overclaims of the inquest as a necessary or essential part of a process of grief, but I 
argue that family and grief is central to the contemporary inquest; where the place of the family is 
constructed ŝŶƚŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨ ‘ĂƐƉĂĐĞƚŽŐƌŝĞǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? ?ĂŶĚ
                                                          
35 There is a great deal of literature which engages with criticism of the inquest system from the doctrinal, 
medical and public health perspectives, and one central feature of my analysis is on conflating these criticisms 
as different forms of technocratic concern distinct from questions of the relationship of convivial and 
technocratic accountabilities. 





return in my conclusion to reflect on the questions of therapeutic jurisprudence, bureaucracy and 
the possibilities of justice. 
 
To contextualise the three broad areas of scholarship I draw on  W sociological and cultural responses 
to death; family and kinship scholarship; and work on death and the State  W I give some key 
examples and explain how I seek to build on them below.   
1. Sociological & cultural concern with death  
One key area for academic engagement with death and society is attention to the investigation of 
ƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ/ĚƌĂǁŽŶƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?insights into the ways in which actors in the 
inquest system construct suicide, and in particular on the key role of the officer in that account.  
Other research has included analysis of the role of the inquest in bereavement (Davis et al 2002; 
Biddle 2003), including establishing  ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚa fitting explanation (Hawton & Simkin 2003; Scott 
Bray 2010; Chapple, Ziebland & Hawton 2015), as well as public health oriented assessments of the 
effectiveness of the Coroner ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚĂƐĂƐŝƚĞĨŽƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ(Linsley, Schapira & Kelly 2001; 
Palmer et al 2015) based in part on the influence of the family in that process (Carpenter 2015b). 
This scholarship also calls for reflections on the inquest in a wider context of death and grief, and the 
way in which relationality is revealed and engaged by death in contemporary society.  These range 
from cultural claims of the modern private death, surrounded by family and sequestered away from 
the community (Aries 1981; Prior 1989) to nuanced empirical analysis of relationships between 
deceased individuals and their family, kin and the wider community (Seale 1995; Klinenberg 2001, 
2015; Owens et al 2008; Kellehear 2009) as well as reflections on kinship, grief, the body of the 
deceased and systemic responses to sudden death (Dix 1999; Howarth 2000; Partington 2004; Mowll 
2007; Chapple & Ziebland 2010).  Butler (2006) resists an account of the privatisation of death, 
arguing that the loss of death is not exclusively composed of the loss of the deceased or the loss felt 
by the living, but of a relational tie.  As such, grief is not privatising but instead  ‘ĨƵƌŶŝƐŚĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the 
relational ties that have implications for theorising fundamental dependency and ethical 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?.  In one example of a piece of work drawing on Butler, Reimers 
(2011) argues that practices of grieving are kinship practices which can presuppose and reinforce the 
heteronormative conjugal family, potentially preventing  ‘other relations and identity positions from 
being articulated as legitimately in mourning. ? (Reimers, 2011, 259); and such articulations have 




My work draws on all of this scholarship, engaging with the ways in which death raises and reveals 
questions of community and kinship, and I seek to add further insight on the responses of law and 
the ways in which law shapes and is shaped by those practices of grieving.  In this context I also draw 
on socio-legal work on succession and inheritance law (Monk 2011 & 2014) engaged in exploring the 
way law mediates the relationship between death and kinship.  
2. Interdisciplinary kinship and family research 
My reflections on kinship and family are not solely drawn from work relating to death, but also 
engage in two broad and in places overlapping fields of scholarship in feminist and Foucault-
influenced literature. 
From critical feminist engagements with family and kinship I draw insights about the contingent 
construction of family and kin (Al Haj 1995; Jacob 2009 & 2013) the shifting nature of conceptions of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?^ŵĂƌƚ ? ? ? ?, 11) and a need to attend to practices of family and kinship 
(Butler 2004; Morgan 2011).  I also draw from work theorising an ethics of care (Held 2005; Slote 
2007), empirical work engaged with the role of negotiation and obligation in the construction of 
family (Finch 1989; Finch & Mason 1993; Maclean & Eekelaar, 2004) and calls for critical analysis of a 
focus on the heteronormative, biological and conjugal in kinship (Weeks et al 2001; Law Commission 
of Canada 2001; Roseneil & Budgeon 2004; Roseneil et al 2013; Weston 2013).  Importantly for my 
work, feminist scholarship has traced and critiqued legal and administrative reconceptualisations of 
family and kinship (Smart 2009; Sloan 2011; Cornford, Baines & Wilson 2013) and has called for 
critical reflection on the theoretical framings in those shifts (Wilson 2007; Pylkannen 2007) including 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶƚŐŝĨƚ ?ŽĨůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?ƵƚůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŬer 2012).   
/ĚƌĂǁŽŶĂůůƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞ ‘ŽďǀŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨĨĂŵŝůǇŝŶƐŽŵĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ
to provide critical nuance to a potential overemphasis on the progressive nature of reforms 
widening legal definitions of family.  I seek to add to this literature by developing an account of the 
iterative relationship of the law and kinship in the inquest, with an emphasis on both what family do 
and who family are, and with attention to the role of family and the system in the construction of a 
meaningful and instrumental form of kinship. 
My work also engages with accounts of the politics of conceptions of family (Buss & Herman 2003) in 
the context of multiple neoliberalisms (Larner 2003, 510).  As such, whilst this is not solely a study of 
governmentalities in the inquest, it engages with Foucauldian scholarship, ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐK ?DĂůůĞǇ ?Ɛ
(2009) reflections on risk and Pavlich (2007) on restorative justice.  In relation to risk however, my 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƐŬŝƐŶŽƚƐŽůĞůǇĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵK ?DĂůůĞǇ ?ĂƐ/Ăůso seek to explore the different ways in 




interviewees engage with the risk that an ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚǁŝůůĨĂŝůƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŐƌŝĞǀĞĂďůĞ
ĚĞĂƚŚ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ2006). 
The historical work draws in particular on the work of Donzelot (1979) on the rise of the family.  His 
work has been criticised by amongst others, Atkinson (2014) who draws on Bourdieu (1996) to argue 
that this account fails to recognise the ways in which family is reproduced through subjective 
schema and objective structures.  Sidestepping this debate, my reading of Donzelot relies on his 
emphasis on the essential malleability of family as a tool of policing, to critically expose accounts in 
which, as Atkinson puts it, despite lacking a universal substance, family  ‘is treated as if it had a 
timeless essence and natural basis, an existence sui generis and palpable purpose, with which agents 
carve up the social universe and organise experience ? (Atkinson, 2014, 225).   
My use of this scholarship is therefore to engage with the contingent creation of the contemporary 
inquest.  However, my account does not set out with a presupposition of law-as-tactic (Foucault 
1991, 95), or with a concern with unaccountable petty sovereigns (Butler 2006, 65), but seeks 
instead to engage with the formulation of an account of law in a particular context, returning to 
consider the potential relationships of this account of law with Foucault-inspired engagements with 
law in the conclusion. 
3. Death and the State: critical legal scholarship & campaigning activist literature  
The final area of scholarship I draw from is research which engages with the most contested 
inquests; those which are involved in exposing the potential failings of the State in relation to deaths 
involving State agents and systems.  Developing out of critical criminological attention on the politics 
of inquests into controversial deaths at the hands of the State, this area of research was first 
instituted in the 1980s (see Warwick Inquest Group 1985; Scraton & Chadwick 1987; Tweedie & 
Ward 1989).  Since then it has included critical legal reflections (Scott Bray 2012) as well as insights 
from other disciplines, particularly media/cultural studies (Erfani-Ghettani 2015) and with close links 
to activist work, in particular the work of INQUEST (Ryan 1996; Coles & Shaw 2006; Shaw & Coles 
2007; Speed 2012) but also the Institute for Race Relations (IRR 2015).  Particularly focused on 
deaths relating to policing and in custody (see Beckett 1999; Pemberton 2008; Martin & Scott Bray 
2013; Scraton 2013) this scholarship has provided a sustained critique of the workings of the inquest 
system incorporating the concerns of bereaved individuals and including insights into the way in 
which the inquest system can reinforce hegemonic power through reproduction of structures of race 
and class (Scraton 2002; Keenan 2009; Razack 2011a & b, 2015), tropes which do not only arise in 




scholarship, Scraton argues that the inquest is a site for aggregating truth, and illustrates the ways in 
which the system can work to deny truth and thus justice and accountability (Scraton 1998). 
I draw on this for critical reflections on the ways in which the inquest system can hide prejudice and 
deny the humanity of the deceased and lived experience of the bereaved, adding a perspective of 
the non-controversial inquest and the perspective of the actors within the inquest system. 
From a promise to control risk to the inquest hearing: chapter guide 
Chapter Two examines the relationship of law, the family and the community in the historic inquest, 
and the shifts which constituted the foundation of the modern inquest.  To explore these shifts, I 
draw on the deodand  W a gift to God of an object or animal which had been associated with death, 
and which had sometimes been used for financial relief of the bereaved.  In my discussion, I argue 
that the deodand brought contingency, risk and community engagement into the law.  Its abolition 
was a promise to contain that risk, and was matched by the first right for the bereaved family to 
bring a claim, formalising family and ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞĂĐŚ ?/ƚƐůŽƐƐǁĂƐĂůŽƐƐŽf the 
uncertainty and contingency of materiality, and a move to rationalise the investigation of death; 
limiting the unruly community and disempowering the family through regulation.  Crucially for my 
account, before its abolition, the deodand had represented the possibility of convivial forms of 
accountability in the inquest (drawing on Morgan 2006).  
I move in Chapter Three to further explore the interaction between DŽƌŐĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ
convivial and technocratic accountability in the historic inquest, before analysing the possibilities for 
convivial accountability in the contemporary inquest.  I argue that the inquest has a long history of 
combining forms of accountability, and that while convivial approaches were diminished in the 
modern inquest, the contemporary reformulation presents the possibility of a revival.  I argue that a 
fundamental feature of the inquest system is its perceived ancient heritage, with a mixture of aims 
and a stated emphasis on facts and pragmatism instead of lofty ideals, as well as a pride in local 
connections.  This flexibility and ambiguity, with the possibility of constructing a contextual 
meaningful account of death in alliance with powerful narratives of therapeutic closure for the 
bereaved, legal continuity and modern medical knowledge, gives the inquest a unique legitimacy, 
but also presents a series of risks, challenges and the possibility of creating or reinforcing injustice.  
To explore and illustrate these possibilities and problems, I develop case studies on what I have 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůǁĞůĨĂƌĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? W an inquest which engages with the concerns of social welfare 
law.  Some similar themes run through social welfare law  W a concern with scale, particularly 
local/national; questions over discretion and the administrative/judicial divide; and tensions 




areas of the inquest, from the inquests into deaths in custody discussed above, to inquests into 
medical malpractice and road traffic deaths (see Howarth, 1997).  Furthermore, I argue it merits 
attention as an area in which the inquest is increasingly engaged. 
Chapter Four takes up the themes of combining forms of accountability and the central place of the 
family, ĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞƌĞůĂƚĞƚŽĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨůĂǁ ?ƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
on jurisdiction (Dorsett & McVeigh, 2012), I develop a jurisprudential account of the contemporary 
inquest jurisdiction, which accounts for the central family and draws in the themes of risk and the 
liability to reveal, explain and justify through both technocratic and convivial modes of engagement.  
This account of law prioritises the materials of law, and the systemic, the procedural and the 
technical aspects of law, as well as the way in which the jurisdiction is represented.  Importantly for 
my research, I argue that the law of the inquest is not just an official account of death, and is not just 
the form of the procedures which govern the conduct of the space.  It is also a question of the ways 
in which lawful relations are constructed in the inquest and in the space and time before the 
inquest.  I argue that paying attention to the practices of jurisdiction, and in particular exploring the 
key technologies of jurisdiction  W those of notification and enabling participation  W reveal the 
emergence of the family in inquest law.  Critically for my argument, it is through attention to these 
jurisdictional devices that the claim of centrality can be understood and joined to an account and a 
representation of law.  Furthermore, in placing the family at the centre, those jurisdictional devices 
institute a representation of inquest law in which the participative family is constitutive of the law of 
the inquest itself.  This is an account of law authorised by the joining of possibilities of 
accountabilities, but in this chapter and subsequently I also draw out the ways in which law remains 
continually bound up with risk.  This concern with risk may resisted by a jurisprudence of combined 
accountability, but as with the abolition of the deodand, the carefully constructed structures of law 
do not banish risk, but enable it to resurface in different forms; now, crucially, through the 
possibility of failure of the delicate relationships between structures and formulations which 
authorise different modes of accountability.  
In chapters Five to Eight I take the insights from these historical and jurisprudential chapters and 
explore my empirical work to deepen, contextualise and challenge the claims in those earlier 
chapters.  In Chapter Five, I consider the first contact that officers and Coroners have with the 
family, and expand on the ways in which I link my critical and jurisprudential reflections to an 
analysis of my empirical research.  I open by focusing on the next of kin, how the next of kin is 
determined, and the first contact that they have with the inquest system (and specifically the 
officers).  I argue that this first contact and initial engagement with officers is key to understanding 




chapter focuses on the disconnect between the formal legislative requirement that the next of kin 
are notified at the opening of the inquest and the lack of definition of next of kin, and the ways in 
which this formal requirement plays out in the practice of the inquest.  Critically, even accounting for 
the lack of legal clarity, my research shows that a reliance on the text and techniques of law will not 
properly account for the ways in which the next of kin is discovered and engaged, and demonstrates 
the need to engage in a naturalistic and systemic analysis.  In this discussion, I draw out the ways in 
which processes of routinisation and typification are particularly crucial aspects of the way in which 
decisions are made about next of kin, and argue that notification illustrates the role of family in 
reintroducing contingency and resisting typification.  In the final section of this chapter I move to 
examine first contact with the Coroner in order to draw out the key frames which I use to analyse 
my interview materials.  In this section I explore how the different answers Coroners gave to the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ‘ŚŽǁĂŶĚǁŚĞŶĚŽǇŽƵĨŝƌƐƚŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚ ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶ
which the same factors can be given different meanings depending on whether the frame adopted 
was focused on engaging with combined forms of accountability, or was instead concerned to pre-
empt risk. 
A key early issue for the inquest system in any investigation, and a critical determinant in making 
decisions about next of kin, is the question of the dignified disposal of the remains of the deceased.  
In Chapter Six I examine the role of dignity in relation to the way in which inquest law and the 
inquest system construct the tripartite relationship of the family, the body and the inquest process.  
Drawing on and developing ŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
conscience and jurisdictions of civility, I open by comparing the construction of dignity in canonical 
and civil courts in relation to the role of families seeking or resisting exhumation of human remains.  
I argue that the different approaches, with a focus on dignity as humanity versus a conception of 
dignity as civility/honour, envisage the relationship of the family and the body in fundamentally 
different ways.  I move to explore the place of the family in oversight of the body in the 
contemporary system, arguing that the family are responsible for the dignified engagement of the 
inquest with the deceased, and I then move on to explore framings of conscience and civility in 
relation to post-mortems and the release of the body to the family.   
Chapter Seven engages with the traditionally legal concerns of status and rights as procedural 
questions before and during the public hearing.  My attention is directed to exposing the ways in 
which an attention to rights and status do not fully explain the reflexive and reactive relationship of 
the family, law and the inquest.  I argue that decisions (and non-decisions) in relation to who has the 
status of  ‘interested person ? and who has the right to receive disclosure can again be seen to be 




and the critical importance for the inquest system of having someone there to represent social 
connection and emotional ties.  Central to this analysis is an uncovering of the ways in which 
decisions are tacit and sequential, and have critical implications for the shaping of the investigation 
ĂŶĚŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĚĞŶǇůĂǁ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?/
argue that law remains central in these interactions, as it is the practice of creating lawful relations  W 
the crafting and representation of a lawful jurisdiction  W towards which actions are oriented.  Thus 
the family are called to law by a broad notification, and the law of the inquest is inaugurated in that 
process, and once calůĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶshapes the inquest process.  Their participation 
gives meaning and authority to the law, fusing privacy and kinship with transparency and oversight, 
but creates the risk that their absence or their refusal to conform to the demands of the system will 
leave the public hearing as remnant, thin and undignified.   
My final substantive chapter turns to engage with that public hearing, and focuses in particular on 
the complicating and revealing role of other participants, to explore the ways in which they 
construct a central family.  This chapter engages with the place of the public inquest and explores 
the ways in which technology has a critical role in the construction of a public space.  Inquest 
hearings are held in very different places, from police clubs (with the snooker table covered over), 
registry offices (where for one widow, the last time she had been in the room was on her wedding 
day), hotels, town halls, specially built courts and magistrates courts.  I argue that the role of the 
family is key to the public nature of the inquest, and explore the relationship of the family with the 
media and a jury, as well as the role of legal representation for the family.  I also argue that the 
unrepresented family illustrate the ways in which Coroners endeavour to construct a space for 
combining accountabilities, and how concerns with risk can disrupt this construction.  I close with 
reflections on the ways in which some of my interviewees engaged with meaningful revelation, 
closure and the conclusion of the inquest, arguing that an emphasis on understanding can be framed 
through attention to risk or as part of an attempt to create space for kin to weave their own 
understandings into law.   
My conclusion draws the threads of these chapters together, exploring the possibilities of seeing an 
open ended justice through the role of the family in the inquest, and highlighting future possible 





Chapter Two: A promise to control risk - the abolition of the deodand 
and the rise of the family 
 
And nothing may we use in vain; 
Even beasts must be with justice slain, 
Else men are made their deodands. 
Though they should wash their guilty hands  
In this warm life-blood which doth part 
From thine, and wound me to the heart,            
Yet could they not be clean; their stain 
Is dyed in such a purple grain. 
There is not such another in 
The world, to offer for their sin 
ŶĚƌĞǁDĂƌǀĞůů ? ‘dŚĞEǇŵƉŚŽŵƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞĂƚŚŽĨ ŚĞƌ&ĂǁŶ ?Đ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Introduction 
For centuries in England and Wales, at the end of in an inquest into a death, the jury could declare 
an animal or inanimate object to be responsible for the death.  Such an object was named deodand, 
a gift to God,37 and was forfeit to the Sovereign.  Abolished by statute in 1846, the demise of the 
ĚĞŽĚĂŶĚĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨ>ŽƌĚĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǇĞĂƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
permitted relatives of the deceased to claim damages arising out of the death.  Prior to this, any 
possible claim for negligence ended with the death of the injured party. 
Recent academic engagement has focused on the deodand as an example of the role non-human 
actants can play in law, troubling the distinction between human and object/animal (Bennett 2010; 
Dayan 2011; Lemke 2014)  W ĂŶĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚďĂĐŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚDĂƌǀĞůů ?ƐEǇŵƉŚ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƵŶŐĞŶƚůĞŵĞŶ ?ŝŶƚŽĚĞŽĚĂŶĚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƵŶũƵƐƚƐůĂǇŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĂŶŝŵĂů ?dŚŝƐ
chapter builds on these insights, and focuses on the moment of abolition of the deodand to draw 
out the subversive possibilities of the deodand and the place of the family in the historic inquest.  I 
explore the ways in which the deodand brought contingency and materiality into the law, and argue 
that in exchanging the deodand for a claim, the law promised to contain risk, which the deodand had 
previously demonstrated was everywhere and in everything.   However, this promise to replace risk 
                                                          




with certainty with the imposition of a familial compensation claim  W constructed as rational and 
progressive  W brought a new kind of arbitrariness into the law.   
I argue that this replacement of the deodand with a familial claim to compensation makes an 
account of the place of the family a crucial part of any discussion of the deodand, and vice versa.  
ƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶŽŶǌĞůŽƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇŝƐĐƌŝƚ ĐĂůŝŶƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨůŝďĞƌĂů
governmentalities, I develop the abolition of the deodand and the institution of the family claim 
outside the inquest as a case study to examine the contingent emergence of the modern and 
contemporary inquest and the place of the family and the community in that account.  Critically, 
prior to this moment, the family had no special place in the law, and the legislative swap of the 
deodand for the claim was a key step in carving out a distinct place for them in the inquest 
jurisdiction.   
The chapter is in four parts.  In the first part I briefly discuss the deodand itself and describe the 
relationship between the deodand and the family in the historic inquest.  Thereafter, adopting 
ŽŶǌĞůŽƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŽĨĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚƌĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ
reshape the social surface, I analyse three lines of transformation, starting with the technical legal 
change from deodand to cause of action by the family.  My second line of transformation analyses 
the shift from community to family; exploring public order and the inquest as a popular court.  
Finally, I examine mutations in the ritual of the inquest, the promise to control risk, and the decline 
of materiality.   
The deodand  ? flexible, contingent and anti-modern 
In London, in late August in the mid-thirteenth century, a jury gathered on a Monday morning to 
consider the death of William Bonefaunt.  They concluded that  
On the preceding Sunday, at the hour of curfew, the above William, had stood drunk, naked 
and alone, on the top of a stair in the aforesaid rent for the purpose of relieving nature 
when by accident he fell head foremost to the ground and forthwith died.  The stair 
appraised at 6d for which William De Brykelworth, one of the Sheriffs, will answer.38 
The stair from which William fell was a deodand, and the value of it was forfeit.    ‘Any moveable 
thing not fixed to the freehold, or instrument inanimate or beast animate ? (H.B. 1845) could be a 
ĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚtŝůůŝĂŵŽŶĞĨĂƵŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĞƉŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚŝŶĂůůŽĨŝƚƐĞůƵƐŝǀĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ? 
                                                          
38 Sharpe 1913, 194-5, Roll F27.  See also a deodand of 12d for a step in the case of William Hamond at 233, 




Its defining feature is a lack of definition.  The decision to name an object deodand was at the 
discretion of the jury (although the attitude of the Coroner was inevitably relevant; Pervukhin 2005, 
248) and it was for the jury to assign a value to it.39  Crucially, the deodand was an inherently 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚŽďũĞĐƚ ?ĂĐŚĂƚƚĞůǁŚŝĐŚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐƐŚĂƉŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨĚĞĂƚŚďĞĐĂŵĞ
linked to thaƚĚĞĂƚŚ ?dŚĞǀĂƌŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĞĐŽƌĚ
mean that few irrefutable assertions can be made about it, and its origins predate legislative 
attention.  The earliest official mention of the deodand is found in the reign of Edward I, in De Officio 
Coronatoris in 1275-76, which includes no definition and which clearly draws on pre-existing 
common law.40  The deodand did not appear again in statute until 1833,41 but was considered 
judicially and, probably most influentially, in the work of a handful of key jurists, including Fleta, 
Britton, Coke, Hale and Blackstone.  
Unfortunately, in their attempts to set out the law  W a task which, speaking about his wider project, 
Coke describes as  ‘a worke arduous, and full of such difficultie, as none can either feele or beleeve, 
but he onely which maketh tryall of it ? (Coke 1797)  W they only succeeded in creating more mystery 
and confusion over the meaning and purpose of the deodand.42  In fact, as Pervukhin (2005, 239) 
convincingly shows, the creation of deodand law was driven by juries, and many of the rules around 
deodand were created as jurists and courts sought to make sense of the wide variation in jury 
decisions on deodand.  Few inquest jury decisions were appealed for the courts to develop common 
law principles, and while jurists sought to impose clear principles on deodand law, there is little 
evidence to suggest that juries considered themselves bound by these principles.   
This is not to suggest that Coroners and juries entirely ignored these rules.  For example, courts 
emphasised the role of movement, and juries often suggested movement43 was important, as with 
Elyas Ide, seaman, who fell from a mast and  ‘immediately ? died.  The jury  ‘attribute his death solely 
to his drunkenness and the rope, and further find that neither the ship nor anything belonging to it 
was moving or being moved except the rope, which they appraise at 10s ? (Sharpe 1913, 177). 
                                                          
39 Although this valuation could be, and was, challenged, see for example Hunnisett 1961a, 33. 
40 De Officio Coronatoris states  ‘Concerning horses, boats, carts (mills) etc., whereby any are slain, that 
properly are called deodands, they shall be valued and delivered into the Towns, as before is said. ? Hunnisett 
contends that this was not a statute proper, but was rather an excerpt from Bracton, a thirteenth century 
jurist, which came to be regarded as a statute; Hunnisett 1961a 5. 
41 1833 3&4 Wm IV c.99 (Fines Act). 
42 Including making errors of law, as noted in Hunnisett 1961a, 5 and H.B. 1845, 191. 
43 The test is generally stated to be omnia quae movent ad mortem, deodanda sunt (a deodand is that which 




However, as court decisions acknowledged, movement was only one factor,44 and other jury 
considerations in finding and valuing a deodand seem to have included mischief, negligence, 
retribution, and proximity.45  Juries manipulated items said to have caused death  W and the values of 
those objects  W and  ‘tailored their findings to each individual case. ?46 
It is otherwise difficult to understand the deodand of a ladder in the case of William le Cupere of 
Bedford.  The jury concluded that on 18 August 1272 he had  
climbed up Cauldwell chƵƌĐŚ QƚŽĚŽŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?,ĞƐĂǁƚǁŽ pigeons in the belfry, climbed up 
inside it to look for them, and by misadventure fell through the middle of an opening (clera), 
breaking his right leg and the whole of his body. (Hunnisett 1961b, 38)  
He died the following day, and the ladder he had climbed up to get into the belfry was appraised at 
6d and declared deodand.  Suggestively, the report also states that the Prior of Cauldwell was fined 
for taking it without warrant, and although no explicit link is made between the Prior ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝŶ
taking the ladder and the declaration of deodand, it is clear that in some way the jury linked 
tŝůůŝĂŵ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚƚŽƚŚĞPrior, perhaps as an informal health and safety punishment.  From our 
perspective, the ladder might be seen as peripheral; having used it to enter the belfry, the 
inquisition suggests it played no part in his subsequent fall.  Declaring the ladder to be deodand, 
therefore supposedly  W by one definition (Wellington 1905, 16)  W the immediate cause of his death, 
ƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ƐĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
The abŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚŝŶ ? ? ?ŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶ
which the institution of the inquest engaged with conceptions of modernity during the 19th century 
in a productive tension between the professionalised inquest (a site for medical and public health 
intervention) and the inquest as a public forum for protection of individual liberty (Burney 2000).  
Abolition was one step within a broader pattern of cultural, political and legal reformulations; 
including legislative endeavours to rationalise and standardise the office of Coroner, to deal with 
                                                          
44 See, for example, Elena Gubbe who on November 1, 1324 fell into the Thames while attempting to collect 
water; the stair of the wharf was a deodand and appraised at 4d, while the earthenware jugs she had filled 
with water from the river were not (Sharpe 1913, 100). 
45 See, amongst others, Sutton 1999, 14; Pervukhin 2005, 239. Burke similarly states that there is evidence that 
in some cases, negligence or carelessness might encourage a jury to find a deodand or increase the value of it, 
see Burke 1929. 




corruption, the abolition of Coronial election in 1888 and a reconstitution of the office and powers 
of the Coroner in legislation in 1887.47   
This modernisation of the Coroner ?Ɛŝnquest meant that by the early twentieth century the inquest 
had been significantly reworked: pulled out of the public house,  ‘where the majesty of death 
evaporated with the fumes from the gin of the jury, ?48 and (re)invested with its  ‘modern [focus of] an 
investigation into the cause and circumstances of death. ?49      
The deodand as financial relief 
One aspect of the flexibility of the deodand is that, although theoretically forfeit to the Sovereign, it 
was sometimes used as a mechanism to provide financial support to those bereaved by the death.  
In 1837, Robert Cocking, a stuntman in Vauxhall Gardens, died when his parachute failed to open.  
Following the inquest, the parachute was declared deodand and was given to the Treasury.  A fund 
to support his widow applied for the parachute, and this was granted (Smith 1967).50  Similarly, in 
1825 in London, deodands of £50 on a coach and horses and £10 on a cask of ginger were granted to 
the widows of deceased men (Sharpe 1913, XXVI).  The coach and horses had run over and killed a 
hairdresser, while the cask of ginger was being carried by a labourer when he fell down a hole and 
died. 
Primary sources do not generally tell us what happened to the object, and sources differ over 
whether as a matter of law the owner of the deodand could choose to forfeit the object which 
would then be sold, or pay the valuation by the jury, or if it was not open to them to choose.  Where 
ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚǁĂƐĨŽƌĨĞŝƚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŝƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĂƚƌŽůĞƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂǇĞĚ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌthat in 
ƐŽŵĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚZŽďĞƌƚŽĐŬŝŶŐ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĐŚƵƚĞ ?ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝƚƐĞůĨǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶƵƉ ?/ŶŵĂŶǇƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?
there is slippage between deodand as an object and deodand as a sum of money amounting to a 
valuation of an object, as with the debates in Parliament at the point of abolition, where the 
Attorney-General referred to the new system as  ‘making the deodand recoverable by an action at 
civil law. ?51   
                                                          
47 I reflect further on these shifts in Chapter 3, but see Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836, An Act to 
provide for the attendance and remuneration of medical witnesses at Coroners Inquests 1836, County 
Coroners Act 1860, Coroners Act 1887, Local Government Act 1888. 
48 Sprigge 1889/2012, 125 (354 in the original), and see Hurren 2010, 239. 
49 Dorries 2004, 6. The pace of such changes should not be overstated, and as an example, Burney describes 
the move ŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŚŽƵƐĞĂƐ ‘ƐůŽǁĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĂů ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘pub inquests, especially in rural districts, 
survived wĞůůŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? See Burney 2000, 81. 
50 ^ŵŝƚŚŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZŽďĞƌƚŽĐŬŝŶŐ ?ƐǁŝĨĞĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽůůĞĐƚƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĐŚƵƚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ
sold at auction, probably to the owners of Vauxhall Gardens. 




The Sheriff, or other local official, is often stated to be responsible for the deodand, and may have 
been able to collect the value from the local community (Wellington 1905, 17), and there are 
examples of a deodand being awarded but not subsequently collected from the owner (see inter 
alia, the cases discussed in Sutton 1997).  As with the definition of the deodand, the sources suggest 
a great deal of variability in practice, and also in valuation, with at least one suggestion that where 
ƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞDĂŶŽƌƉƵďůŝĐůǇĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐ
encouraged higher awards (Gray 2011, 27). 
However, it is not easy to establish how often the deodand was used to provide some financial 
support for the bereaved, as the ultimate destination of the deodand is not generally included in the 
Coroner ?ƐƌŽůůƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐŽƵƌĐĞof evidence.  One support for it as a practice might be 
found in the rule which states that no deodand will be declared in non-moving cases where the 
victim was under 14.  Pervukin argues that this rule appears to have been inadvertently invented by 
Staunford based on Coroner ?ƐƌŽůůƐĂŶĚũƵƌǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐďƵƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨŝƌŵũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ (Pervukin 
2005, 253).  She contends that it is likely that the rule arose because most children would be killed at 
home, and it was unlikely that juries would want to punish grieving parents.  Another possibly 
complementary explanation is that if the deodand was regularly granted to the bereaved, there 
would be little need for a deodand for the death of a child at home, because the parents would both 
own the deodand already and be the beneficiaries of a declaration of deodand by the jury.  While 
this is speculation, there is substantial support in the secondary materials for the deodand playing a 
role in providing financial relief for the bereaved (Burke 1929, 16; Havard 1960, 14; Smith 1967, 398; 
Thurston 1976, 1; McKeogh 1983, 198; Sutton 1999, 16; Gray 2011, 27).  
The historical origins of this practice are contested.  Links to the deodand have been drawn (and 
disputed) with Biblical law, Roman and Greek law as well as the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďĂŶĞ ?
whereby family members of those slain would receive payment from the slayer to avert vengeance 
(see inter alia, Anonymous 1841, 15-17; Wellington 1905, 14-15; Finkelstein 1972, 85; Jurasinski 
2014).  MacCormack argues that a definite conclusion cannot be reached (MacCormack 1984, 339), 
while Sutton considers that  ‘It is quite possible that the deodand was at first a form of compensation 
which gradually developed into pure forfeiture ? (Sutton 1999, 12). 
The traditional narrative in relation to deodands is that they peaked in use in the 13th-14th Centuries 
and gradually disappeared during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, before reappearing with the 
railway age, when some significant deodand awards were made (Wellington 1905, 17; Havard 1960, 
14; Sutton 1997, 46).  Some near-contemporary sources support this analysis (Anonymous, 1841, 




the 18th Century, as well as examples in Marlborough and Westminster (Sutton 1997, 48-50), and 
Pervukin suggests that the deodand might have continued to be levied, but had slipped out of 
official attention (Pervukin 2005, 248) ?dŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚŝŶDĂƌǀĞůů ?ƐNymph could also 
be counted as supportive evidence for awareness of, and therefore some possible use of, the 
deodand in the 17th Century.   
From financial relief to cause of action 
Crucially, by the time the deodand came to be abolished, its abolition was mirrored by the 
introduction of a right for the dependent family to claim compensation, reinforcing the link between 
the bereaved family and the deodand.  This technical legal line of transformation, from a 
discretionary decision by the inquest jury, to a claim outside the inquest, is explored in three short 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞůŝĞĨĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŶ/ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƐ
in Parliament, and finally I assess the replacement - ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďƌŝŶŐĂĐůĂŝŵ ? 
Discretionary relief 
A crucial plank in the argument against the deodand as a compensatory tool was that it was based in 
the  ‘defective machinery of a Coroner ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚ ?, in the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the inquest 
jury.52  From the perspective of the dependent bereaved and the need to replace lost income from 
the death of a family member, the wide scope granted to the jury in relation to both the award of a 
deodand and the valuation of the item doubtless carried risk.  There was little guarantee that if any 
relief was awarded it would cover the loss, and there was a risk that the jury would award no 
deodand at all.  Smith argues that juries may have declined to award significant deodands because 
of the stigma attached to such awards, and inquest juries might have objected to mistreating 
otherwise responsible citizens by taking away their property or fining them (Smith 1967, 395).  In 
1845 H.B., albeit in an article seeking to juxtapose the unreasonable use of deodands in the 1840s 
with previous decisions, describes it as being  ‘clear from the ancient authorities, that jurors always 
determined the amount of deodand to be imposed with great moderation, and with due regard to 
the rights of property and the moral innocence of the party incurring the penalty ? (H.B. 1845, 190). 
There was also the risk that large deodands could be struck down by the court, leaving families with 
nothing (Cawthon 1997, 141-4; Kidner 1999, 321).  In 1842, a decision of Lord Denman nullifying an 
£800 deodand was  ‘an example of the venom which Coroner ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚƐĐŽƵůd excite among high court 
judges ? (Cawthon 1989, 144) and there were a sequence of cases in the early 1840s in which the 
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YƵĞĞŶ ?ƐĞŶĐŚĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŝŶǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞůĂƌŐĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚƐ53 (although 
not all appeals by owners of deodands were successful54). 
It was not only the jury that exercised a discretion in relation to the deodand.  Once declared, the 
deodand was forfeit to the Crown or to whomsoever the Crown had granted the right  W a local 
landowner or a local institution.  Thus, for a bereaved family to receive financial relief, a second 
hurdle sometimes needed to be crossed; as with friends and relatives of the nine individuals who 
died in the Sonning railway crash on Christmas Eve 1841.  Despite the reluctance of the Coroner, the 
jury levied a £1000 deodand, attaching  ‘great blame ? to the company for placing passenger coaches 
(filled with 3rd class passengers) close to the engine, so that the heavy goods which formed most of 
the train crushed their coaches when the train hit a landslide.  Subsequently, The Times reported 
that friends of the nine deceased would get £100 each.  It seems that Mr Palmer, the local lord of 
the manor, received petitions from these friends based on the article in the Times, as he then wrote 
to the paper to state it was questionable whether a deodand would belong to him, and in any case it 
was too early to say how the money would be distributed.  Sutton notes from the accounts of Great 
Western that there was indeed no apparent subsequent payment to Mr Palmer, but the company 
did pay out money for hospital bills for those injured.55  
A possible response to both the risk of having a deodand struck down and the family not receiving 
compensation, was for a jury to threaten a deodand, and thereby to negotiate a solution with the 
deodand owner.  In one example of this, in 1833, the jury apparently extracted financial support for 
the widow of John Skinner from the ship-owner Mr Mellish by threatening a deodand (Cawthon 
1989, 146-7). 
Thus the deodand could be deployed as a tool to give money to the family, either through a direct 
grant or through indirect means by jury negotiation, but the bereaved could not oblige the Coroner, 
jury or state to provide them with financial relief.  Smith, reviewing these developments, suggests 
that the deodand was moving towards a system of compensation  ‘although at a painfully slow rate 
and in an incredibly haphazard fashion ? (Smith 1967, 389). 
                                                          
53 E.g. R. v. Great Western Railway Company 3 A & E, N.S. 333; R. v. William West, (1841) 1 QB 826. 
54 The Queen v. The Grand Junction Union Railway Company 113 Eng Rep 362 (1839). 





Passage of the Bills 
In direct contradiction to this, in the Lords debate on abolition, Lord Campbell asserted that under 
the deodand, relatives could receive no compensation, whatever the degree of negligence.56  Lord 
ĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞfocused on the incoherence of a law which compensated where injury was short 
of death, but not where death ensued, ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĚĞƚĞƌƉŽŽƌ
practice leading to deaths.57  
In the other House, Thomas Wakley, prominent radical MP and  ‘one of the most fearless, capable 
and sympathetic Coroners who ever served the public ? (Cowburn 1929, 397) set out an alternative 
account of why the deodand  ‘ought not to remain in its present state. ?58  He cited an example of a 
fatal accident which was caused by a railway employee previously found to be guilty of very gross 
offences but nevertheless retained by the company. The jury had imposed a deodand of £2,000.  As 
Coroner, Wakley was concerned that  ‘if it was tried in a court of law, the inquisition was not very 
likely to stand. ?  He therefore consulted the Attorney-General59 and leading Counsel60  and was 
aĚǀŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚǁŽƵůĚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?ƐĞŶĐŚ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? 
,ĞƐĂŝĚƚŽŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ‘tĞůů ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽǁĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŐ ŽƐƐŵŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǁŝůů
have to pay 2,000l ? ?,ĞǁĂƐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƐĂĚůǇĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞsult.  The case was taken 
ďǇƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨYƵĞĞŶ ?ƐĞŶĐŚ ?ǁŚĞƌƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂƚŽŶĐĞ
declared to be utterly worthless  W it was cast aside and treated as almost worse than waste 
paper.  He believed that no inquisition had ever been drawn with so much care and 
attention as that to which he was referring; and he thought it was quite clear, from the 
result, that the law ought not to continue in its present state.61 
For Wakley, the problem with the deodand was the inconsistency of its application, which gave a 
reactive and conservative Queens Bench the opportunity to defeat just punishments with legal 
technicality.62  Wakley was eager to use the position of Coroner to promote public health, and had 
                                                          
56 ,>Ğď ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ǀŽů ? ? ?ĐŽů ? ? ? ?>ŽƌĚĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐƐ ĞĞĐŚĞĐŚŽĞƐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚďǇ, ? ?ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ?  
and it may be that this was his source for the statement, see H.B. 1845, 193. 
57 See, for example HL Deb 24 April 1846, vol 85, col 967-9, and HC Deb 21 August 1846, vol 88, col 926. 
58 HC Deb 22 July 1846, vol 87, col 1372-3. 
59 It is not clear whether he is referring here to the then Attorney-General, Sir John Jervis, who had been in 
post for 5 days, or an earlier Attorney-General. 
60 Mr Serjeant Stephen, first author of New Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
61 HC Deb July 22 1846, vol 87, col 1373. 
62 In a later debate, noting differences between the Attorney-General and Mr S. Wortley, he noted that, 
despite having received an entirely similar education, they had widely differing views on the deodand.  Indeed 
 ‘if either of these Gentlemen were elevated to the Bench, the law of Coroner would entirely depend on the 




found  ‘no benefit whatsoever to arise from the present law of deodands ?63  because it failed as an 
effective tool he could use to force change.64  Instead of reinforcing a rational investigation 
dedicated to preventing future deaths, the deodand permitted the jury a wide rein at the end of the 
hearŝŶŐ ?ŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞĂĚĞŽĚĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŐĞŶƚůĞŵĂŶ ?ƐŚŽƌƐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŚŝƐ
servant may have been to blame for the death; failing to punish a livery stable keeper who lent a 
drunken apprentice an unmanageable horse which then killed someone; or unjustly punishing a 
railway company which had properly examined a train before it left the station.   
ŶĚƚŚŝƐůĂƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽĨtĂŬůĞǇ ?ƐƚĂƉƉĞĚŝŶƚŽĂĚĞĞƉĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ PƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇĂŶĚƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ
deodand inhibited the increasingly valorised risk-takers in charge of industry (Simon 2004).  In 
contrast, the deodand, representing a tool available to the local community for the collectivised 
management of risk, clashed with dominant conceptions of risk as either a matter of individual 
responsibility, dealt with by contract law and thrift, or else something to be spread through rational, 
predictable and institutional mechanisms  ?K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?.   
Support for the principle behind the conjoined Bills was overwhelming; they were approved by large 
majorities in both Houses of Parliament and were supported  ‘by the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief 
Justice, by all the law Lords, and by the Judges of England. ?65  The only unease expressed about 
abolition was raised by Mr S. Wortley MP, who argued that despite its problems, the deodand 
provided  ‘a cheap and ready compensation [for] the poor ?66 avoiding expensive and risky legal 
proceedings.  Additionally, he argued that the Bill would not enable claims against a company, but 
only against a servant  ‘who was in most cases a man of straw, and could pay nothing. ?67  His 
concerns, immediately dismissed by the Attorney General, would prove prescient. 
Claim for the dependents 
On August 18, 1846, Queen Victoria assented to the abolition of deodands.68  Eight days later, Lord 
ĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐĐƚĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?69 the rule in Baker v. Bolton70 was bypassed and claims for bereaved 
relatives were instituted.   
                                                          
63 According to Lord Campbell, HL Deb July 22 1846, vol 87, col 968. 
64 ^ĞĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚtĂŬůĞǇ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?
65 HC Deb May 7, 1846, vol 86, col 173. 
66 HC Deb 11 August 1846, vol 88, col 625. 
67 HC Deb 11 August 1846, vol 88, col 625. 
68 1846 9&10 Vict. c.62. 
69 1846 9&10 Vict. c.93. 




The mechanism purportedly gave agency to bereaved families, but was in fact extremely limited 
from their perspective (Cawthon 1986, 201), with workers  W legally deemed to have voluntarily 
taken on risk by signing an employment contract  W particularly poorly served (Kidner 1999, 331; 
Stein 2008).  Judges compensated bereaved families  ‘rarely and begrudgingly ? (Cawthon 1989, 147)71 
and while there was an increase in claims, particularly for railway passengers (Kostal 1994; Oliphant 
2014), legal, social and cultural barriers prevented many claims from getting as far as a courtroom 
(Bartrip & Burman 1983; Bartrip 1987, 7; Kidner 1999, 321; Stein 2008, 956-7).  S.2 of the Act 
required action by the estate of the deceased, which was impractical for those too poor to proceed 
to probate; and the courts restrictively interpreted the Act to require pecuniary loss, thus replacing 
the uncertainty of the deodand (Sutton 1997, 50; Pervukin 2005, 245) with the vagaries of 
establishing negligence and financial loss.  According to the Mines Inspector in 1853,  ‘However gross 
ŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚĞŶĞŐůĞĐƚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƵƐĞĚƚŚĞŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?ĂůůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚs are arrayed against the 
survivors. ?72  
Thus compensation, based on an increasingly structured assessment of loss, itself shaped by 
documentary evidence generated in a civil action to a specific standard of proof, replaced 
discretionary and flexible financial relief.  At the same time, juries in civil claims were warned not to 
take the opportunity to punish railway companies with large awards against them (Kidner 1999, 328) 
and were instead to focus on the law.  Dependents better able to establish family connections or 
pecuniary loss  W those with formally sanctioned relations recognised by the law73 and with licit, 
certain and evidenced financial affairs  W were in a far stronger position than those with less formally 
recognised intimate relationships or financial affairs (Stein 2008, 957).  The question of financial 
relief shifted from the inquest arena to the civil courts; from a local space, a hearing held in a public 
house attended by neighbours, into an  ‘extended, expensive process ? in a formal court room 
(Cawthon 1997, 144).  The dependent family became a key actor; plaintiff and later claimant, moving 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁŝŶƚŽůĂǁ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŐĂǌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐĂƉƌŝĐŝŽƵƐŝŶƚŚĞ
inquest, was shackled in the civil jurisdiction by legal technicalities, expertise and evidence.   
In this process, despite being re-engineered as the vehicle of justice, the family revealed flaws when 
opened to the scrutiny of the law.  In particular, legislators expressed concerns about leaving the 
family to manage finances.  A widow, left to herself, as Viscount Sandon observed in the House of 
                                                          
71 Although railway companies complained that in their cases, juries awarding compensation were overly 
generous, see Kidner 1999, 333. 
72 H Mackworth, quoted in Bartrip 1987, 7.  Also see Smith 1967, 401-3. 
73 Categories of potential claimants were set out in ss. 2 & 5 of the Act, and relationships falling outside these 




Commons, might marry another man and  ‘the money might all be expended the day after the 
verdict in a drunken frolic. ?74  Such families had to be controlled; meaning widows, cast either as 
domestic angels to be protected or fallen women to be anxiously managed (Ward 2014), had to be 
restrained and the money secured to the children.75  
In the post-deodand world, the risks for business were made more predictable,76 as new technology 
drove the development of tort law (Oliphant 2013, 837-8).  However, financial relief for the family 
may not have appeared any less arbitrary, and was certainly less immediate.  The family were given 
rights, but with little ability to enforce such rights for all but the richest families, and the informal, 
negotiated and uncertain gave way to the impenetrable, constrained and putatively certain.  
From an unruly community to governing through the family 
As well as a tool for financial relief for the family, the flexibility of the deodand enabled financial 
relief for others  W if there was no family, or the family was not formally constituted.  Alternatively, 
monies could be put to community benefit  W fixing bridges or providing financial relief to those with 
leprosy (Sutton 1999, 16; Burke 1929, 18)  W or as a negotiation tool to effect health and safety 
improvements (Smith 1967, 397; Cawthon 1989, 147). Abolition of the deodand was a way of 
managing the unruly juries who sought to use the deodand in this way, whether with the support of 
a local Coroner, or without, as Thomas Wakley discussed with such chagrin in the House of 
Commons.  At the same time, the creation of a right to sue for the bereaved dependents was part of 
a process of formalising the family, and framing them as properly and primarily responsible for 
leading reaction to death.  The abolition of the deodand and the implementation of the Fatal 
Accidents Act were thus central to strategies to manage the unpredictability of the community 
following death.  The next section looks at each in turn. 
Subduing an unruly community 
Prior to abolition, the deodand was available as a tool of resistance for the community, most 
famously in relation to the industrialisation of Britain and the railways.  As discussed above, abolition 
was closely linked to the protection of risk-takers driving the burgeoning rail network.  As Wellington 
dryly notes,  ‘the date of this statute (1846) may suggest the great inconvenience which the law, if it 
had remained in operation, would have caused ... to railway and other enterprises in which loss of 
life is a frequent occurrence. ? (Wellington 1905, 18; contrast Kidner 1999, 323). 
                                                          
74 HC Deb 22 July 1846, vol 87, col 1369. 
75 See Lord Campbell, HL Deb 21 August, vol 88, col 926; also see s.2 9&10 Vict. c.93; and discussion in Kidner 
1999, 325. 




The railways expanded dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century,77  ‘a mindless 
juggernaut, grinding private rights into the ground in the blind quest for profit. ?78  As deaths at the 
hands of the juggernaut became a frequent occurrence, some inquest juries reacted to defend the 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŬŝůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ?dŚĞDĞĐŚĂŶŝĐ ?ƐDĂŐazine of 1842 cast the railways as 
 ‘The Modern Mechanical Moloc ? and severely censured  ‘the railroads for the numerous accidents 
that had occurred, attributing them to a general lack of precaution and scarcity of safety measures. ? 
As a result  ‘Deodand after deodand has been imposed by honest and indignant juries  W deodands in 
amount surpassing any previously known in our criminal history ? (Burke 1929, 28).  Case reports bear 
this activity out, and in a number of cases in the late 1830s and early 1840s, juries found trains and 
carriages to be deodands, and valued them at significant amounts.79  The Monthly Law Magazine in 
1841 stated that  ‘in 1840 we have seen [deodands] rapidly ascend to £500, £800, and at length, 
£2,000. ?80  Railway companies took such inquests very seriously,  ‘almost always sending legal 
counsel and at least one director ? (Cawthon 1989, 145) and successfully challenged many deodands 
which were awarded.81  Railway deaths provided the backdrop to the debates in Parliament,82 and 
Cawthon highlightƐƚŚĞ ‘ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂŝůǁĂǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? W ‘A combination of 
outraged lawyers, employers and judges [who] got in the ear of Parliament in the matter ? (Cawthon 
1989, 147). 
Before this lobby succeeded in abolishing the deodand, Smith suggests that the law left juries little 
choice but to declare trains and carriages as high value deodand, as an ancient rule that the deodand 
moved to the death bound them to recognise them as such and it was  ‘hard to pretend they were 
low value ? (Smith 1967, 395).  This version of events implicitly undermines the place of active 
                                                          
77 See for example, the statement by Mr Williams MP in 1846 that in the previous 2 sessions of Parliament, 
Bills for railways requiring private funding of £210,000,000 (over £100bn at 2014 prices) had been passed, 
which had  ‘caused great apprehension in the money market, that the monetary affairs of the country would be 
deranged, and its commerce considerably retarded, by the application of so much capital to railway 
undertakings. ? See HC Deb 11 August 1846, vol 88, col 623. 
78 J Kellett, quoted in C Wolmar, The Subterranean Railway (London, Atlantic Books, 2005) 19. 
79 See Cawthon 1989 for a detailed discussion of this development, and also see a deodand of £1,400 awarded 
against the Stockton & Darlington railway, discussed in Fellows 1930. 
80 Anonymous 1841, 15-16  W which may well have been the deodand which Thomas Wakley discussed in the 
House of Commons in 1846. 
81 See, for example R. v. William West 1 A & E  826, Leeds and Selby Railway, R. v. Midland Railway Company 8 
QB 587 (1844), R. v. Great Western Railway Company 3 A & E, N.S. 333. 
82 See for example the  ‘mildly humorous exchange ? (Smith 1967, 399) between Lords Campbell and Lyndhurst, 
in HL Deb 7 May 1846, vol 86, col 174-5, and the pointed remark by Lord Campbell in which he stated that he 
trusted that the  ‘great many ? House of Commons members who were also railway proprietors  ‘would forget 
that they were directors, and consider only that they were citizens and subjects ? (see HL Deb 24 April 1846, vol 




resistance in the deliberations of these juries, who could have decided on a low value,83 or chosen, 
as in other deodand cases, to separate part of a moving object from the whole (E.g. Hunnisett 
1961a, 33).  Instead some Coroners and juries explicitly deployed the deodand as a tool to exact 
concessions, and while this was not common in the early Victorian inquest, it was a vital and 
potentially progressive development, curtailed by the abolition of the deodand (Cawthon 1989, 147; 
Gray 2011, 29-31). 
Without the ambiguity available in the deodand, the inquest jury lost this tool, and also lost the 
possibility of expressing a formal retributive reaction to deaths deemed to be by misadventure.  
Furthermore, shifting out of the potentially populist Coroner ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽǀĞƌ
compensation lacked the vital energy which an inquest in close physical proximity to the death could 
generate.  By contrast, after abolition, financial loss was principally a dispassionate question for 
objective determination by the law, and the potentially insurrectionary voice of the public was 
radically diminished. The inquest, the  ‘only court in which working class people could participate as 
jurors ? (Sim & Ward 1994, 263) was shorn of a tool for the community to exact accountability. 
Governing through the family 
Inquests have long been a site for the maintenance of public order. As part of this, emphasis was laid 
ŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚsecurity. In the 1840s, J. Toulmin Smith argued that inquests 
were a forum for  
free unofficial men ... to declare for the satisfaction and security of all, whether it appears to 
their plain common sense that the case is free from suspicion. ... The object is one of such 
paramount importance to the safety and security to all men in the community, that there 
has, from the earliest times existed an officer ... whose special function it is to preside at 
these inquiries. (Toulmin Smith 1852) 
The Coroner as presiding officer did not constitute the historic jurisdiction of the inquest, but rather 
arranged for it to exist.  The Coroner  ‘ĚŝĚŶŽƚ “ŚĞĂƌĂŶĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ? ? but kept records of all that went 
on in the county and that in any way concerned the administration of criminal justice ? (Wellington 
1905, 1). 
However, in the period from 1840 to 1926, the development of medical expertise and medically 
qualified Coroners, the shift from election to appointment of the Coroner, the reduction in cases 
which had to be heard by juries, and the removal of the body from the inquest forum, reshaped the 
                                                          
83 As other juries did, e.g. in relation to the first recorded railway deodand, awarded in April 1833, for Jane 
Hazell, a girl killed by a train of three wagons of sand.  A deodand of £2 was levied on one wagon and the sand 




place of the community, from agents of that declaration to listeners to the declaration.  Public order 
was increasingly maintained through public information, not necessarily through public involvement 
in any conclusions.  As Burney argues  
At its theoretical core lay the proposition that the public circulation of information 
concerning potentially disturbing deaths was a tool of social stability.  In giving a formal 
context for the airing of the gossip, rumour, and suspicion generated by such deaths, the 
inquest diffused a tension that, if left to fester, might pose a threat to the reign of sense and 
reason. (Burney 1994, 34) 
In the maintenance of public order, the emphasis was on the gathering of men,  ‘the doer, the 
creator, the discoverer, the defender ? rather than women,  ‘whose intellect is not for invention or 
creation, but for sweet ordering, arrangement and decision, ? excluding, apparently, legal decision-
making (Ruskin, quoted in Ward 2014, 8).  
However women, including the spectre of the drunken widow, also presented a risk to public order.  
Whilst her husband was alive, the Victorian wife was  ‘ǇŚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƉůĂĐĞ QƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂůů
danger and temptation, ? (Ruskin, quoted in Ward 2014, 8) but such protection was lost following her 
ŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?dŚƵƐƚŚĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐŚĂĚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚŽĨƐƵĐŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƚ
was in this context that the dependent family was reconstituted as key participants in the inquest; 
firstly as claimants in a potential civil case, and later with the development of formal rights to 
engage with the inquiry.  Family, rather than community, became the essential component in an 
effective declaration of the cause of death to allay suspicion; as junior co-author and principal 
reactants to the declaration.  Whilst in 1817 Umfreville, a key pre-Victorian authority, had declared 
that Coroners should not  ‘intrude themselves into private families ? (quoted in Cawthon 1986, 194), 
these moves shifted the system directly into that private space. 
Donzelot describes this transformation of family into the reorganising principle of society as  ‘as a 
positive form of solution to the problems posed by a liberal definition of the state rather than as a 
negative element of resistance to social change ? (Donzelot 1979, 53). He analyses the way that in 
ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚĨĂŵŝůǇďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƉĂƵƉĞƌŝƐŵĂŶĚŝŶĚŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?
with philanthropy focusing efforts on the family, encouraging family saving and thrift, and making 
the family  ‘agents for conveying the norms of the state into the private sphere ? (Donzelot 1979, 58). 
As he argues, the strength of family as a mechanism for policing lies in the relationship between the 
imposition of these state norms and the complexity of familial configurations; social control is 
maintained through an interplay between external forces and differences of potential within the 




Thus, according to Donzelot, because the family is malleable and ill-defined, continually recreated by 
the interplay of external and internal pressures, it becomes the key tool by which social cohesion is 
maintained. The shift from deodand to compensation claim is an illustration of this; a move from 
networks of solidarity to claims procedures.  The abolition of the deodand marked a severing of a 
key link between the community and the family in relation to death.  At the same time, the 
establishment of a limited civil claim marks out the separation of family and a claim to justice 
distinct from any rights the community might have.   
Furthermore, the family was developed as a mechanism to import key norms, focusing on the 
protection of life within and by the family and interdependence of family members to the exclusion 
of their place and links in the community.  The difference of potentials within family, and the flexible 
engagement with that variability was seen in the tool of compensation; as noted above, with larger 
awards for lawfully recognised families which managed their finances in formally established ways 
and could thereby establish dependence on each other, whilst less formally constituted families lost 
out.  Law reinforced the angel in the home, and penalised the fallen woman. Through all these 
means, narratives around compensation and explaining the unexplained saw the formal family 
ƌĞĐĂƐƚĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐƵŶŝƚŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞĂƚŚ ?ĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
take place, from which claims to justice can initiate and must depend, and upon which social control 
is founded.   
From contingent matter to the promise of law  
The abolition of the deodand and creation of the right to claim highlights a final line of 
transformation; that of the place of ritual, symbolism and materiality.  I examine this final line in 
three parts: ritual and the deodand; the abolition of the deodand; and the role of materiality. 
Taming Death and the Deodand 
ƌŝĞƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĞǀĂůƚĂŵŝŶŐŽĨĚĞĂƚŚŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚƵŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ
death by detaching it from the blind violence of nature through ritualization.  He argues that a 
crucial part of this ritualization is the imprisonment of death in public ceremony and spectacle (Aries 
1981, 604-5).  Key to this was a belief in the advance warning of death; in comparison a sudden 
death was ugly, destroying the natural order of the world (Aries 1981, 10). 
Berman (1999) argues that, in such cases, ceremonies were needed to re-establish law.  The 
deodand can be seen as playing a part in this strategy of humankind against nature, a part of the 
ritual of death and a bulwark which re-tamed death, tying it down with a physical object and 
opening it out to public exploration and authentication.  Berman suggests that the declaration of 




storytelling, permitting  ‘the community to heal itself after the breach of a social norm by creating a 
narrative whereby a symbolic transgressor of the established order was deemed to be  “ŐƵŝůƚǇ ? of a 
 “ĐƌŝŵĞ ? and cast beyond ƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ?ĞƌŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Thus a declaration that 
an object is guilty must be taken seriously and its symbolic content must be assessed, rather than 
being dismissed as superstition or error, because the legal narrative plays a function in constructing 
reality.  A narrative founded in such proceedings identifies transgressors and removes them from the 
community, through banishment, forfeiture, excommunication, or execution.  This symbolic gesture, 
founded in an essential human need for a managed response to an unexplained event, is a common 
thread in contemporary academic discussion of the deodand (Sutton 1997, 11; Berman 1999, 25-31).  
However, there is a crucial difference between the deodand and trials of animals and guilty 
objects.84  Unlike in those trials, the potential deodand, be it animal or object, was not charged and 
symbolically put in the dock, and the inquest hearing was not primarily charged with deciding its 
guilt or innocence.  A declaration of deodand did not result in the slaughter of an ox that gored, and 
resulted in a payment by the owner rather than actual forfeiture in some cases.85  Instead of being 
the defendant in a criminal process, the object or animal was part of the factual nexus that the jury 
shaped into a narrative explaining death.  It was a flexible process, in which a range of potential 
conclusions could be reached, and objects which were nearby when the death occurred could be 
symbolically brought into the forum, declared deodand and valued at the end of the process.  
Equally, the jury could reach a conclusion on death without finding a deodand.   
While the symbolic importance of the deodand  W casting out an object to preserve the integrity of 
the social order  W might have similarities to other legal processes involving non-human actants as in 
the continental animal trials, the distinction between the two is important in analysing the abolition 
of the deodand and the institution of the family claim.  
Ritual and Abolition  
Some Victorian and contemporary commentators argue that, with its very basis in superstition 
(Burke 1929, 16), the deodand could not survive modernity (Finkelstein 1972, 207; Berman 1999, 
53).  The deodand as an evil object could not be reconciled wŝƚŚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ‘which is the soul of law ? 
(H.B. 1841, 191).  However, this account of the irrational deodand underplays the contingent nature 
of the deodand and its abolition.  MacCormack argues that it is not clear that juries were engaged in 
declaring an object to be evil (MacCormack 1984, 339), and immediately prior to its abolition, the 
                                                          
84 See MacCormack 1984, 323, counselling caution in drawing links between the deodand and non-human 
trials. 




primary narratives around the deodand were of prevention of death and compensation of the 
bereaved.  Adaptation of the deodand was not impossible.  It could, as Smith has argued was 
happening, have been remodelled into compensation for the family (Smith 1967, 389).  Additionally, 
adopting the justifications of Hale and others, modification of the deodand could have increasingly 
focused on the deodand in a narrative of prevention of death (Hale 1800).  Such a shift could have 
maintained and obscured the symbolism of the banishment of the object; allowing the ambiguity of 
the deodand to continue to reflect different concerns.   
Having criticised the irrational deodand, one Victorian commentator proposed exactly such an 
adaptation in the Monthly Law Magazine of 1841:  
When we consider how often the death of a husband and a father plunges the wife and 
children in a state of extreme destitution, how frequently a whole family is thus by one blow 
deprived of the very means of existence, we must surely lament that it is not left to the 
discretion of the inquest to deduct a certain portion of the deodand for the relief of the 
sufferers.  Thus the same means which have been adopted to instil a horror of inflicting 
death, might also tend to the support and nourishment of life. (Anonymous, 1841, 24) 
This proposal was not acted upon.  Crucially, this was not because the deodand as an object which 
caused death was no longer sustainable.  The deodand was never solely such an object, but was 
instead a flexible community tool which could meet various ends. It was this very freedom and 
flexibility which could not be tolerated; as a jury could not be relied upon to be objective and 
rational.   
Once the deodand was abolished, the powerful demands of symbolic justice required that the 
inquest did not lose the aspect of excommunication, and the reworked public health inquest, 
gradually shorn of its criminal jurisdiction, found this in the responsibility to banish systems, 
structures or processes which had caused death, in order to prevent future death.86  Importantly, for 
reasons of complexity and expertise, these were not questions which could be left to the jury and 
had to be dealt with by the Coroner.87  Symbolic justice could therefore be married with reason, at 
the cost of the exclusion of the irrational jury.  The deodand, not necessarily associated with evil 
before its demise, is now regularly cast as the evil object, because it was abolished in the name of 
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƚŽŶĂŵĞŽďũĞĐƚƐ
                                                          
86 Now contained in Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Rule 28 of the Coroners 
(Investigations) Regulations 2013 SI 1629/2013. 
87 dŚĞũƵƌǇ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĂĚĚĂƌŝĚĞƌrecommending action be taken to avoid future fatalities survived until 1980 




deodand which offended reason, and the deodand was made the blameless victim of the triumph 
over reason over evil.  In this triumph, symbolised in the Coroner ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĨƵƚƵƌĞĚĞĂƚŚƐ ?
one crucial aspect of the previous legal regime was lost: the deodand as physical object. 
The loss of materiality 
At one level, the deodand was an object made by the jury.  It was given substance, independent 
form and value by their declaration, as wheels were separated from carts, and individual steps from 
staircases.  At another level, it pre-existed the declaration as an object which the deceased was near 
in the moments before their death; a cask they were carrying, a vat of ale they fell into, a boat they 
fell out of, a ladder they climbed up.  It might have been classed as a thing which moved due to a 
deliberate act  W a horse which bolted  W or an object which could not reasonably have any intention 
attached to it  W a pebble on which they tripped. 
All of these things act (Latour 2005).  They intervene, make a difference, and make things happen.  
They are actors both because they pre-exist and because they are named as actors by the jury, and 
these cannot be separated.  A deodand cannot be intangible, untouchable, but it also cannot be 
called into being as a deodand unless the jury names it so.  Once called into being, it acts backwards, 
as a cause, occasion or instrument of death, and forwards, as explanation, punishment, deterrent 
and relief. 
Abolishing the object as an actant can be seen as part of a wider trend in which causation shifted 
from Aristotelean to Newtonian understandings of the subservient nature of things.  Bennett argues 
that this conception, the  ‘image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter, feeds human hubris 
and our earth destroying fantasiĞƐŽĨĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ? (Bennett 2009, Kindle Loc 40-43).  
She calls for recognition of the vibrant nature of materials; not by positing a force that can enter and 
animate a physical body, but rather by exploring the affective nature of non-human bodies.  A 
modern focus on a division of object and actor binds material into  ‘passive, mechanistic, or divinely 
infused substance ? (Bennett 2009, Kindle Loc 90) while removing this division allows a refocusing on 
the catalyzing capacity of non-human actants and their affective potential.  Lemke, drawing on Barad 
as well as Braun & Whatmore, argues that this approach is too all-encompassing and fails sufficiently 
to recognise the importance of a relational perspective, and the conditions in the specific moment in 
which non-human actants have vitality (Lemke 2014, 13-14).  
These insights are demonstrated in the deodand; both in the way the deodand is founded in the 
specific relative conditions of the moment of its creation, and the affective potential of each 
deodand.  The abolition of the deodand meant that recognition of this affective capacity was lost to 




and this was denied after 1846.  Crucially, it also had an affective place for the family.  In granting 
the deodand to the bereaved, the very material of death was being tied into the outcome of the 
inquest.  The family, in receiving the parachute that did not open, was put in immediate proximity to 
the deceased and the end of their existence.  Where a family received the value of the contents of 
the barrel which had crushed one of their number, that money was directly linked to that cask; it 
was representative of that cask and maintained the immediacy of the link to death.  The material 
was thereby affective in a way which transcended a formulation of it as an instrument of another 
human.  It also could not be said to be wholly an instrument of the jury, as while they had a broad 
discretion to attribute value, they were bound by what was available to be a deodand  W a house 
twenty miles away from the death could not be deodand  W and if they could compensate without 
the deodand, such compensation would not intervene in the narrative of death in the same way.  
dŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ ?ƐĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂǆŝŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
historically specific moment it was created; stretching from the physical site and moment of death, 
to the politics of the inquest hearing which shaped the narrative of that death.   
Its combined physicality and contingency also permitted it to embody risk.  Until its abolition, the 
deodand marked a world in which peril and possibility lay everywhere and in everything.  In binding 
those risks into physical form, it made them directly available to the community, and provided both 
demarcation for the generation of a narrative and a vessel to contain the ubiquitous risk.  It 
ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ ?ĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵǁŝƚŚĂ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌƵŶƌƵůŝŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
joining of law and that world.  Aries describes the medieval resignation to suffering and death, and 
acceptance of the constant presence of evil, not as submission to nature or biological necessity, but 
 ‘as recognition of an evil inseparable from man ? (Aries 1981, 605).  Similarly, the deodand had acted 
as recognition of  W not submission to  W the inseparable place of the uncontrollable physical world in 
ůĂǁ ?/ƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĂŶĞŵďƌĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
material world, and brought the contingency of the physical world into the heart of law. 
Abolition meant the separation of the inseparable, and the abrupt termination of the possibility of 
the deodand acting beyond human agency whilst being inextricably merged with human agency.  
This was lost to law; reinforcing a change of perspective towards the natural world as lifeless 
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽƌƵŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĞĂƐƚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝĐ ?ƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂůůŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ƐǁŝůůƚŽĂĐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?dŚĞ
ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽŶĐĞŚĞůĚŽƵƚďǇDĂƌǀĞůů ?ƐNymph were excluded, and the place of matter was 




Separated from contingent matter, law proceeded to make a bold promise: that it could 
characterise, contain and restrain risk.  Appearing to give agency to the bereaved family  W the 
apparent chief beneficiaries and subjects of the Act  W law promised to provide certainty, 
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚ>ŽƌĚĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐĐƚ ?ůĂǁŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞƌŝƐŬƐ ?ĂŶĚ
promised to reduce them; not only from the risk of poverty for a bereaved family, but also the risk of 
arbitrary removal of property and the reduction of risky behaviour, as a claim against careless 
companies would  ‘read such companies a proper lesson. ?88  >Ăǁ ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞǁĂƐƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
providing certainty in the face of such risks, through the imposition of apparently objectively 
justifiable factors; negligenĐĞ ?ůŽƐƐ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚĨĂŵŝůǇůŝŶŬ ?K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-61).  
Thus while the deodand had dealt with risk through incorporating and materialising it piecemeal, 
passing possession of it to the community, the law sought to settle risk in advance, sharing it out 
according to political rationalities.  This meant, as far as possible, individuals owning their own risk, 
determined by contracts of employment or insurance, or else risks being spread by formal 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞĂŶƐ ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚůĂǁ ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŽƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚĨĂŵŝůǇǁĂƐĂĨĂůůĂĐǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
individualisation and spreading of risk either thrust risk upon them, or passed determination of fault 
and need to more centralised and more inaccessible authorities.  The reframing of the relationship 
of risk and law reassembled death and the family as legal subjects constituted by knowable relevant 
fĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƐƚƌŝƉƉŝŶŐĂǁĂǇŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐůĂǁ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĚ
dĞŶǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞůĂǁ ?ƐƉƵƌǀŝĞǁ ? 
^ƵĐŚĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĂďůĞĚůĂǁ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƵŶĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂďůĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚƚŽ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚĂůĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌŽĨƐƵĚĚĞŶĚĞĂƚŚ ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽŶŽĨĨĞƌǁĂƐƚŚƵƐŝůůƵƐŽƌǇĨŽƌůĂǁ ?Ɛ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ĂƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞůĂǁ ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐĂŶĚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĞǀĂĚĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĂďůĞƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽ
be rationalised away.  Where the material of the deodand had sustained networks of solidarity, 
maintaining affective links between law, the community, the family and the deceased, the loss of the 
deodand broke those links, separating family off and subjecting them to the disciplinary process of 
claiming.89 
Conclusion 
The deodand appears at the end of the historical inquest, at the conclusion of a particular inquest 
and the point where the record ends.  The deodand appears at the last, only to disappear, and it is 
this very liminality which means that an analysis of the deodand is not limited to a discussion of the 
                                                          
88 Lord Campbell, HL Deb 21 August 1846, vol 87, col 926. 
89 akin to the move from collective to disciplinarǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚďǇK ?DĂůůĞǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĞĞ




inquest but can produce an account which drives directly at legal personhood and the foundations of 
the modern state. Its value to the scholar is in its ambiguity, grounded in the dualism of its thing-
ness and its essential lack of clarity.  The fact that it can never be pulled away from the contingent 
moment of its creation highlights the role it played in bringing physicality and contingency to law, 
and in giving authority to the community.  The circumstances of its abolition and the development of 
a civil claim are similarly illuminating; as law promises to structure and make certain, and family is 
reshaped as a vital tool of governance; constrained and directed.   
>Ăǁ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐŶŽƚůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?dŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚŚŽůĚƐŽƵƚĂŶ
alternative formulation, absorbed in an object made powerful by legal tradition, ancient precedent, 
and within a particular imaginary of the common law.  The deployment of the deodand in an 
individual case could appear unjust, but the deodand represented a form of justice framed through 
 ‘convivial ? local accountability (Morgan 2006) founded in the contingent moment and engaging in a 
productive relationship between law and the material world.  Its replacement promised to correct its 
flaws, but in the futile search for clarity and legitimacy, the law shifted away from the richness and 
possibilities of contingency and materiality while risk, loosened from captivity in the deodand, 






Chapter Three: Combining accountabilities 
Introduction 
The abolition of the deodand was not the end of possibilities of seeking an opened ended justice in 
the inquest.  Bracketing the question of the legitimacy and accountability of the inquest until the 
next chapter, taking a broad approach to the definition of accountability in the inquest, and seeking 
to explore justice through that broad conception of accountability, I turn in this Chapter to engage 
with some of the ways in which the historic, modern and contemporary inquest provided forms of 
accountability.  My focus is on case studiĞƐĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘social welfare inquest ?  W an 
inquest into a death which engages aspects of social welfare law and the responsibilities of the state.  
I open by considering the historic social welfare inquest, and the transition to a modern conception 
of the inquest, and then explore case studies in the contemporary jurisdiction in relation to deaths 
linked to welfare cuts, inquests involving the provision of housing and care homes, and the 
relationship of Serious Case Reviews and inquests into child deaths.  Using these case studies, I argue 
that the inquest can in some cases offer the prospect of a nuanced and tailored accountability in 
response to an unexpected death.  My contention is that while the contemporary inquest cannot 
make findings of civil or criminal liability  W leading to critique of its possibilities for achieving 
accountability  W it can open a space for accountability through revelation, explanation and 
justification.   
My analysis develops academic discussion of a collapsed distinction between democratic, 
bureaucratic and judicial modes of accountability.  Drawing on Morgan (2006), I characterise these 
as technocratic forms of accountability, as opposed to community or  ‘convivial ? forms of 
accountability.  I argue that adaptability of the inquest allied with the recent changes in inquest law 
open a space in which convivial forms of accountability can be achieved in combination with other 
forms of accountability.  However, I also argue that the inquest can be left at risk of being limited 
through capture by expertise and technical forms of knowledge, undermining the prospect of non-
technocratic forms of accountability.   
Accountability and the historic social welfare inquest 
Accountability connotes revealing, explaining and justifying (Scott, 2000, drawing on Normanton)90, 
and is intimately bound up with foundational notions of justice, responsibility, the limitation of 
                                                          
90 There is a huge literature on accountability, including typologies of accountability (Mashaw 2006), and 
reflections on accountability norms and regulation (Harlow & Rawlings 2006; Black 2008; Casey & Scott 2011).  
My focus is not on regulation, but on the possibilities a broad conception of accountability offers for justice, 
and my focus is on the role of accountability in revelation and explanation, with particular attention on the 




power, legitimate authority and democracy.  Some Victorian CoronerƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂŐŝƐƚƌĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉŽŽƌ ? ?^ŝŵ ?tĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŝƚŚƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
vulnerable and marginalised, in cases involving a wide range of circumstances from child welfare to 
treatment of the impoverished.91   
In November 1840, a diabetic inmate at Hendon workhouse died after being confined for 
impertinence in a damp room with only bread and water to sustain him.  In the inquest into his 
death, Reverend Williams, a local magistrate and chairman of the guardians of the workhouse 
defended the incarceration, arguing that the room was more comfortable than 99 cottages out of 
every 100 in Hendon.  The jury disagreed, finding that this inhumane treatment of an infirm man had 
caused his death.  Thomas Wakley  W the radical MP and friend of William Cobbett who had 
advocated abolition of the deodand  W was Coroner in charge of the hearing, and his oversight of the 
inquest left no question over where his sympathies lay; accounts of the inquest describe Wakley 
stating that the guardians of the poorhouse had shown as much impertinence to him during the 
ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĂƐƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚŚĂĚƐŚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?^ŝŵ ?tĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tĂŬůĞǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ǌĞĂůŽƵƐĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐĞƐ ? ?^ŚĂƌƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?was a doctor and medical campaigner and had represented 
at least one bereaved family in an inquest before being elected Coroner for West Middlesex in 1839 
(Hempel 2014).  His investigations could be high profile and deeply controversial, with significant 
public interest in their outcomes.  In July 1846, he oversaw an inquest into the death of Fredrick 
White, a soldier who had received the lash for indiscipline.  He sought a medical opinion from 
Horatio Grosvenor Day, a surgeon, but after examination of the case, Day disputed any causative 
ŵĞĚŝĐĂůůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂůƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞ ?ƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĚĞĂƚŚ ?tĂŬůĞǇĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ
ŚŝƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƐŚĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ? and the jury agreed 
with him.  Their verdict found that the 150 lashes White received caused his death, and furthermore 
ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĨƌŽŵĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŚŽƌƌŽƌ and disgust at the existence of 
ĂŶǇůĂǁ QǁŚŝĐŚƉĞƌŵŝƚƐƚŚĞƌĞǀŽůƚŝŶŐƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĨůŽŐŐŝŶŐƚŽďĞŝŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶƌŝƚŝƐŚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?
(Hopkins 1977, 180).  The case was credited with stopping corporal punishment in the British Army 
(Sprigge, 1897; Thurston, 1969; Hopkins, 1977; Sharp, 2012), and meanwhile Day was subjected to a 
very public backlash for refusing to subject his expĞƌƚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŽtĂŬůĞǇ ?ƐĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?92 
                                                          
91 And there is evidence of earlier inquests expressing concerns with, and making improvements to, social 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐĞĞŝŶƚĞƌĂůŝĂŶŐĞůů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨůů ŽĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ĂCoroner ?ƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶ
ďĞƚƚĞƌůŝǀŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶĞĚYƵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞseventeenth century. 
92 ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞtĂŬůĞǇǁĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĨŝĞƌĐĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨ>ŽƌĚƐĨŽƌ ‘ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
of four [doctors] ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƐƵĐŚĂƐŚĞǁŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?>ŽƌĚZĞĚĞƐĚĂůĞ ?,>Ğď ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ?ǀŽů ? ?ĐŽů
 ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬtŚŝƚĞ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŽĨ




tĂŬůĞǇ ?ƐŚŝŐŚƉƌŽĨŝůĞƐƚŝŶƚĂƐCoroner from 1839 to 1862 was followed by other Coroners similarly 
engaged in pushing a public health agenda, including Edward Hussey, controversial, empathetic and 
fractious Coroner ĨŽƌKǆĨŽƌĚĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?,ƵƐƐĞǇ ?ƐƚĞŶƵƌĞĂƐCoroner was a natural step for a 
doctor who had held himself out as a campaigner for the poor from early on in his career, and as 
Coroner he championed causes relating to deprivation and poverty, including child healthcare, 
infanticide and neglect (Hurren, 2010, 226).  
Coroners like Wakley and Hussey founded the reputation of the Coroner as the magistrate of the 
poor.  The inquests they oversaw, usually in a local pub, ǁĞƌĞ ‘ŚĞůĚďǇƚŚĞĨƌĞĞ-men of the 
neighbourhood before the Coroner and not by him ? (Wellington, 1905, 9, emphasis in original).  One 
contemporary drawing of an inquest which appears to have taken place in the boardroom of 
University College Hospital  ‘ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐtĂŬůĞǇ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞ head of the table, the jury 
ƐĞĂƚĞĚŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂůŽŶŐĞĂĐŚƐŝĚĞ ? ?Richardson 2001, 2152) and it was critical that those jury 
members were entitled to directly question witnesses.  A guide on coronial practice from 1888 
notes: 
After each witness has been examined, the Coroner should inquire whether the jury wish 
any further questions to be put.  This is essential to the administration of justice; the jury 
living in the neighbourhood being, most probably, acquainted with the circumstances better 
than the Coroner. (Melsheimer, 1888, 35) 
Unlike the modern disinterested detached jury, the inquest jurors were framed as active and central 
participants in the hearing.  Furthermore, the jury itself was potentially more diverse than juries in 
other jurisdictions, as the inquest was the only court in which working class men could act as jurors 
(Sim & Ward, 1994).  As Chapter Two argues, in alliance with a campaigning Coroner or in opposition 
to the Coroner ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂůƚŚŽƌƉĞ^ƚƌĞĞƚ ? jury who ruled the death in 1833 
ŽĨĂƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŝŶĐůĂƐŚĞƐǁŝƚŚƉƌŽƚĞƐƚŽƌƐĂ ‘ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞŵĂŶƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ? (Scraton & Chadwick 1987, 
31), the inquest jury could act to resist powerful factions like the railway lobby or the Government 
(although such jury decisions were often overturned on appeal). 
The wider community was not only involved in the historic inquest through acting as jurors, but also, 
in the majority of areas, voted to elect the Coroner.  These elections could be hard fought and 
                                                          
ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ ?ŝƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĨŽƌWŝĞƚǌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ZĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐůŝŬĞtĂŬĞůǇ ?ƐŝĐ ?ǁĞƌĞ
revaluing the reasons for death within a scientific framework of purely physical causality for which moral 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ ?ƋƵŝƚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?     ?&ŽƌtĂŬůĞǇ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞĂŶĚŝŶŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŵŽƌĂů
considerations and physical causality were intimately intertwined; after the verdict, he announced that he had 
made inquiries and White was insane at the time he was punished.  Hopkins notes a report from the Sun that 




expensive affairs, with a potentially broader and more flexible franchise than in Parliamentary 
elections.93  It was this link between the central role of the community and the place of the Coroner 
as expert which produced and defined the modern inquest (Burney, 2000).  It is also this 
combination which enabled the Victorian inquest to potentially provide a bridge between different 
forms of accountability; both as a place which involved different modes of expert technocratic 
accountability within its institutional architecture, and as a place in which community or convivial 
accountability was made possible. 
Dowdle (2006, 4- ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƚŽǁŚŽŵĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐŚĞůĚůĞĚ
to accountability being defined through institutional architecture; from the democratic, to the 
bureaucratic-organisational and judicial-legal.   Some Victorian Coroners demonstrate a combination 
of all of these modes of accountability; an elected local judicial official, embedded in and generating 
a nascent public-health oriented bureaucracy.   
The jury retained a central role, and the wider community was involved through attendance, 
election of the Coroner and engagement in public discussion of the proceedings.  As such, the 
historic ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂĨŽƌƵŵŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐŽŶviviĂů ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇcould be generated 
(Morgan, 2006).  Morgan describes convivial accountability as accountability grounded in social 
identity and implicit or tacit knowledge and focused on the importance of revealing, explaining and 
justifying in ways which are meaningful to those involved in the community.  Such accountability is 
local, immediate and contextual, and the flexibility and ambiguity of the Victorian inquest meant it 
was ideally suited to such forms of accountability.  While it was concerned with investigating death, 
there was little that was fixed, with, for example, few procedural rules and a range of possible 
recipients of accountability; it could be for one, some, or all of; the deceased, their family, the 
community, the Coroner in their own right or as representative of the Sovereign, their electorate or 
a wider public, or some non-identified future possible victim. 
At the same time, the Victorian inquest could be a place with an absence of any form of 
accountability, with many Victorian Coroners subject to fierce criticism and accusations of bias 
towards vested interests.  Scraton & Chadwick (1987, 25-28, drawing on Hall & McLennan) highlight 
the ways in which the historic Coroner ?ƐƌŽůĞƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ ‘ůŽĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶǁĞalth 
ĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚƐŽĨ ? ?ŵŝŶĞƌƐŝŶĂŶĞǆƉůŽƐŝŽŶĂƚ,ĂƐǁĞůůŽůůŝĞƌǇŝŶ
County Durham in 1844 illustrated.  W. P. Roberts, a campaigner for improved mine safety, attended 
                                                          
93 Glasgow 2007, 80-82. In America at a similar time, as European settlers spread west  ‘and the number of 
Coroners grew, there was no accompanying demand that they possess medical or legal credentials.  Political, 
not professional skills were what was demanded of potential CoronerƐ ? ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&ŽƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ 




ƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌĐŽŵŝŶŐƐƵĚĚenly into the room might without much 
difficulty have fallen into the error that the Coroner ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂƚƚŽƌŶĞǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚƐ ?
1844, 70).  From the other side, populist Coroners complained of a lack of adequate powers to 
investigate, with Hussey describing the Coroner ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞǁŚĞƌĞ/ŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞƚĂůŬƐƚŽ
/ŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĞĞŵƐǁŝƐĞ ? ?,ƵƌƌĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
In the face of such criticism, including widespread criticism of bribery and corruption (see inter alia 
Hunnisett 1961, 169; Richardson 2001, 2150; Glasgow 2007, 95-6); and driven by narratives of 
rationalisation and medicalisation, the Victorians engaged their reforming zeal.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this included abolition of the deodand, as well as efforts to standardise fees and powers 
of Coroners; and the holding of inquests in public houses was banned (although continued 
nonetheless for many years; Burney, 2000, 80).  The office of the Coroner was refounded in statute 
in 1887, and a year later, 600 years of history were wiped out as election for county Coroners were 
replaced with local authority appointment.94  In 1926, the role of the jury was further reduced, when 
the requirement to view the body was removed and inquests without a jury were initiated, and by 
2014 99% of inquests were heard by a Coroner sitting without a jury.  Furthermore, the coronial role 
became an expert position, with five years of legal or medical experience required, a development 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞƌĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂǇ ?<ůĞŝŶ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂprivatisation ŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ‘ŝŶ
so far as professionals and experts claim that only their peers can judge their conduct and 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂǇ ?<ůĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
By this time the ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶcriminal investigations was already diminished as Coroners had 
fought (and ultimately lost) a long battle with the police and Justices of the Peace for primary 
responsibility for violent crime, and this role was further reduced in the twentieth century.95  The 
1926 Act obliged Coroners to adjourn an inquest when criminal charges were brought in another 
court, but the inquest still had power to name an individual guilty of homicide and commit them for 
trial.  This power was criticised by the Wright Report (1936, 22-31) and then again by the Broderick 
Report (1971), and was eventually abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1977 following the high profile 
controversial decision by an inquest jury to name Lord Lucan as guilty for the murder of his 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŶĂŶŶǇ.  In relation to civil liability, the Wright Committee recommendation ƚŚĂƚ ‘CoronerƐ ?
ĐŽƵƌƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŝǀŝůůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?tƌŝŐŚƚZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ? ? ?34)
was introduced in the 1953 Rules, which determined that the verdict could not be framed in such a 
way as to appear to determine any question of civil liability.96  The Coroner ?Ɛ(Amendment) Rules 
                                                          
94 In the Coroners Act 1887 and the Local Government Act 1888. 
95 Toulmin Smith, 1852; Havard 1960, 32; Dorries, 2014, 6-7. 




1980 further limited the role of the inquest, removing the power of juries to add  ‘ƌŝĚĞƌƐ ?Žƌ
recommendations to their verdict.  Glasgow, analysing these shifts in the context of endeavours to 
ensure all Coroners were medically qualified, argues that post-1926  ‘the campaign for a more expert 
medicalized inquest gained momentum whilst the campaign for medical Coroners declined ? 
(Glasgow 2007, 228). 
Thus the inquest shifted from a legal forum founded in popular participation, to a more technical 
and professional jurisdiction, with fewer Coroners concentrated in larger districts (from the 1930s 
onwards there was a reduction in the number of coronial districts, from 309 in 1936 down to 128 in 
2003 (Dorries, 2004, 7) and 97 in 201597).  Drawing on Morgan (2006), this development, with a 
greater emphasis on the need for Coroners to act as disinterested and arms-length actors, can be 
seen as part of a shift which undermined the possibility of convivial accountability through the 
inquest.  Morgan argues that forms of revelation, explanation and justification tending towards the 
ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ‘ƚƌŝĂĚŝĐ ?ĨŽƌŵ  W in which an expert and neutral actor provides accountability sitting 
outside a dispute  W seek to mute raw politics and hide discretionary and value-laden decisions.  In 
doing so, they can crowd out community knowledges and meaningful participative explanation. 
However, aspects of the inquest remained resistant to this modernising drive, including crucially, the 
fact that the Coroner remains an office primarily organised on a local rather than national level.  A 
shift to a national service was proposed by Luce (2003, 101) but these proposals were rejected and 
Coroners continue to be local appointments.98  One of my interviewees reflected on this, telling me 
that,  
Parliament in its infinite wisdom, despite the advice of Dame Janet Smith and Tom Luce that 
it should be a national service, has decided no, it remains a local service, and yet we have 
got this fudge that it is a local service but with national leadership from the chief Coroner.  
Well if it is a local service it is going to serve local needs, quite properly in my view, if they 
really wanted to make it a national service and we all did it the same way then wŚǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
you make it a national service?  Instead we have got a mish-mash which is perhaps the worst 
of all worlds. 99 
                                                          
97 See Chief Coroner 2015, para 52 & 66. 
98 Albeit with consent of the Chief Coroner, who has issued guidance on how appointments should be made. 
99 My interviewees reflected a range of opinion on the 2009/2013 structures, with another describing the CJA 
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Critically, as other researchers have found (Scraton & Chadwick 1987; Tait & Carpenter 2013), its 
local foundations remain a central feature of the office of the Coroner, and my interviewees often 
expressed a strong connection to their area, as one told me 
[This] is a lovely jurisdiction because it is very wide-ranging, a real mixture.  QŝƚŝƐƋƵŝƚĞĂ
nice rural area, we get a lot of people coming out on bikes on Sundays. 
Another expressed enthusiasm for the complex urban area they were Coroner for, telling me this 
ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂƌƵƌĂůŽƌƐƵďƵƌďĂŶĂƌĞĂ ?ďƵƚǁĂƐĂƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇĐŽŵƉůĞǆĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ůŽƚƐŽĨĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
custody deaths, complex cases where police cover-ups ĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐ
really is a jurisdiction where I have done the death of a homeless person found on the street 
followed by the death of a member of the aristocracy, it is a place of real extremes, it is a fascinating 
place to work because of the range of cases ? ? This fascination turned to local pride in some cases,  
It may be that some areas of the country are different, but on the whole in my jurisdiction 
anyway, people are not liars. 
For another Coroner, this connection was key to doing their job, 
I get to understand [this area], so when you are a judge, circuit judge, you move around a lot 
of different courts, you are just looking at the defendant and his offending record, with here 
we are looking at why death is occurring in certain parts of [the area], do we need to put 
fencing up on a bridge over the dual carriageway because people keep jumping off it, that 
sort of thing, you get to know the community. 
As well as this local connection, another theme which has been noted by other researchers is the 
emphasis by Coroners on the ancient heritage of the office of the Coroner and the inquest.  One of 
my interviewees saw the strength in a jurisdiction which  
predates the Star Chamber which was the first court in this land, by three hundred years, 
you have got ancient and very real common law powers.  And I think that is a strength of our 
service, even though I like things to move on, I am not hide bound, but it is our difference 
that makes us good. 
Longstanding legal commentator Joshua Rozenberg sums up this sentiment in his foreword to a 
ƚĞǆƚďŽŽŬŽŶŽƌŽŶŝĂůůĂǁ P ‘EŽŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƵƌůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵŚĂƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĞĚƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĨŽƌƐŽ
ůŽŶŐ ? ?ŽƌƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?ǀŝŝ ? ?As Scraton & Chadwick (1987, 22) argue, this emphasis on a static 
institutional account can disguise the dynamic nature of the inquest system and the sometimes 




developed in response to other pressures.  However, this sense of history remains critically 
important as a key way in which the inquest system narrates its legitimacy, an ancient office focused 
on fact finding aided by modern medical knowledge; flexible, pragmatic and local, and now, with 
bereaved family at the centre.  /Ŷ ? ? ? ?ŝŶŚŝƐ ‘ĨŝƌƐƚŵĂũŽƌƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ĂƐŚŝĞĨCoroner, Thornton HHJ 
made this clear:  
 ‘Coroner ? Wthat is a good word, with an ancient and fine heritage.  I am very proud to have 
ƚŚĂƚǁŽƌĚŝŶŵǇƚŝƚůĞ QKŶĞCoroner impressed me ǁŚĞŶŚĞƐĂŝĚ P ‘/ŚĂǀĞĂĚĞĞƉĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?ŶĚƐŽǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ƌŝŐŚƚůǇƐŽ ?/ƚŝƐĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞŽĨŐƌĞĂƚǀĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ
importance.  But I suspect you would be the first to admit that the Coroner system is not 
perfect. (Thornton 2012b, 1, 3)  
His speech went on set out his ten priorities for the following twelve months, and closed with a 
reflection that  
tŚĞŶƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽŶĐĞǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚĚĞĂƚŚǁĂƐ ‘dŚĞĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞŶĚŽĨĂůůƉĂŝŶĂŶĚŽĨĂůůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽ
ƐƵĨĨĞƌƉĂŝŶ ? ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŽƐe left behind.  The bereaved rightly expect justice 
from the Coroner system.  I shall listen closely to them  W and to the organisations for the 
bereaved  W so as to understand better their concerns.  They should be at the heart of the 
process.  (Thornton 2012b, 10) 
This narration of legitimacy from an ancient and fine heritage emphasises continuity whilst dictating 
and describing a break with the past and a shift to a process with family at the heart.  It is this 
reformulation that reinvigorates possibilities of a space for convivial forms of accountability, and for 
convivial and technocratic accountability to be co-constructed in an individual inquest.  For 
participating family members of the deceased, the inquest holds out the possibility that issues will 
be aired, evidence can be gathered and interrogated, witnesses can be tested, and that systemic 
flaws and potential failures by individuals can be publicly exposed.  As one Coroner told me,   
&ĂŵŝůŝĞƐĂƚŽŶĞƉŽŝŶƚĐŽƵůĚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇďĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞŝŐnored now, they are very 
powerful. 
Accountability in the contemporary inquest  ? case studies of the social welfare 
inquest 
For some family members, the opportunity to question witnesses intensively and test detailed 
evidence can provide a form of accountability, as a place of public revelation in which those who 
were engaged in the death must explain and justify themselves.  For others it provides a basis for 




for public campaigns or civil or criminal claims arising out of the facts which resulted in death.  As 
comments in my interviews demonstrated, it is also a place in which the family play a critical role in 
revealing and constructing meaningful explanations.  One officer told me a story about a death in 
which a doctor was not sure about certifying the cause of death,  
You need to speak to the next of kin [and] they said, well that is what his father died of, and 
they thought that it was just a ticking time bomb.  [You need to] reassure the family, then 
seek their opinions with regards to your objectives, and not only are you dealing with their 
loss, but also gathering from them any information that you think would be supportive of 
the Coroners decision, and so their needs are satisfied. 
This was not a case which went to inquest, as the role of the family was key in constructing the 
medical cause of death, but when a case did end up as an inquest, the role of the family was critical 
for this officer,  
(Officer) The family represent moreover more about the person, rather than just the past 
ŵĞĚŝĐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ QƐŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚŝƐŐƵǇŚĂĚǁŽƌŬĞĚĂůůŚŝƐůŝĨĞ ?
up until the age of 75, he was a master builder, he had worked in all sorts of environments, 
ŚĞǁĂƐĂůŽǀĞůǇĐĂƌŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶ QŝƚŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ PŚĞƐƚ
infection. Pneumonia.  Died.   
Unexpected deaths can raise fears of social failure, requiring the construction of counter narratives 
emphasising connectedness (Klinenberg 2001; Kellehear 2009).  As this officer describes, family 
involvement in an inquest holds out the possibility that the inquest can produce an account of a 
person rather than their medical history, creating the possibility of a meaningful, contextual story of 
life and death (Scott Bray 2010), with emphasis on connections and care.  Seale (1995) argues that 
such narratives are key to resisting fears of abandonment and isolation, and are central to strategies 
to contain death in contemporary society.  His argument is in part a response to the Ariesian (1981, 
614) contention that the modern invisible death is a solitary affair, separated from the rest of the 
community and reduced to a medical, institutional event.  Aries argues that where the ideal death 
had been at home, with a community gathered around the death bed, this contemporary 
institutional death takes place away from the public, and is a private family affair.  By contrast, 
medieval dĞĂƚŚ ‘ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂƐŽůŝƚĂƌǇĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞďƵƚhad to be a public phenomenon involving the 
ǁŚŽůĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚwhere community rituals after death had once contained 
the forces of nature, the modern community, ashamed of death, abdicates its responsibility for 
death and mourning.  Others also contest the Ariesian account, identifying community strategies in, 




disengagement with death through attention to graves and churchyards (Rugg 2013a) or 
emphasising the possible agency of elderly individuals who choose to die at home alone (Kellehear 
2009), and from an academic perspective, the inquest can potentially provide a space for unpicking 
the role of family, kin and wider community in these debates.  It can do this because it is not a space 
solely directed at medical expertise and causation (Timmermans 2005) but also seeks to engage in a 
wider construction of meaning, an accountability through meaningful revelation and representation, 
engaging witŚĨĂŵŝůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ƚŝĐŬŝŶŐƚŝŵĞďŽŵďƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĂƉĞƌƐŽŶďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞ
ƉĞƌĨƵŶĐƚŽƌǇ ‘ŚĞƐƚŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?WŶĞƵŵŽŶŝĂ ?ŝĞĚ ? ? 
Furthermore, the inquest can produce a form of accountability through formal or informal standard 
setting and rule compliance, with pressure exerted on the State to act, whether as a result of the 
evidence which emerges, as a result of the conclusion of the court on the cause of death, or in 
response to a recommendation by the Coroner to prevent future deaths.   
In relation to the conclusion of the inquest, the CJA 2009 retains the rule that the inquest cannot 
make, or appear to make, findings of criminal liability in respect of a named individual or of civil 
liability.100  The inquest is required to try to determine the answers to four statutory questions; who 
the person was, and how, where and when they died.101  In cases which engage Article 2 ECHR,  ‘ŚŽǁ ?
must be interpreted more broadly to include the circumstances in which the individual died102 and 
the conclusion should include conclusions on the central issue or issues.  The impact, according to 
Matthews, is that in cases where it is not clear from the outset whether it is possibly a death which 
engages Article 2 ? ‘ĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĞǆƉŽŶĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ QƚŚĞCoroner usually plays safe, 
ĂŶĚĐĂƐƚƐƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŝĚĞƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ? ?DĂƚƚŚĞǁƐ ? ? ? ? ?    ? ? 
The CJA 2009 also gave increased priority to the inquest as a site for producing recommendations to 
avoid risk of future death, and introduced a duty on Coroners to send a Report to Prevent Future 
Death (PFD Report) where, in their opinion, action should be taken to save life in the future.103  The 
                                                          
100 s.10 CJA 2009. 
101 S.5 & 10 CJA 2009, and to also provide the particulars needed for registration of the death. 
102 S. 5(2) CJA 2009.  Where the right to life is engaged, the inquest is the usual way in which the obligation to 
investigate suspected breaches of Article 2 will be discharged, if there is no criminal investigation or public 
inquiry (R (on the application of Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 10 at 20).  Such an inquest 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽŶŵĂũŽƌŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐ ‘ĂŶ
ƵŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞũƵƌǇǀĞƌĚŝĐƚǁŝůůďĞƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŵĞĞƚ QƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨĂŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ
should have the satisfaction of knowing lessons learned may save the lives of others (Middleton, para 18) 
103 Sch.5 CJA 2009.  A recipient of a Report to Prevent Future Death (PFD) has an obligation to respond to it 
within 56 days, explaining what action has been taken or will be taken together with a timetable, or providing 
an explanation why no action will be taken (R.29(3) & (4) Coroners (Investigations) Regulations).  However, if 
the recipient disagrees with the basis for the Coroner ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂCoroner can formally 




role of the report in effecting accountability through setting standards is grounded in the expertise 
of the Coroner in shaping the report,104 and in the effectiveness of publicity of poor practices.105  The 
report is the responsibility of the Coroner, and illustrates the way in which different forms of 
accountability can be enmeshed in one document.  It is founded in a conception of a rationalised 
professionalised bureaucratic-type accountability focused on systems and public good (Dowdle, 
2006, 4) but is also part of a judicial or rule based approach to accountability through setting and 
testing against standards.  Furthermore, while it is not formally part of the conclusion of the inquest, 
it is part of the narrative of revealing and explaining death.  One Coroner emphasised some of these 
different objectives 
(Coroner) I have always had this tendency to write long reports, but always with good 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚǇ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƵŶůĞƐƐǇŽƵƚĞůůĂƐƚŽƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ
why you are making your concerns.   
(Ed) Do you think it elicits a better response? 
(Coroner) In practice I think it does, because it is also unarguable, if you have got some 
vague nonsense, you get vague nonsense back, if you have told the story, it also means that 
the family know when I have taken so much care and time, that (1) the story has been told 
and (2) if the responses are inadequate then the ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĐĂŶƚŚĞŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂŶĚƐĂǇ ‘ǇŽƵ
ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ? 
dŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚĞůůŝŶŐĂŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ‘ǀĂŐƵĞŶŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝƐĐůĞĂƌ ?ĂŶĚĐĂŶŚĂǀĞ
the effect of improved enforcement as the family can act on it.  Reflecting on all these changes, 
another Coroner described that the result would be  ‘ůŽŶŐĞƌŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐ ?ŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ?ŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?
ŵŽƌĞůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŵŽƌĞũƵƌǇŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐ ?106  In this context, I turn to explore accountability in 
the social welfare inquest through four case studies.   
                                                          
104 Rather than engaging with the effectiveness of PFDs in terms of numbers of lives saved, my attention is on 
the PFD as a possible part of combined accountability, but for other work in this area, see Fletcher 2011; 
Sutherland 2014; Mok 2014.  
105 Efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the PFD report mean that now both the report and response must 
be sent to the Chief Coroner, who has stated that there will be a presumption of publication (Chief Coroner 
2013c).  Furthermore, in December 2013 the Chief Coroner produced the first Summary of Reports to Prevent 
Future Deaths. This highlighted a significant increase in reports from 2008 (when the Ministry of Justice began 
collating reports), and states that it is expected that this trend will continue (Chief Coroner 2013b).  He also 
indicated that he is keen to develop his role in this area, and that it is implicit that he should have a role in 
taking some reports and responses further,  recommending action where appropriate, including potential 
legislative changes (Chief Coroner 2013c, para. 54). 
106 Because deaths in mental health units now require a jury to be called, and see discussion at para 27, Chief 




Welfare benefits & the death of Malcolm Burge 
Malcolm Burge, a 66 year old former cemetery caretaker from the City of London, died on 28 June 
2014 in hospital in Bristol  ‘having earlier that day set light to himself and his car in a car park in 
Cheddar Gorge, Somerset ? ?107  His inquest was held in February 2015.  It heard evidence that he had 
been overpaid £800.69 in benefits as a result of an administrative backlog at Newham Council, and 
that the Council had initiated legal proceedings to recover the money.  The Coroner ?ƐZĞƉŽƌƚƚŽ
Prevent Future Death (PFD) finds that  ‘due to a number of factors in particular his age, lack of 
mental awareness, inability to both understand and use the internet and modern telephone 
procedures [sic] communicate his problems to the Council, and as a result took the drastic action 
that brought about his death. ?  The distressing details of his death were reported by Cahal Milmo in 
the Independent newspaper under the headline The appalling death of a man caught up in benefits 
nightmare.  The report notes that Mr Burge,  
had spent all but four years of his life living in the grounds of the City of London cemetery. 
The imposing Victorian graveyard in Manor Park, east London, is one of the largest in Europe 
and his father  W Mervin  W was head groundsman, raising his family in the grey-stone lodge 
ŚŽƵƐĞ Q ?DƌƵƌŐĞ ?ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŐĂƌĚĞŶŝŶŐƚƌĂĚĞ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŵĞƚĞƌǇ
and elsewhere in adjoining Wanstead.  But when his mother died in 1992 and his father 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚWĂƌŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?DƌƵƌŐĞŐĂǀĞƵƉƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŚĞůŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞDĞƌǀŝŶ ?Ɛ
full-time carer, moving to a smaller property in the grounds of the cemetery.  It was to this 
house that his family came last year in the immediate days after the harrowing events in 
Cheddar Gorge. (Milmo 2015) 
dŚĞW&ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘the Court understands that the deceased had never before owed money or 
been in debt ? while Milmo describes it as a  ‘harsh indignity for a man from a proudly working class 
background who, according to his family, had a traditional attitude to debt. ?  The Independent report 
also records his family stating that when they visited his home he had destroyed other documents 
ďƵƚŚĂĚ ‘clearly left out his communications with the councŝů Q/ƚǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇŽĨŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŚŝŵ ?
and quotes his sister telling the inquest  ‘He was a very quiet and proud man. We knew nothing 
about this until after his death ? with his niece adding  ‘His pride kept him away from asking us. We 
would have helped him. ?  The report concludes with a final reflection 
For the man who felt he had to travel far from home to end his life, there was at least a 
return to the place that had provided sanctuary throughout his life. His remains were placed 
                                                          




in the memorial garden of the City of London Cemetery, the place he knew best. (Milmo 
2015) 
The account is affecting, a media obituary created from the evidence at an inquest.  The inquest 
constructs the  ‘sad sad sad story ?108 of the death of Malcolm Burge as a victim of bureaucracy, an 
existence made precarious by digital technology, out of time and place in a world of IPads and the 
internet; according to the Coroner, 
a tragic tale of a man who had lived all of his life in the city of London being caught up in the 
changes to the government benefit system. And while it seems clear to me now that he was 
a man who needed help and was in distress, unfortunately Newham Borough Council were 
unable to give it to him. (Milmo 2015) 
At the hearing, Newham acknowledged failings in their communications with him, and apologised if 
these failings contributed to his death in any way.  Presumably dissatisfied with their response, the 
Coroner sent a PFD Report which set out action to be taken in relation to communication with 
individuals in Mr Burge ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞŵ
assistance, or direct them to  ‘some responsible organisation such ĂƐƚŚĞŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐĚǀŝĐĞƵƌĞĂƵ ? ?
This case can thus be seen to combine the technocratic and the convivial.  The inquest gave space 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂůĐŽůŵƵƌŐĞ ?ĂŵĂŶǁŚŽůŝǀĞĚĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůŝĨĞĂŶĚ
may have been abandoned by the State, but who nevertheless had a loving family who would have 
helped him if they had known of his insecurity.  The public narrative of the media constructed a 
return home, while the PFD seeks to correct administrative systems which could conspire to 
marginalise others, and cause future deaths.  However, as with other inquests into deaths linked to 
cuts in benefits, this case also reveals the limits of the possibilities of accountability through the 
inquest.   
The cuts to welfare benefits instituted by the Government since 2010 have been fiercely contested.  
As well as academic inquiry (See inter alia, Antonakakis & Collins, 2014; Coope et al, 2014) there has 
been a great deal of political and media attention on self-inflicted deaths said to be a result of 
benefits cuts,109 ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĂƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞK ?EĞŝůů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KŶĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚĐůŝŶŝĐĂů
psycholoŐŝƐƚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘tŚĞŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵĂĚĞĐƵƚƐƚŽƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶDĂƌĐŚƚŚŝƐ
                                                          
108 as Milmo described it on his Twitter account in a tweet promoting his report, 12:00 on 7 February 2015, 
https://twitter.com/cahalmilmo/status/563970469607784448.  
109 Including a campaign for the Government to release figures of deaths linked to cuts in welfare, which 





ǇĞĂƌǁĞŶŽƚŝĐĞĚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉĞĂŬŝŶƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐƵŝĐŝĚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞďŽƌŽƵŐŚ ? ?ŽǁďƵƌŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Coroner ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐŚĂǀĞƉƌŽǀĞĚĂƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞĂĨĨĞĐted by benefits cuts to 
raise concerns and provoke media interest.  Some Coroners have ruled that benefits cuts 
contributed to self-inflicted deaths; including the Coroner for South Staffordshire, who ruled that 
dŝŵ^ĂůƚĞƌŚĂĚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ŵĂũŽƌĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ŝŶŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ‘ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
ŐƌĞĂƚůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞĚůĞĂǀŝŶŐŚŝŵĂůŵŽƐƚĚĞƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ? ?dƌĂǇŶŽƌ ? ? ? ?   /Ŷ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
death of Mark Wood in Oxford heard evidence that he had died from malnourishment, and his 
decline and death were due in part to a decision that he was capable of working.  Following the 
ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ŚŝƐƐŝƐƚĞƌǁƌŽƚĞƚŽDĂƌŬ ?ƐDW ?ĂǀŝĚĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?Ă ĚŵĂĚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ P ‘tĞ
worked for years to create a place for him to live safely. But that stopped when his benefits were 
ƐƚŽƉƉĞĚ ?,ĞƚƌŝĞĚƐŽŚĂƌĚƚŽƐƵƌǀŝǀĞ ? ?'ĞŶƚůĞŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
A brief online survey of media reports indicates at least 20 cases reported in the national media 
between 2011 and 2014 which link benefits cuts to self-inflicted deaths.  Furthermore, one linked 
Report to Prevent Future Death has been published in this period.  It states that the assessment by 
ƚŚĞtWƚŚĂƚDŝĐŚĂĞůK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶǁĂƐĨŝƚƚŽǁŽƌŬƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚďƵƚǁĂƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇĨůĂǁĞĚ ?
because it failed to take into account imƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŵĞĚŝĐĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?W&ZĞƉŽƌƚ PK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂƌŝƐŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚƐŽĨDŝĐŚĂĞůK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶĂŶĚDĂůĐŽůŵƵƌŐĞďŽƚŚ
focus on procedural natural justice-style considerations around access and representation, ignoring 
the substantive political questions of welfare cuts.  As such they highlight the potential for official 
narratives which disassociate and decontextualise death (Scraton, 2002, 16).  Razack (2011 & 2015) 
explores this, finding that inquests into the deaths of Aboriginal people in police custody in Canada 
persistently medicalise those deaths and attribute them to alcoholism, with First Nation Canadians 
typically framed as a dying race unable to enter modern life.  Razack argues that this framing creates 
the inevitable consequence that their deaths are thereby disconnected from an ongoing violent 
colonialism.  Similarly, while Coroners have the duty to report where action could be taken to 
prevent circumstances giving rise to death, no Coroner has submitted a report which states that 
future deaths might be avoided by reversing policies designed to reduce the welfare bill.  Drawing 
again on Morgan (2006), the inquest system works to mute raw politics to insulate itself as a 
disinterested actor, but this never quite works as calls for accountability continue in the face of 
continued injustice.  The outcome of the inquest, perhaps a reference in the findings of facts of 
 ‘ŚŽǁ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚŝĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƚŵŽƐƚĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶthat benefits cuts were a contributing factor, 
cannot meet the requirements of convivial accountability, because it is necessarily grounded in an 
individual approach which ignores the wider political decisions central to the death.  Thus, in an 




neutral expert actor, the inquest system can undermine the possibility of effective accountability; 
determining that, ultimately, Malcolm Burge committed suicide.   
However, whilst the requirements of the system focus the investigation on the state of mind of the 
deceased, and a possible conclusion of suicide acts to disconnect the death from wider politics, the 
potential for a contributory finding in some cases, and the potential that the inquest hearing can 
provide a public link between the death and benefits withdrawals can work to reconnect the 
political.  Thus, where the Coroner seeks neutral language, describing the cuts as changes which 
Malcom Burge was caught up in, the Independent report develops this into a wider critique, noting 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘an increasing number of people, ranging from campaigners to CoronerƐ ?ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
increasingly stringent welfare system has at times become inflexible to the needs of the most 
vulnerable ? (Milmo 2015).  Unlike the position of First Nations people in Canada, and perhaps other 
deaths in the UK such as deaths of the homeless (see Carr 2015), the media and social media 
attention given to these inquests demonstrates that the inquest can provide an important space to 
engage with the question of what is a grieveable death (Butler 2006).  Where deaths are not 
referred to the Coroner (as with immigration custody deaths in Australia, see Powell, Weber & 
Pickering 2013) no such possibility even arises, and public discussion is far more limited as a result, 
whereas in the cases linked to benefits withdrawal, the system is perhaps capable of providing a 
focal space for public engagement with accountability and possibilities of a form of justice, even if 
the outcome and attention of some Coroners might be limited and directed solely to technocratic 
forms of accountability.   
Housing & the Lakanal House fire 
On 3 July 2009, a fire started in Flat 65 in Lakanal House, a high rise block of flats in Southwark 
owned by London Borough of Southwark (LB Southwark).  In the resulting blaze, six people died, 
including Catherine Hickman in Flat 79.  Ms Hickman was a private rented tenant of the flat, which 
had been bought from LB Southwark under the Right to Buy (RTB) scheme.  Amongst numerous 
failings identified, the jury found that internal modifications to Flat 79 made more than a minimal 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽDƐ,ŝĐŬŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?dŚĞŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞůĞĂƐĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?
and had been approved, but with a recommendation that they be checked for fire safety by LB 
^ŽƵƚŚǁĂƌŬ ?ƐƵŝůĚŝŶŐĞƐŝŐŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĐŚĞĐŬĚŝĚŶŽƚƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞ ?/ŶƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ P,ŝĐŬŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
As Carr (2011) has argued, the argument that RTB transformed supplicant social tenants to property-
owning responsible citizens is problematic.  Carr demonstrates the limited autonomy of the RTB 
leaseholder and argues for recognition of the vulnerable, conditional and marginal nature of their 




position of a local authority trapped between public law-type responsibilities towards their social 
tenants and private law restrictions on their relationship with long leaseholders, and the impact that 
has on their perception of the place of the RTB leaseholder.   
The PFD report at the close of the Lakanal House inquest, and responses to it, demonstrate these 
themes, and the ways in which the PFD report can operate as a form of technocratic accountability 
which seeks  W and fails  W to neutralise the political, potentially leading to a vacuum of accountability.  
Following the inquest, the Coroner wrote to LB Southwark and the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) under Rule 43 (the predecessor to the PFD Report) setting out a number 
of concerns, including a lack of inspection of modifications within the flats (Lakanal House, Rule 43 
Reports, 2013).  LB Southwark responded to state that the lack of a right of access to RTB flats meant 
they could not check for modifications, with RTB leaseholders framed as a barrier to their public law 
duty to manage the risk of fire in all their properties (LB Southwark, 2013).  They called for a national 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇĂƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌĂƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌŽĨĞŶƚƌǇ ?>' ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚƚŚŝƐ
request (DCLG, 2013), and reaffirms guidance on fire inspections emphasising the autonomy of RTB 
lessees (Local Government Association, 2011).  These responses re-expose the long-standing conflict 
between a Conservative-dominated central government in support of RTB, and a Labour-controlled 
local government opposed to the policy.  The focus of the PFD on the procedural questions of 
guidance and inspection is an endeavour to circumvent politics, but the muting of the political never 
quite succeeds (Morgan, 2006, 257).  The dispute over the essential status of the RTB leaseholder 
remains bound up in values, context and tacit conceptions of community and cannot be reduced to 
objective matters capable of disinterested decision.  Thus a focus on the technical and a lack of 
engagement with these convivial issues leaves a gap, undermining the possibility of achieving 
accountability through either rule setting or through meaningful explanation or justification after the 
inquest. 
Further analysis of the response of LB Southwark demonstrates the way in which the muting of the 
political and reliance on the overtly technocratic conceals the marginalised and vulnerable RTB 
leaseholder, and their potentially even more vulnerable and marginalised tenant.  The Coroner 
recommended that in future, LB Southwark demonstrate the safety features of flats for new 
residents, and consider additional ways of disseminating information, including affixing fire notices 
inside each flat (Lakanal House, Rule 43 Report, 2013).  In response, LB Southwark confirmed they 
would roll out fire training for all new tenants, and existing residents would receive an information 
pack.  In relation to fire safety notices, they did not propose to do this, taking into account increased 
information and signage ŝŶĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůĂƌĞĂƐ ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĚŽƐŽŝŶ ĚǁĞůůŝŶŐƐƐŽůĚ




again constructed as presenting an insurmountable obstruction  W it is not clear why, for example, 
leaseholders could not be offered the option of a fire safety notice for the inside of their flat.  In 
addition, the differential treatment of residents and tenants means that new leaseholders or new 
tenants of leaseholders would not be given training on fire safety, while new public tenants will, 
including training in relation to safe exit routes.  The legal framing of leaseholders as responsible 
autonomous citizens, promoted by DCLG and grudgingly acceded to by LB Southwark, thus leaves 
them and their tenants less protected in the event of a serious fire incident.  This is even clearer 
when RTB leaseholders are compared to other leaseholders in relation to modifications.  While there 
is no right of entry to RTB homes, other types of leaseholder commonly have a right of access to 
check modifications, leaving a RTB leaseholder and all those in a block with them, including other 
RTB leaseholders or their tenants, less well protected from fire. 
As a footnote, drawing again on Carr (2011), the Lakanal House fire also demonstrated the ways in 
which, rather than being enriched by their purchase of a home, RTB leaseholders may be left 
potentially impoverished by it.  In this case it is because of the cost of paying for fire-proofing work.  
An impact of the fire at Lakanal House was widespread reassessments of fire protection in 
communal parts of social housing stock.  In one case in the First Tier Tribunal, it was held that 
despite the fact that a building was scheduled for demolition in the near future, urgent fire 
prevention works were deemed necessary by the freeholder local authority.  As a result, the 
leaseholder was obliged to pay for them (LB Southwark v. Robinson, 23/6/2014, FTTPC Case Ref: 
LON/00BE/LSC/OO10).   
Ultimately, the outcome of the Lakanal House inquest demonstrates that RTB leaseholders fall 
between two stools, left potentially more vulnerable than either social tenants or other 
leaseholders.  However, the process of the inquest also demonstrates the possibilities of narrower 
accountability in the individual cases.  While wider community voices were only heard through 
written submissions  W demonstrating that even in the potentially most expansive and community-
focused of contemporary inquests, examining the very material foundations of the neighbourhood, 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ Wthe scope for a critical outcome and the generation of a meaningful 
and contextual accountability through revelation and explanation was boosted through engagement 
of the families of the deceased and the ũƵƌǇ ?ƐĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽ
extensive media coverage and public discussion of the case.  As such, the one-off high profile 
investigation can be usefully contrasted with inquests into deaths in care homes, which may be no 




Care Homes & the death of Walter Powley 
Care homes are sites which engage with particularly complex forms of security and safety, with 
individuals potentially susceptible to a form of precariousness bound up with frailty and isolation as 
well as an often intricate and opaque structure of provision.  As a result they can be places of 
extreme danger which the inquest is perhaps uniquely able to expose (Mahoney, 1997; Head & Taft, 
2007; McGovern & Cusak, 2014), and with which Coroners appear to be increasingly engaged (with 
encouragement from the courts, see R (Bicknall) v. HM Coroner for Birmingham [2007] EWHC 2547 
(Admin)).  Both inquests and PFD Reports can highlight issues in an area where the victims are 
particularly vulnerable and there are potentially fewer avenues for the bereaved to seek 
accountability; including the difficulties of successfully pursuing justice through a civil claim and 
where concerns have been expressed about other oversight mechanisms, not least the Care Quality 
Commission, which is primarily responsible for inspections of care homes (Health Select Committee, 
2013, 2014). 
Between April 2013 and April 2014, 33 reports were made by Coroners relating to care homes, with 
many of these inquests also ending in a narrative detailed finding of fact.110  Accountability can thus 
be engaged through meaningful explanation in ĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ‘ŚŽǁ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĚŝĞĚ, and 
through a PFD Report, directed both to individual care homes, and at those charged with 
bureaucratic oversight of the system.  Eight of the reports are directed to the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC). Some of these demonstrate concerns about the CQC itself, and as such expose 
the role of the inquest in forms of accountability through bureaucratic-type oversight.   
One example is the disturbing case of Walter Powley.   Mr Powley was an 85 year old who went into 
a care home in Leicester on 4 May 2012 to receive emergency respite care.  On 8 May he was found 
to have fallen out of bed, onto a scalding radiator pipe.  He was taken to hospital, where he died 
from his injuries just over a week later. At the end of the inquest into his death, his family released a 
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ P ‘We had supported and cared for dad daily and kept him safe in his own home for six 
years following a stroke.  The fact that he died from injuries sustained as a result, in our view, of 
inadequate care in a place where he was supposedly safer ƚŚĂŶĂƚŚŽŵĞŝƐŚĞĂƌƚďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ?
(Troughton 2013).  The jury111 concurred, returning a narrative verdict and recording that his death 
was caused by the severe burns from the pipe and was contributed to by a lack of covering of the 
                                                          
110 See inter alia PFD Reports: Barton, 2013; Godfrey, 2014; Grey, 2013; Jones, 2013; Morris, 2013; Newton, 
2013; Rivers, 2014; Robinson, 2014; Waldron, 2014. 





pipework, inadequate risk assessments and failure to keep proper records.112   In addition, the 
Coroner sent a PFD to the CQC and Health and Safety Executive (HSE), noting that despite regular 
and recent inspections, the danger from this pipework was not identified (PFD: Powley, 2013; 
Troughton & Owen 2013). 
In their responses to the Coroner, the CQC and HSE both accepted a degree of responsibility, but 
both suggested the other agency was in a better position to inspect for this particular issue (see Care 
Quality Commission 2013; Health & Safety Executive 2013) ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞY ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
inspectors did not have sufficient knowledge of health and safety law, while the HSE argued that the 
CQC was the lead inspector of care homes and so was best placed to proactively lead inspections.  
The Coroner ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞƌĞǀĞĂůĂĨůĂǁĞĚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶd demonstrate the way the 
inquest and the PFD Report can be powerful tools to shine a light on systemic inadequacies, 
providing evidence-based criticism and combining convivial accountability through effective family 
participation and technocratic accountability through explicit standard setting.  However, they also 
demonstrate the limitations of this accountability in this forum; a liability to reveal, explain and 
justify can easily be lost in expertise, complexity and institutional boundary watching, which a 
Coroner has no official power to follow up or challenge.  
The question of follow up and expertise also highlights a deeper issue around the relationship 
between a one-off inquiry by a structurally independent Coroner in a public forum, as opposed to 
the consolidating, explicitly expert and anonymous Serious Case Review (SCR) into the death of a 
child.  The relationship and potential tensions between these two types of inquiry, ostensibly 
charged with the same objective of preventing future deaths, is my final subject of discussion, and 
illustrates some of the complexities between two systems which engage with technocratic 
formulations of accountability, and the ways in which that interaction can crowd out other 
possibilities for accountability. 
Serious Case Reviews following the death of a child 
 An SCR must be carried out where a child has died and abuse or neglect of a child is known or 
suspected.113  The purpose of an SCR is similar to a PFD,  ‘ƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ
ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?ďƵƚŝƐĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ‘ƚŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞŐŽŽĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ
which lead to sustainable improvements and the prevention of death, serious injury or harm to 
                                                          
112 The case also demonstrates more traditional forms of accountability through criminal prosecution, as in a 
subsequent HSE prosecution, the care home pleaded guilty to breaches of health and safety and was fined 
£100,000, see BBC News 2015. 





ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? ?tŽƌŬŝŶŐdŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ŷ^ZŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ Ăsolely technocratic-oriented form of 
accountability founded in expertise and anonymity and directed towards bureaucratic reform. 
Coroners are required to notify the Local Safeguarding Children Board (the Board) where they 
investigate a death of a child, and must disclose all information gathered as part of that 
investigation.114  However there is no provision providing for disclosure from a Board to a Coroner.  
This absence led to the Worcestershire High Court decision in 2013 involving the death of a looked-
after child.115  The Worcestershire Safeguarding Children Board had undertaken an SCR; collecting 
over 600 pages of evidence, ten Individual Management Reviews, six Information Reports, and 
producing a draft overview report.  The Coroner requested all of this evidence, and, after initially 
resisting, the Board disclosed the draft overview report but refused any further disclosure.  The 
Coroner obtained a witness summons to force disclosure, and the Board applied to the High Court to 
set this summons aside on the basis of Public Interest Immunity. 
Baker J noted that the chief concern of the Board was that the overriding purpose of a SCR might be 
undermined, because candour from contributors would be less likely if their confidentiality was not 
secure.  Baker J held that a Coroner has a  ‘ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǀŝƚĂů ?ƌŽůĞǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐĚĞĂƚŚƐ
of looked-after children, and as such, the public interest in full disclosure to the Coroner firmly 
outweighed any claim for non-disclosure.116  The case was heard in May 2013, and in July 2013 the 
implementation of the CJA 2009 substantially changed the process.  Where previously Coroners had 
to apply to the High Court to order disclosure, they now have the power to order it themselves.  
Post-July 2013, where a Board seeks to make a PII claim, the Coroner may need to consider the 
documents, and can insist on seeing them.117  The presumption must therefore be of much wider 
disclosure of evidence collected in SCRs to the Coroner  W with the Chief Coroner arguing that the 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ‘ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƚƌĞŶĚŝŶ the courts towards greater disclosure, at least, in this case, for the eyes 
of the Coroner ? ?ŚŝĞĨCoroner 2014a, 4).118 In the context of this new disclosure regime, a growing 
                                                          
114 R.24 and 28(4)(b) Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013/1629. 
115 Worcestershire County CounciůĂŶĚtŽƌĐĞƐƚĞƌƐŚŝƌĞ^ĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŝŶŐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŽĂƌĚǀ ?,DCoroner for 
Worcestershire [2013] EWHC 1711 (QB). 
116 At the end of his judgment, Baker J stated that it was relevant that the disputed documents were authored 
reports, based in part on interviews but without any transcripts.  He further indicated doubt that knowledge of 
onward disclosure to the Coroner would inhibit the individual interviewed in any case; leaving the door open 
for more intrusive disclosure by Coroners, but with a potential argument for Boards who wish to resist.   
117 Sch.5(1)(4) and 5(2)(2) CJA 2009 and CPR 31.19(6)(a). 
118 This is a significant development, as the literature indicates little consistent nation-wide practice of 
interaction between the inquest system and safeguarding systems in the past (see inter alia Stanley & 
Manthorpe, 2004; Brandon et al, 2008; Manthorpe & Martineau, 2009). As the Coroner in the Worcestershire 





emphasis on PFD Reports, and the growth of Article 2 inquests, there will be more interaction 
between Coroners and SCRs in the future.119   
Critically, the approach highlights the role of the Coroner considering the evidence separate from 
the public inquest and from onward disclosure to the family.  In an endeavour to resolve a tension 
between candour-through-anonymity and a meaningful role for the Coroner, the approach 
emphasises the non-automatic nature of disclosure to the family.120  Disclosure to the family in these 
cases is framed as presumptively risky, and while the approach of an individual Coroner holds the 
potential for shifting that presumption and considering the contexts of a particular case, a risk-
framing producing an overemphasis on risk threatens the possibility of an effective participative role 
for the bereaved family, which itself threatens the possibility that an inquest can combine effective 
rule-making and a meaningful contextual account of the circumstances.   
Conclusion 
An individual inquest can hold out the possibility of ǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶed accountability, ? 
but can also fail to provide any form of accountability for death, particularly in circumstances where 
uses of direct force by the State are central to the death. 121  It is also a place in which conceptions of 
accountability can come into direct conflict, and a neat demonstration of this might be the direction 
of the Chief Coroner that Coroners should employ moderate, neutral, well-tempered language, 
rather than forcefully expressing themselves to be appalled or disgusted (Chief Coroner, Guidance 
Note 3, 2013).  It would be interesting to know how the apparently (at times) uncivil Thomas Wakley 
would have responded to a direction to prioritise technocratic moderation over perhaps more 
meaningful language, with his self-declared penchant for uttering  ‘ƵŶƉĂůatable truths to ears 
ĂƚƚƵŶĞĚƚŽĐŽƵƌƚĞŽƵƐĨŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?^ŚĂƌƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
However, my focus on the role of the inquest as a place for exploring social welfare law also 
illustrates the ways in which forms of accountability can be shaped and combined, and critically, 
after decades of heavy emphasis on the narrow and expert, the shift towards wider investigations, 
                                                          
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ? ? ?tŽƌĐĞƐƚĞƌƐŚŝƌĞŽƵŶƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůĂŶĚtŽƌĐĞƐƚĞƌƐŚŝƌĞ^ĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŝŶŐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ
Board v. HM Coroner for the County of Worcestershire [2013] EWHC 1711 (QB), 26. 
119 with potentially significant implications for the workload of Coroners (and implications for an inhibition of 
effective accountability due to information overload, Greiling & Spraul, 2010).   
120 Chief Coroner 2014a, perhaps over-emphasising this, as a strong argument could be advanced in a 
Middleton-type inquest that documents created as part of an SCR ought to be disclosed to the family 
members, and a blanket ban on such onward disclosure would be very difficult to justify. 
121 And see the different possibilities highlighted in such cases by MacMahon (2014), contrasted with the 




narrative conclusions, more reports to Prevent Future Deaths and an increased role for the family, 
has reinvigorated these possibilities in an individual inquest.  As one Coroner told me 
Families are a huge pressure group now, who can in fact be very powerful in, for example, 
effecting change following death. I did a report which was discussed in Parliament, and the 
family are very keen to ensure that if changes are brought about they can be.   
The inquest here made possible a form of justice for this family, but it is central to my argument that 
this powerful place of the family is not solely directed toward accountability in the inquest, but is 
also central to constructing the accountability, authority and legitimacy of the inquest, and it is this 









Chapter Four: Accountability, legitimacy, authority and jurisprudence  
Introduction 
As my first two chapters have argued, the inquest has long been a contested, ambiguous and 
contingent space.  Politically, legally and culturally constructed, it is a jurisdiction in which, 
historically, narratives of sovereignty, neighbourhood, revenue, justice and pardon worked alongside 
each other.  Starting with the Victorian reforms to the inquest, the modern jurisdiction developed 
out of a particular productive tension between discourses of public health and those of the liberal 
state (Burney, 2000).  The endeavour was designed to reduce contingency but the increasing 
emphasis on technocratic accountability in the twentieth century eroded the possibilities of more 
convivial approaches to achieving revelation, explanation, and justification.  My argument is that the 
contemporary inquest has seen these possibilities revived, and in this chapter I turn to examine how 
the core of that revival  W the central place of the family  W can be seen to have reshaped the 
legitimacy and authority of the inquest.  
Whilst themes of heritage, a local link and expertise are key to narratives of the legitimacy of the 
inquest, my focus in this chapter is on legitimacy as lawfulness, and the ways in which lawful 
relationships and the authority of the Coroner and the inquest are constructed.  My objective is to 
develop a jurisprudence of the contemporary inquest, which encompasses an account of combined 
accountability, with family at the centre.  It is in two parts: firstly I explore authority in the inquest, 
and drawing on Dorsett & McVeigh and a historical account of the inquest, I argue that any account 
of inquest law must engage with a range of sources of authorisation.  In the second part I turn to 
explore the critical place of the family in the law of the inquest, and the ways in which they are 
engaged in the law of the inquest.  My focus here is on establishing the importance of attention to 
the technical procedural rules which shape the place of the family, and of developing an argument 
that a conception of a participative family is constitutive of contemporary inquest law.   
Rival authorities 
A traditional doctrinal account of authority in the inquest focuses on the wide discretion of the 
Coroner, emphasising the network of legislation, precedent, guidance and best practice which 
constrains and supports the work of the Coroner, who acts to answer the four questions of who the 
person was, and how, where and when they died.122  In 1994, the Master of the Rolls, Thomas 
Bingham declared that  ‘an inquest is a fact-finding inquiry conducted by a Coroner, with or without a 
jury, to establish answers to four important but limited factual questions. ?123 The Coroner is  ‘the 
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public official responsible for the conduct of inquests, whether he is sitting with a jury or without ? 
and it is his duty  
to ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated... He fails in his 
duty if his investigation is superficial, slipshod or perfunctory.  But the responsibility is his.  
He must set the bounds of the inquiry.  He must rule on the procedure to be followed.  His 
decisions, like those of any other judicial officers, must be respected unless and until they 
are varied or overturned.124  
The dual focus is on a narrow but important inquiry, and on the authority of the Coroner to 
determine that inquiry.  The Coroner, unless overturned, speaks the law, arising from an 
investigation which is not superficial, slipshod or perfunctory but which is otherwise theirs to shape.  
The central emphasis is therefore put on the Coroner ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ?ĚĞĐŝĚĞĂŶĚũƵĚŐĞ ? 
There is a huge amount of critical academic reflection on the question of authority, including 
compelling scholarship which focuses on the inherent violence of the exercise of legal authority.125  If 
applied to the inquest, as with a doctrinal account of authority which focuses on the source of 
legitimate power, such framings place the Coroner as ultimate authority within their jurisdiction.  
Despite the power of this critique, such an account risks seeing individuals other than the Coroner as 
lacking any constitutive role in that authority.  Taking the claim of the centrality of the family 
seriously, my attention is instead on the ways in which the authority of the inquest is constructed 
through law.  This approach focuses on the way in which authority is given to law, and the critical 
role of individuals other than the Coroner in shaping that authority.  Importantly for my account, I 
employ a broad conception of law, and as well as the official outcomes of the inquest, I characterise 
the operational, interlocutory and procedural rules which establish the system and the parameters 
of an individual inquest as equally important subjects of legal analysis.  Furthermore, as I explain 
below, and drawing on Dorsett & McVeigh (2012), this broad conception of law includes 
jurisprudential reflections on the representation of this law.  
Authority in the historic inquest 
The role for actors other than the Coroner in establishing the law was perhaps clearer in the historic 
inquest.  When the historical Coroner was informed of a suddenly dead body lying within their126 
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125 See inter alia, Benjamin 1996; Agamben 2005; Mantell 2014.   
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jurisdiction, the first step they had to take was to call together the community to carry out an 
inquest.  De Officio Coronatoris in 1275 provided that the Coroner was  ‘to go to the place [where the 
body was] ... and shall forthwith command four of the next Towns, or five or six to appear before 
him in such a place ? and  ‘when they come thither ? the Coroner is to hold an investigation.127  Fines 
were levied on Coroners who did not call the jury, or on community members who did not attend.  
Earlier statutes ensured that, where an Inquest is held  ‘for the Death of Man... all being twelve years 
of age ought to appear unless they have reasonable cause of absence. ?128 These inquests into the 
death of man were distinguished from other inquiries into robbery and burnings of houses, from 
which 12 year olds could be excused.  Crucially, where a death had occurred, all were obliged to 
attend, and as noted above, when they attended, the inquest was ŚĞůĚďǇƚŚĞũƵƌǇ ‘before the 
Coroner and not by him ?(Wellington, 1905, 9, emphasis in original). 
In one classically liberal formulation, the Coroner was framed as 
an officer at common law, with a thoroughly constitutional and responsible origin and wide 
jurisdiction ... There is no more important thing needed in our day, than to induce the public 
to know that the common law, instead of being a mystery which they cannot understand, is 
the sole guarantee of their liberties; and that every man may understand it, and is bound to 
understand it.  Its entire foundation rests upon the principle ... That freemen are not to have 
so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵďǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚĂƌĞƚŽĂĚũƵĚŐĞŽĨĂůůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ
that concern them for themselves; that every man is to be tried by his peers; that every 
matter, inquiry into which concerns the welfare or safety of freemen, is to be inquired into 
by the freemen themselves, and none other; and that the magistrates whom they shall 
acknowledge as legitimate are those only whom they have themselves, as free men, chosen. 
(Toulmin Smith 1852) 
As with the contemporary doctrinal formulation, this places a strong emphasis on the breadth of the 
Coroner ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ůĂǁĨƵůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚ ?ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐĂƚŚŝŶ
account of a judicial officer exercising the authority of the sovereign within their jurisdiction, and 
instead inserting rival constitutive authorities.  The Coroner ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďǇ
contrasting sources; a knight (or later) landowner responsible for the revenue to the Crown, but also 
an elected magistrate with a  ‘truly popular characteristic ? (Toulmin Smith 1852).  In addition, their 
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legal authority in the inquest was founded upon the wider principle that free men were to adjudge 
the law for themselves, represented by the legal authority of the jury.   
Rather than jumping to doctrinal questions of the source and the legitimacy of potentially competing 
authorities, an alternative approach to analysing the authority of law is advocated in the work of 
Dorsett & McVeigh (2012).  They argue that attention to the ways in which practices of jurisdiction 
represent or authorise the law can provide accounts of the links between authority and law, and 
produce an account which links authority to the institutions of law.  They argue that jurisdiction 
should be considered as a practice of creating legal relations: it is the power to speak the law, and 
calls and binds people to law.  Critically, they call for a focus on who authors the law  W who speaks, 
determines, decides, judges  W and for law to be seen as more than simply rules, but also as the 
representation of the authority of law.129 
Seen from this perspective, while the pre-modern Coroner ?ƐůĞŐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇǁĂƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ
received notification of the slain, the wounded or the suddenly dead, their jurisdiction extended to 
notification of the community and to calling that community to law.  The jurisdiction of the inquest, 
a public hearing which binds the event of death to law  W making the death legal; both public and 
explicable  W was not constituted until the appearance around the body of the neighbours of the 
fallen.  It was this gathering of the community which inaugurated the law of the inquest.   Once 
gathered, their participation together with the Coroner shaped the jurisdiction, linking their legal 
joint authority; and ultimately speaking the law by pronouncing the verdict.  Contested and lost in 
reforms though this theme eventually was, the quote illustrates the powerful narrative of an inquest 
in which free citizens, bound with an obligation to understand the way their liberty is upheld, acted 
in a jurisdiction and through a common law represented as theirs.    
Reading the authority of the law of the historical inquest solely through the role of the Coroner 
cƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƌƵŶƐĨŽƵůŽĨ,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ
overlooking what actually happened in an endeavour to find objective meaning,  ‘independent of the 
aims and awareness of the actors ? (Arendt, 1954, 88).  Instead of a focus on the incomprehensibility 
and inefficiency of the historic inquest, from the deodand to the election of the Coroner, attention 
on the inquest as given authority by the combination of both Coroner and jury can illustrate the 
ways in which the inquest was constructed by their conjoined or differing aims and awarenesses, as 
the example of the differing deployments of the deodand demonstrates.  The modern and the 
contemporary inquest developed through, or in resistance to, these narratives of the roles of the 
                                                          




Coroner and the jury, and I turn next to trace these accounts of authority in the contemporary 
jurisdiction. 
The representation of authority in the contemporary inquest 
A key moment in the creation of the modern inquest was the Coroners Act 1887.130  Prior to this, 
statutes had been declaratory of, supplementary to or restrictive of the coronial jurisdiction 
developed in common law, but the 1887 Act constrained Coroners to investigations into death.131 
The source of modern and contemporary inquest law is therefore founded in the will of Parliament, 
with all the potential complexities and interpretative possibilities which flow from that formulation. 
One Coroner described this to me when I asked who the inquest system was for; 
(Coroner ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŬŶŽǁ ?ŝƚŝƐĂǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƚƌŽƵďůĞǁŝƚŚ
Parliament again and again is it does not state its purpose, both under the old law and the 
ŶĞǁ ?ŶŽǁŚĞƌĞĚŽĞƐWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƐĂǇ ‘ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝƐ Q ? W all it says is  ‘ĂƐĂŶ
inquest you shaůůĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƵƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? Yeah, why? What for? What good does it 
do?  No answers. 
In this gap, in an office committed to uniting ancient tradition, local association and a modernist 
demand for efficiency, expertise and therapeutic responsiveness, the question of the basis of 
legitimate authority in the contemporary inquest remains live.  To seek to examine this, rather than 
focusing on the legal source of their power, I asked my Coroner interviewees who they were 
responsible to,  
(Coroner) ŽǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ/ŚĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌĂƐŬĞĚŵǇƐĞůĨ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ĂŶǇŽŶĞ
who has an interest in the deceased, I suppose is the broad answer. 
(Coroner) Well, on one level, I have a statutory responsibility to do my job properly as 
complying with the statute, I am technically responsible to the Chief Coroner and the Lord 
Chief Justice, and I have got a wider responsibility to the public, to ensure I think that I am 
doing my job properly, and that I can identify circumstances that if remedied could prevent 
future deaths.  And so I think I have got three comparative layers of responsibility.   
                                                          
130 Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) described the 1887 Act as moving the office  ‘into the modern era ? 
see R. v. North Humberside Coroner, ex p Jamieson (CA) QB [1995] 1, 11C.  Also see Melsheimer 1888, 4, and 
/ŵƉĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƚĞĂƐ ‘ďĞŝŶŐǁŚŽůůǇĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĂĨĨŝƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂǁ ? ? 
131 Except Treasure trove, which remained and remains part of the Coroner ?ƐĚŽŵĂŝŶĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ for 
reform (including amendments to the role in unintroduced parts of the CJA 2009), see discussion in Matthews 
2014, 399-417, and see an interesting historical discussion of law and practice in relation to treasure trove and 




(Coroner) I suppose the relatives. 
(Coroner) I see it as a responsibility to society, to do your duty as best you can, as 
independently as you can, so public service I think is important, that is what I really try to do, 
it is an independent judicial position, very much with an emphasis on public service. 
(Coroner) I serve the people of [this area], that is my primary responsibility, I have no 
problem though in saying that I report to the chief Coroner.  A lot of people think that being 
appointed by the local authority and being funded by the local authority, yes it is bizarre, but 
that it is a real problem.  I see myself as a local officer, serving the people of [this area]. 
(Coroner) Well the joker answer is God and the Queen. You are responsible for doing your 
job; I am not answerable to the local authority, I am not answerable to anybody really other 
than the duty to do my job well and if I am not doing it well I can be judicially reviewed, so I 
am an independent judicial officer with all that that implies. 
From the pragmatic unreflective to the technical legal, and from an emphasis on judicial 
independence to an office embedded in intensely local foundations, these reflections demonstrate 
the range of ways in which authority is constructed from the perspective of the Coroner.  They are 
important in two ways; firstly because they illustrate the thinness of a narrow, purely doctrinal 
account of legal authority focused on statute.  Secondly, they are a group of reflections on questions 
of jurisdiction; questions of who belongs to the law of the inquest and who that law is properly 
addressed to: from relatives, to those with an interest in the deceased, from the local population to 
a wider public, and ultimately  W the joker answer  W to God and the Queen.  They are about 
geographical and legal boundaries and the hierarchy in which the inquest exists, and they are bound 
up with questions of the representation of the law of the inquest.  Critically, while there is 
engagement with questions of illegality  W of the oversight of judicial review and the proper 
relationship with the local authority  W they are also focused on lawful relations, described by Dorsett 
& McVeigh as  ‘a positive engagement with the offices, roles, and obligations and rights shaped by 
jurisdiction ? (Dorsett & McVeigh, 2012, 55).   
This focus on the creation of lawful relations further calls into question an account of the Coroner as 
solely responsible for the creation of lawful relations  W as sole author of the law.  The Coroner ?ƐƌŽůĞ
is central, but as the range of their reflections shows, their jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the 
inquest, is malleable and open to hermeneutic concoction.  The flexibility of these foundations mean 
the inquest is perhaps uniquely responsive to the actors and factors which shape, grant or deny 




focused on the creation and sustaining of lawful relations, the critical question is therefore not: what 
is the source of the legal authority of the Coroner?  It is rather: how are different devices and 
knowledges combined to shape and represent a jurisdiction which has the authority of law? 
ŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?ƐŬĞǇƚŽŽůĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůŝĨĞŽĨůĂǁƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨůĂǁ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐŽĨ
jurisdiction, which they argue shape lawful relations.  Technologies of jurisdiction are the devices or 
organisational structures which are ordered towards the production or embodiment of a jurisdiction.  
Those devices or strategies have a role in giving form to the way in which persons, places and events 
are bound to law and the representation of lawful relations.  To identify these technologies requires 
us to focus our attention on material practices, on the craft of law.132   
Crucially, this is an attention to what is often perceived as the procedural and the technical; to 
questions of who or what is within or outside the law, what devices give them authority in the law 
and how they are bound by law.  They are questions of legal doctrine, of statutory construction and 
of legal technique, what Riles has described as the technical aesthetics of law (Riles, 2005, 976).  In 
both the historic and contemporary inquest, there are two critical means by which the inquest 
jurisdiction is produced, by which people are bound to its law, and by which lawful relations are 
represented in the inquest: notification and enabling participation. 
As argued above, the historic inquest was a place of law because of the gathering of the community, 
and it was notification and their participation which bound them to law and gave their 
pronouncements the representation of law.  Their role, questioning witnesses, giving evidence, 
establishing a verdict or declaring a deodand, confronted, responded to and shaped the law of the 
inquest and the legal authority of the Coroner.  As such, their participation highlights the need to 
focus not on the ultimate power to decide, but on the way that that power is formed in a specific 
case and the way that those specific cases are part of an ongoing systemic creation of a legal 
jurisdiction.  As Chapter Three illustrates, this community role gradually diminished in the modern 
inquest, and as I now turn to argue, drawing further on an analysis from the jurisprudence of 
jurisdiction, it is the notification and participation of the family which makes the contemporary 
inquest a place of law. 
                                                          




Family at the centre 
dŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŵŽǀĞĨƌŽŵ
peripheral to central.  In one example, in an interview on the Today programme on 25 July 2013, the 
Chief Coroner declared that the purpose of the procedures being introduced was to put the family at 
the heart of the inquest. 133  Ten months earlier, the then newly appointed Chief Coroner gave a 
speech in which he set out the two core functions of the inquest system: the  ‘need to know ? and 
 ‘preventing future deaths ? ? In relation to the former, in the quote which I abridged in my 
introduction, he stated 
First, the public, especially the bereaved, family and friends, need to know what happened, 
how the deceased came by his death. That applies particularly to deaths in custody or at the 
hands of an agent of the state, where there is a wider duty to protect citizens from the 
wayward or mistaken actions of the state and to expose wrongdoing and bad practice. But it 
applies equally to all deaths where there is a real element of uncertainty. The public need to 
know. They have a right to know. It is natural justice, public justice and justice to be done in 
public, openly and transparently, for all to see, particularly the family. The family has now 
become, quite rightly, the focus for this public process, to give them answers, where that is 
possible. They are at the heart of the process as the Charter for Coroner Services134 makes 
clear. (Thornton 2012a) 
The account, when combined with the new procedural rights for the family, is one of enabling the 
possibility of convivial accountability.  The focus is on meaningful revelation, with an emphasis on 
the importance of participation and connection through community.  In contrast, the second core 
function focuses on an amorphous wider society who will be protected from risk through an 
emphasis on expert, rule-setting technocratic means.  It is thus a philosophy of law for the inquest 
jurisdiction which sees the inquest as a space for combining the convivial and the technocratic, and 
the place of the family in that construction is central.  
The shift of family from edge to centre of the legal process was gradual, and some discussion of the 
piecemeal changes to the law are important because they reveal and contextualise the dramatically 
new place of the family and the foundations of the technologies which bind the family to the law of 
the contemporary inquest.   
                                                          
133 In an interview relating to the introduction of the 2013 Rules and Regulations. 
134 The Charter (part of the Guide to Coroners and inquests and Charter for Coroner services 2012) has now 




The 1887 Act includes only one mention of the relatives of the deceased, in s.18(6), in which it is 
provided that a Coroner holding an inquest can authorise a body for burial prior to the verdict, and if 
he does so he should deliver the burial order to  ‘the relative or other person to whom the same is 
required by the Registration Acts to be delivered. ?135  Otherwise statute law was silent as to their 
involvement in the investigation into death, but that was in the context of very few procedural rules 
about the way inquests should be managed.  In the Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926, provision was 
put in place to make rules for the running of inquests, but a decade later, the failure to put such 
rules in place was decried by the Wright Committee, which described Coroners labouring under the 
 ‘disadvantage of having no general ruůĞƐŽĨƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?tƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? The Wright report did note 
that in practice it was common for family to be permitted to be represented, but it was at the 
discretion of the Coroner (Wright 1936, 55).   
Rules were eventually made in 1953136 which allowed relatives who notified the Coroner to be 
represented at the post-mortem.137  In addition, the 1953 Rules provided that an otherwise 
undefined  ‘properly interested person ? should be entitled to be informed of the hour, date and place 
of the inquest hearing, and to put  ‘relevant ? and  ‘proper ? questions to witnesses at that hearing.138  
Effectively declaratory of the pre-existing guidance on Coronial practice139 the proactive family was 
permitted procedural entry, but their involvement was limited and circumscribed. 
In 1980, new Rules were published.140 Their explanatory notes describe them as amending the 1953 
Rules, and note that for Rule 5 defines persons who have a right to examine witnesses at the 
inquest.  The content of Rule 5 was repeated in the 1984 Rules, 141 which, according to their 
Explanatory Notes, were also chiefly consolidating, and their principal amendment of substance was 
the creation of a power to draw up an interim death certificate.  However, the impact of Rule 5 of 
the 1980 Rules and its translation into the 1984 Rules was to define who was entitled to be involved 
                                                          
135 Interestingly, for deceased members of both Church of England and non-Church of England, orders to bury 
could be delivered to relatives or persons responsible for the funeral, but for non-Church of England funerals 
only, an order to bury could also be delivered to a friend: compare Burials Act 1874 s.17 and Burials Act 1880 
s.11. 
136 The Coroners Rules 1953 SI 1953/205. 
1371953 Rules, R.4. Such representation had to be by a legally qualified medical practitioner, and the Coroner 
must notify them of the post-mortem. The rules did not include any right for relatives to request a second 
post-mortem, but it was subsequently held that the Coroner ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽŚŽůĚĂƉŽƐƚ-mortem is not exclusive, 
and they cannot refuse a reasonable request for a second post-mortem from an interested party (discussed 
further below).  See R v Greater London Coroner, ex parte Ridley [1986] 1 All ER 37. 
138 1953 Rules, R.16. 
139 As noted above, see Melsheimer 1888, 35. 
140 Coroners (Amendment) Rules 1980, SI 1980/557. 




for the first time.142  The Coroner retained a general discretion to include any other properly 
interested person, but after 1 July 1984, for the first time, some family members had an automatic 
right to participate in the inquest hearing, although automatic and discretionary participants alike 
often continued to be described as properly interested persons.  Furthermore, they were entitled to 
see documentary evidence used in the inquest, during and after the hearing (but not in advance)143 
and they should be notified if criminal charges were preferred in relation to the death. 144  In 2005 
the category of automatic entrants was expanded to include civil partners and partners145 while in 
the CJA 2009 this right shifted from secondary into primary legislation and the categories of family 
members were further expanded.146  
It is this expanded category of family which is represented as at the heart of the contemporary 
inquest jurisdiction as a legal space focused on combining convivial and technocratic forms of 
accountability.  Crucially, the family can be seen to be brought to law and bound to law by two 
specific technologies of jurisdiction: notification and the enabling of their participation.  These 
technologies, despite their clear differences to the organising techniques of the historic inquest, 
have clear parallels with those devices which constructed the place of the community in the pre-
modern inquest.  The analogy with the place of the historic community is instructive, and I explore 
the ways in which they are similar or might be distinguished below.  Furthermore, as my analysis 
below shows, these technologies were founded in the procedural requirements before the 
2009/2013 reformulation, but they also represent a radical departure from the previous place of the 
family. 
                                                          
142 providing that a properly interested person would include a parent, child, spouse and any personal 
representative of the deceased; as well as any beneficiary under a policy of insurance issued on the life of the 
deceased, 1984 Rules, R.20. 
143 1984 Rules, R.37 & 57 respectively. 
144 1984 Rules, R.33.  The rights in relation to notification of the post-mortem remained identical in the 1984 
Rules, and in both Rules, relatives could request a different pathologist if the proposed pathologist worked in 
the hospital in which the deceased died.  The 1984 Rules supplemented these rights with notification rights 
where material from the body was preserved, or where special examinations for toxicological or other 
purposes were to be undertaken. This right to be notified included the requirement that the relatives be told 
what material was being preserved or tested, the period for preservation, and options for disposal after expiry 
of period of preservation.  1984 Rules, R.9 & 12. 
145 persons of the same or opposite sex who lived together in an enduring family relationship, see Coroners 
(Amendment) Rules 2005 SI 2005/420 
146 to include brothers, sisters, grandparents, grandchildren, children of a brother or sister, stepfathers and 
stepmother, and half-brothers or half-sisters, see s.47 CJA 2009.  Also the definition of partner was amended 
so that instead of an enduring family relationship, a partner was someone in an  ‘enduring relationship ? - 




Binding the family to inquest law I: notification  
Under the 1953 and 1984 Rules, relatives were not automatically notified of a post-mortem; they 
were informed that it would be going ahead only if they notified the Coroner that they wished to 
attend or be represented at the autopsy.  Writing before the 2009/2013 changes, Thomas et al 
(2008, 127) state that despite there being no statutory duty to notify, there were  ‘an increasing 
array of reasons why this should be done ? citing 2002 Home Office policy, Article 8 ECHR, and case-
law which  ‘has noted it is good practice to seek the views of the family prior to the post-mortem. ?147  
The material practices of notification vary, from acting directly, through other family members or 
other agents of the State, including telephone calls and attendance in person, to written physical or 
electronic communications.  Problems with communication have been a common cause of concerns 
and complaints raised by family members, including discrepancies in information and methods of 
notification.148   
/ŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂƌƌĂǇŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ǁĂƐƐƵƉĞƌƐĞĚĞĚďǇĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
2013 Regulations that the Coroner  ‘must attempt to identify the ĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƐŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
representative and inform that person, if identified, of the Coroner ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞŐŝŶĂŶ
investigation ?149 and further notification requirements then arise.150  Notification primarily linked to 
disposal and management of the body, provided upon request, therefore became all-encompassing; 
linked to the initiation and inauguration of the inquest jurisdiction. 
As with the requirement to call the community together to inspect the body, the requirement of 
notification is thus a technology of jurisdiction.  Notification of the family is a device which is 
directed to the creation of the inquest as a place for establishing the law, and the involvement of the 
family is a critical part of that establishment.  It is unlawful not to notify them; it is notification which 
calls the family to inquest law, and then notification represents the lawful part they are expected to 
play.  Unlike the historic community, law does not act to overtly compel the acceptance of this place, 
but enables their engagement or structures itself around their acquiescence.  As I explore in later 
                                                          
147 See Thomas et al 2008, 127 citing the case of Kasperowicz v. HM Coroner for Plymouth [2005] EWCA Civ 44, 
15. 
148 See inter alia Beckett 1999; Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2013, para 4.1 and 4.1.7. 
149 R.6, Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1629, and see further discussion of the practice of 
notification in Chapter 5. 
150 Where an investigation requires a post-mortem, the Coroner must inform the next of kin or personal 
representative of the decision to hold a post-mortem, R.13, 2013 Regulations.  Further notification 
requirements arise where material is preserved or retained (R.14) or a decision to discontinue is taken 
following the post-mortem; and reasons for that decision have to be given (R.17).  The body must be released 
as soon as reasonably practical, and if more than 28 days has passed, the Coroner must notify the next of kin 
or personal representative of the reason for the delay (R.20).  Additional notification requirements in relation 




chapters, the impact of their absence, from a system which holds them central and seeks to meet 
their need to know, is therefore more problematic and raises more existential questions about the 
inquest than the absence of a historic community, who could be directly disciplined if they did not 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽůĂǁ ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ? 
In relation to the body, this early notification of the family represents a shift in the representation of 
the family from residual recipients of the remains of their member, to active informed agents in the 
management of the body and the construction of an explanation for the death.151  It also reflects the 
fundamental shift in the representation of the role of the Coroner  W the Coroner is not just a 
custodian of the remains of an individual for a specific time and for a specific purpose, but together 
with their responsibility for the physical body, the Coroner must take custody of the relationship of 
the family to the body.  This goes beyond granting a family member rights if they initiate contact 
with the inquest by permitting them to attend the post-mortem or carry out their own post-
mortem.152 Instead it is a proactive and structured role in which the defining characteristic is 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇĂŶĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
with both the body153 and the inquest.  Notification becomes the first step in shaping lawful relations 
in the inquest, demonstrating the lawful place of the family.  It is the first step towards drawing tacit 
knowledge into the jurisdiction and seeking to constitute the inquest as a place of meaningful 
participatory revelation.   
Binding the family to inquest law II: enabling participation 
Once notified, the family take their place as privileged participants.  The 2009/2013 changes give all 
interested persons, including family members, the right to disclosure on request and associated 
rights.  However, the rhetoric of family at the heart, and the representation of the inquest system 
this rhetoric engenders, does more than simply give family the right to be involved.  Critically, as the 
shift in notification illustrates, the inquest is a jurisdiction in which the place of family is not simply 
permitted, but is enabled and encouraged.  A further illustration of this is found in the way in which 
ƚŚĞůĂǁŚĂƐƌĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? 
                                                          
151 This move can be considered in relation to debates about dignity in the context of political and legal 
debates over ownership and control of bodies and body parts arising out of numerous high profile instances of 
retention of body parts and I return to consider this in Chapter Six.   
152 R v Greater London Coroner, ex parte Ridley [1986] 1 All ER 37. 
153 See Human Tissue Act 1961 s.2 and Human Tissue Act 2004 s.1  W once body released, permission of 
relatives needed before a further post-mortem is allowed.  Also see Bristol Coroner ex p Kerr [1974] 2 All ER 




The historical development in statute law in relation to the family ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ is 
outlined above; from a role outwith statute or caselaw, based in practice, over which the Coroner 
has absolute discretion to allow participation, to an automatic right to participate founded in 
primary legislation. 154  The impression is one of a slow and incremental development of rights, but, 
drawing on Riles (2005), attention to the legal reasoning in relation to the right to ask questions 
illustrates the depth of the radical rupture in the place of the family as participants in the 
contemporary inquest.  Furthermore, this rupture illustrates a fundamentally different form for the 
inquest.   
The historic position is described in the 1888 edition of Jervis, the leading authority on inquest law 
and practice,155 in which it is stated that 
It is the duty of the Coroner to examine the witnesses himself, but he has a discretion, in 
cases where he thinks that it will be of any assistance, to allow questions to be put by, or on 
behalf of, persons interested. And after each witness has been examined, the Coroner 
should inquire whether the jury wish any further questions to be put.  (Melsheimer 1888, 
35) 
As noted in Chapter Three, this involvement of the jury was framed as a crucial part of the process, 
while the place of the family is at the discretion of the Coroner.  The purpose of permitting such 
questions is where the questions will assist  W the family is framed as potentially capable of helping 
the inquest achieve its goals, but their role in questioning witnesses is not an essential constitutive 
part of that process.   
Where the discretion of the Coroner to admit (some) family members ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ was removed 
through the 1953 and 1984 procedural changes, the same logic for their role in asking questions 
remained central.  This is clear in the leading case on the exercise of discretion by a Coroner when 
                                                          
154 In addition to this automatic right to participate, a raft of notification ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞ
as participants. New notification rights are set out in the 2013 Rules where an inquest is to be resumed (for 
example, after a criminal trial), (R.10), or is to be transferred to another Coroner (R.18).  As well as 
longstanding requirements to notify of the date and the right to examine witnesses, the new rights also 
include a right to advance disclosure, and to consider views re witness screening and videolink.  Notably, the 
Coroner is not required to notify family where a report is made to prevent future deaths; instead reports and 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŝŶƚŚĞCoroner ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞŝƚ ?
(R28, 29).   
155 Melsheimer 1888.  An indication of the esteem in which the analysis by the authors of Jervis is held is 
shown in the fact that the battered, binding-less copy of this 5th edition of Jervis held by the British Library is 




deciding who ought to be a Properly Interested Party, that of Driscoll.156  The High Court reviewed 
the refusal of a Coroner to permit the participation of two sisters in the inquest ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌďƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
death.  Under the CJA 2009 they would automatically be granted the right to participate, but in 1994 
their application fell to be considered under the test of a  ‘person who, in the opinion of the Coroner, 
is a properly interested person. ? The High Court held that there could be circumstances in which a 
Coroner could conclude that even a close relative (outside the automatic categories) was not 
properly interested.157  In the key section of the judgment, Kennedy J held: 
What must be shown is that the person has a genuine desire to participate more than by the 
mere giving of relevant evidence in the determination of how, when and where the 
deceased came by his death. He or she may well have a view he wants to put to the 
witnesses, but there is no harm in that.  Properly controlled it should assist the inquisitorial 
function.158 
The role of individuals, even where their relationship is very close to the deceased, is focused on 
assisting in the inquisitorial function.  The boundaries for that inquisitorial function are determined 
by the Coroner, and so from the perspective of the law, the focus of the family remains on assisting 
the Coroner.  There is no caselaw dealing with the reason for permitting automatic entrants to ask 
questions, but the logic and reasoning remains the same from the historic inquest.  That 
involvement may be of value, but they pose a risk to proceedings if they are not properly controlled 
and directed to the purpose of the enquiry.  Their view of the case does not cause harm as long as it 
assists with the investigation, and they must be corralled so that irrelevant or illegitimate questions 
are organised out of the process.  This is part of a narrative in inquest law in which the family  ‘not 
infrequently strain to pursue their quarry well beyond the bounds set by the Coroner. ?159 The 
Coroner sets the boundaries in the quest to seek answers to the questions required by statute, and 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŽƐĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŬĞĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞ
effective investigation.   
Instead of an opening concern with risk, the contemporary inquest jurisdiction re-establishes the 
place of the family ?Ɛ right to ask questions as part of their necessary effective participation, founded 
                                                          
156 R v. HM Coroner for the Southern District of Greater London, ex parte Driscoll (1993) (1995) 159 JP 45: 1994 
COD 91: Independent, November 22, 1993.   
157 A conclusion which now seems difficult to sustain, following Platts v. HM Coroner for South Yorkshire 
[2008] EWHC 2502, see discussion in Chapter 7.  
158 Driscoll, (1995) 159 JP 45, at p 56B  W G. 




in the construction of the lawful place of the family.  In jurisprudential terms, the critical technology 
of jurisdiction is directed at enabling their participation, as it is this enabled effective participation 
which shapes the character of the law of the contemporary inquest.   
This development can be first seen in Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to Article 2 ECHR, but 
deploying a key piece of judicial historicisation,160 Lord Bingham pulled pre-Human Rights Act 
inquests into line with that jurisprudence in the key case of Amin.161 In the application by Imtiaz 
Amin, uncle of Zahid Mubarak, a young man killed by his racist cellmate, Lord Bingham stated it was 
 ‘very unfortunate that there was no inquest, since a properly conducted inquest can discharge the 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝǀĞŽďůŝŐĂtion [under Article 2 ECHR], as established by McCann v. UK. ?162   In his 
discussion in relation to the duty of the state to investigate deaths in custody, Lord Bingham found 
that  
effect has been given to that duty for centuries by requiring such deaths to be publicly 
investigated before an independent judicial tribunal with an opportunity for relatives of the 
deceased to participate. The purposes of such an investigation are clear: to ensure so far as 
possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is 
exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if 
unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those 
who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons 
learned from his death may save the lives of others.163 
ůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌŬĞǇĐĂƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ?Ɛ ?>ŽƌĚŝŶŐŚĂŵ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶAmin 
established a sometimes uneasy relationship between the requirements of Article 2 ECHR and the 
inquest system, and his characterisation of the inquest as providing space for family participation 
was a critical legal manoeuvre permitting the joining of the two jurisdictions.  In the same case, he 
went on to what family participation might look like.  He discussed investigations by the Prison 
Service and the Commission for Racial Equality, and dismissed them as insufficient because, in part,  
                                                          
160 His move, inventing a traditional place for the family in inquest law, is perhaps akin to the invented 
traditions of Hobsbawm (1983) as a practice of a symbolic nature which establishes a continuity with the past, 
ĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ ‘ŶŽǀĞůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽŽůĚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
161 R (on the application of Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51, [2003] 4 All 
ER 1264. 
162 Amin, 33. 




the family were not able to play any effective part in [the] investigation[s] and would not 
have been able to do so even if they had taken advantage of the limited opportunity they 
were offered.164 
The crucial emphasis is on the effectiveness of their participation.  A later case reflects further on the 
question of effectiveness, holding, in relation to public funding for representation at an inquest that  
the [Article 2] duty on the state is fulfilled by the Coroner's effective investigation.  But, for 
the investigation to be effective, the family must be able to play an effective part. So, the 
[question] is whether [representation] is necessary to enable the family to play an effective 
part. In other words, the decision must focus on the effective participation of the family and 
not on the needs of the Coroner.165 
The focus is on the question of the substance of their involvement.  An effective investigation by a 
Coroner can only take place if the family are effectively involved.  This does not only apply to the 
investigation, but to the hearing itself, and by paying close attention to the form of the technical 
argument, the place of the family in that hearing is revealed.  The needs of the Coroner are 
dismissed, as is the formal right to be involved, and the central issue is the question of the needs of 
the family, not whether they can assist the inquisitorial function.  As a later excerpt from the same 
case shows, it is not a question of their understanding, and is not about being able to have their 
concerns raised and dealt with, but is specifically about the substance of their right to speak: 
the [guidance states] that the starting point for consideration of whether funded 
representation will be necessary is that in the majority of cases the family will be able to 
participate effectively without the need for advocacy services.  It is said that the ability to 
attend and understand the proceedings together with an opportunity to raise any particular 
matter of concern with the Coroner will be sufficient. ... [this] seems to overlook the right of 
ĂĐůŽƐĞĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞŵďĞƌ QƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? Of course some family members will be 
able to exercise that right competently, although I think it will often be difficult for them to 
do so.  But to suggest that in general it will be enough for them to be able to tell the Coroner 
of their concerns seems to me to contemplate that they can properly be deprived of their 
right to question witnesses.166 
                                                          
164 Amin, 37. 
165 R (Humberstone) v. Legal Services Commission [2010] EWCA Civ 1479, 79, and see McIntosh 2012 for 
discussion of the case and the purposes of an Article 2 inquest. 




The right to ask questions, characterised as centuries-old by Lord Bingham, and enshrined in 
legislation since 1953, is reimagined.  The shift is a critical one.  From, at best, a helpful adjunct to 
the Coroner ?ƐƚĂƐŬ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƐŝƚŽƌŝĂůĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ
questions signals a jurisdiction endeavouring to combine accountabilities.   
This right  W arising in all inquest cases, not solely in Article 2 hearings167  W would be substantially 
ĚĞŶŝĞĚŝĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞǁĂƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Coroner what questions they might have.  The implication is that the content of the questions they 
might ask does not characterise their role, and neither does the substance of their concerns,168 but 
instead it is the form of their right to ask questions which is key.  In this productive interplay 
between form and substance the family shifts from an assistant in an exercise in expert discernment 
to a collaborator in meaningful authentication.  The familiar legal move in Humberstone between 
form and substance might be framed as instrumental in pursuit of substantive objectives (Kennedy 
1976, 1776), but the reappearance here of a changed form of the family in this procedural rule 
reveals the deeper changed form of the inquest.  As the effectively participating family becomes 
analogous to the effective investigation, the family becomes an analogy of the community in the 
historic inquest; called to law at its inauguration; enabling and constituting that inauguration; 
unexcludable from the inquiry;169 vitally empowered in the construction of the narrative of the 
inquest; bringing the texture of tacit knowledges and connections to the deceased into the space of 
the law of the inquest.   
Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to take the possibility of a revival of convivial forms of accountability seriously, 
and to explore how concepts of law relate to the possibility of a combination of convivial and 
technocratic forms of accountability, through a focus on jurisdiction.  In so doing, I seek to explore 
the way in which an endeavour on the part of the contemporary law of the inquest to combine 
                                                          
167 And notably not all Article 2 cases (ie, non-inquests) require the ability to ask questions, see for example R. 
(on the application of Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 2941 (Admin). 
168 These are secondary issues  W as irrelevant questions remain capable of exclusion by the Coroner, 2013 
Rules, R.19(2). 
169 Unlike the public who can be excluded, see 2003 Rules R.11(4) & (5), and see also R. (SSHD) v Assistant 
Deputy Coroner for Inner West London [2010] EWHC 3098 (Admin) and the way in which the European Court 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐŝŶ:ŽƌĚĂŶǀ ?h< P ‘ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĂƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in 
theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the next-
of-kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her 
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?Jordan v. United Kingdom (2001, App.no. 24746/94) [2003] 37 E.H.R.R. 2, para 109, 




accountabilities constructs a place for the family, and seek to draw possibilities of justice from that 
place and from my account of the role of combined accountability in the law. 
My account of law focuses on the systemic, the procedural and the technical questions of law, as 
well as the way in which the jurisdiction is represented.  The law of the inquest is thus not just an 
official account of death and is not just the form of the procedures which govern the conduct of the 
space.  It is also a question of the textures of lawful relations in the gathering of the inquest, created 
and revealed through practices of jurisdiction.  It is an account of a jurisprudence formed by the 
joining of accountabilities, but it is also bound up with an ongoing concern with risk, ever present in 
the possibility of a breakdown in the potentially fragile relationship between structures and 
formulations which enable different modes of revelation, explanation and justification.   The 
engagement with family is an endeavour to control risk, to join the contingent and contextual to the 
legal order to produce a process and an official account which encompasses and manages risk.  In 
doing so it carries within it the risk that the endeavour will fail, that an absence of participative 
family will leave the inquest reliant on a legal order which is narrowly authorised by technocratic 
conceptions of accountability alone.  It is in these relations that the family emerges in the 
contemporary inquest, and through these means that the claim of centrality can be understood and 
joined to an account of law.   
Critically, this account is one in which the law is represented as enabling family to co-construct; in 
which the inquisitorial function and the law and procedure of the inquest is shaped by the effective, 
notified, encouraged family, and in which the authority of the law flows from that representation of 
jurisdiction.  Unlike Tait & Carpenter (2014) for whom therapeutic approaches to family are a new 
and distinct theme from older themes of medicine and law, this account places family as the heir of 
community and as central to the law of the inquest.  However, unlike the historic community, the 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƐƉĞĂŬƚŚĞůĂǁŝƐŶŽƚĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĂǀĞƌĚŝĐƚ ?ŽƌŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶ
the form of a deodand.  Where the law of the historic inquest was inaugurated by the gathering of 
the community, in the contemporary inquest there are more blurred lines between the legal 
authority of the Coroner and the inquest, making the inauguration of the law of the contemporary 
inquest a more complex, piecemeal, and crafted process.  It is a process in which the family must be 
called and they must be at the centre.170  As such, the family is perhaps more critical to the 
representation of the law of the contemporary inquest than the community was in the historic 
inquest.  Where the historic inquest saw the community gathered metaphorically, if not actually, 
                                                          
170 It is this constitutive role where my account perhaps differs from those engaged in exploring a therapeutic 




around the body of the deceased, the contemporary inquest gathers metaphorically around the 
family.171  The critical question for the contemporary inquest  W a question which I seek to address in 
my next chapters  W is therefore how that gathering is framed: as facilitative, as comforting, or as 
captivity.    
                                                          
171 Perhaps a legal fiction, but if so, drawing on Pottage (2014, 156, discussing Thomas (1995)), perhaps a 




Chapter Five: first contact, the next of kin and framing 
Introduction 
Family appear in the statutory framework which has reconstructed the inquest through two devices: 
the next of kin, and the interested person.  This chapter takes the first of these, and examines the 
ways in which the system initially engages with the family and next of kin.  The aim is twofold.  The 
chapter first sets out an account of the initial contact and early engagement between the officer and 
the family, and then moves to the initial contact between the Coroner and the family, but I also use 
this account to set out my argument for a naturalistic analysis of the inquest as a system.  This 
approach includes consideration of the role of law as well as typification and routinisation, serial 
decision-making, and materiality.  My contention is that first contact is a key part of an account of 
the family and the inquest, but is often treated as peripheral from a legal perspective.  When it does 
arise in analysis of the inquest, it is generally in the context of criticism of the way in which the 
family are told of the death and the details of the investigation, through a lens of lessons to learn.172  
While these are important issues, I seek instead to reflect on the constitutive implications of this first 
engagement for the inquest and inquest law.   
Decision-making in the inquest system 
There are two key references to family in the legislation governing the conduct of Coroners and the 
inquest  W next of kin and the list of interested persons in s.47 CJA 2009 (together with caselaw 
governing when Coroners should exercise discretion to include others173).  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
there has been an incremental development in who falls into the category of interested person but 
the opening obligation to involve the family ŶŽǁĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ ‘ŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ? ?ĂƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶZƵůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
2013 Regulations which states: 
A Coroner who is under a duty to investigate a death under section 1, must attempt to 
identify the deceased's next of kin or personal representative and inform that person, if 
identified, of the Coroner's decision to begin an investigation. 
 ‘EĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Đƚ and first appeared in the 2013 Regulations.  As the most 
recent edition of Jervis on Coroners notes,  ‘dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ?ŚĂƐŶŽĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
meaning in English law and it is surprising that it is not defined for the purposes of the Coroner 
legislation ? (Matthews 2014, 169).  The documents accompanying the legislation do not assist in 
defining the phrase, as the only relevant reference in the Explanatory Memorandum for the 2013 
                                                          
172 Luce 2003, 142-152; Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2013, para 4.1 & 4.1.7. Also see reflections in 
Beckett 1999, 273; Davis 2002, 27. 




Regulations is an undefined reference to putting  ‘the needs of bereaved people at the heart of the 
Coroner system. ?  Matthews further notes that  
the phrase next of kin is used to denote a person or persons who should be informed of 
various stages or events in the invĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?Ɛ
personal representative.  Closeness to the deceased, ability to receive and act on 
information and smallness of number are more important for these purposes than, say, the 
rules of inheritance or the principle of representation, which work better for the (passive) 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƐŚĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƐĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŶĚŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŽƌĐŝǀŝůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌship is 
closer even than blood. (Matthews 2014, 170)   
This final assertion is based on the order of individuals in s.47, but, perhaps surprisingly, does not 
indicate whether Matthews considers that non-married partners are to be considered in priority to 
blood relatives (as they are in the ordering set out in s.47(2)(a) CJA 2009).  In contrast, an officer I 
interviewed was clear on how to decide this point, as they had guidance, 
(Ed) / ?ŵŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ Wwhere does it come from?  If you have someone who has 
a brother and a sister, how do you decide which one is next of kin? 
(Officer) We have got a list. 
 ?Ě ?zŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂůŝƐƚ ? 
(Officer) On my wall, the priority of who would be first. 
(Ed) Could I have a photocopy of that by any chance?   





After the interview, the officer gave me a copy of the list from somewhere on the wall.  It had come 
from a training course the officer had been on and I reproduce it below:   
 
I found the lack of reference for its baldly asserted hierarchy fascinating.  As such, it generates its 
own authority; a source-free statement of law to which no lawyer would automatically accede but 
which represents law, structuring the approach of those administering the law.  Its location is also 
important; putting it up on the wall further reinforced it as authoritative statement; a tool for quick 
reference which summarises the norms to be applied in case of dispute.  But it had also disappeared 
on the wall somewhere, and instead of being a rigid hierarchy, had become a flexible guide; 
(Officer) But you would tend to phone whichever one on the list.  You would just pick and 
sort of get an idea, you know, obviously  ‘/ ?ǀĞŐŽƚǇŽƵƌĚĞƚĂŝůƐĂŶĚǇŽƵƌƐŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
one of you is it best to contact? ?  ŶĚƵƐƵĂůůǇƚŚĞǇƐĂǇŝƚ ?ƐďĞƐƚƚŽƐƉĞĂŬƚŽŵĞŽƌĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĐĂn 
you contact my sister that would be better and they usually sort it between themselves.  
Again if they both wanted to be contacted then we would contact both of them but majority 
of time they would, usually they are all together anyway and talking to one of them so just 
go through me, so yeah, it is usually not a problem. 
The first contact, with whoever was on the list, is therefore key to creating the place of the family.  
Ɛ ‘ƚhey usually sort it out between themselves ?, it is a first engagement which indicates the 
potential flexibility of approach and a concern with pragmatism and practicality, with the possibility 
that next of kin is not a single point of contact but is a shared responsibility.  I explored the same 





(Coroner) Well, that is a very good question.  Technically of course, we have got s.47 of the 
CJA 2009, which spells out the identifiable, what we might describe colloquially as, next of 
kin.  But my normal sources of information are either going to be the hospital if it is a 
hospital death to identify primary members of the family, or if the police are involved then 
police to identify members of the family.  It will be impossible to contact each and every 
family member, we normally would go to, obviously the spouse if there is a surviving spouse, 
mother and father, a brother or sister if they were taking an interest, but there can be family 
and I have dealt with them before where there are loosely competing interests between for 
example the brothers and sisters. I had a case where a sibling was in complete logger heads 
with another sibling, and applied for an injunction to stop me releasing the body to his 
sister.  TŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂƚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƚŚroats, so we try and be as inclusive as possible, can I say 
ŚĂŶĚŽŶŚĞĂƌƚƚŚĂƚǁĞƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞǀĞƌǇƚŝŵĞ ?EŽ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ?ǁĞƚƌǇĂŶĚĚŽŽƵƌĂďƐŽůƵƚĞďĞƐƚƚŽ
make sure that we know. 
As these answers demonstrate, the question of who is next of kin is perceived to be a technical legal 
question capable of being conclusively identified (as Atkinson found with the meaning of suicide  
Atkinson 1978, 90), but treated practically as a question which is open to negotiation and 
determination by the people within the category of family.   In addition, the answers demonstrate 
other features of the relationship between the legal form and the decision-makers in the system, 
including the important role actors outside the inquest system play in decisions about who to notify.   
As Matthews (2014, 170) suggests, the emphasis is on closeness of link to the deceased as well as 
the ability to receive and act on information, but also importantly, to disseminate that information.  
The answers illustrate that for many of my interviewees, the emphasis from this very first 
engagement is on informing the entire family, not simply notifying a single next of kin.  As such, part 
of the role and responsibility of a next of kin is to engage the wider family, and they play a critical 
role in defining who that wider family is.   
This emphasis on notification and engagement with the family beyond a single next of kin, and if 
necessary, notifying and engaging with more than one family member, is limited by considerations 
of practicality.  This includes taking into account available resources, highlighting the importance of 
material considerations in decision-making, including methods of making and maintaining contact.  
As one Coroner said 
sometimes families, you can send them material, written material, and you can tell a 





writing long letters. 
It was also noticeable that there was very little reference in my interviews to personal 
representatives.  As Matthews (2014, 170) notes, there is no provision enabling individuals to 
nominate another individual to be their next of kin for the purposes of an inquest.  The only way in 
which an individual could lawfully nominate another to act on their behalf would be by appointing 
them as executor in their will174 but a personal representative and next of kin are not the same, and 
there was no references in my interviews to personal representatives.  The clear implication is that 
the wishes of the deceased are not central to the decision,175 and that the next of kin is perceived to 
have priority over any personal representatives.176  Finally, as subsequent examples show, there was 
a clear preference for making decisions about who was next of kin informally wherever possible, and 
only resorting to formal declarations where it was perceived to be necessary. 
Critically, these insights from my interviews, together with reflections from my historical and 
jurisprudential work demonstrated the limitations of a positive approach which ignores the 
interpretative work which goes on in these processes (as argued by Tait & Carpenter 2014).  It is also 
critical to my approach to avoid an overemphasis on the determination of a discrete case by a 
rational individual  W an approach which can act to disconnect decisions from their contexts.  My 
contention is that an account of the engagement of the family which only engages with the explicit 
ĨŝŶĂů ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶof the Coroner (if there is one) is incapable of providing an account which 
engages with the subtlety and nuance of the interactions which combine to create a place for the 
family in the inquest.  The way in which family is involved includes decisions through deployment of 
law, but they are also often made in a context in which the explicit rules are not definitive and are in 
any event only a part of the process of deciding (Gilboy, 1991).  Such an approach also ignores the 
central role of the officer.  Drawing on insights from Hawkins (2002), I turn in the next sections to set 
out systemic features which are key to the construction of a place for family, drawing on the initial 
contact and engagement between the family and the officer.  Much of this discussion draws on the 
ways in which my interviewees responded to the four vignettes I set out in the introduction  W the 
                                                          
174 Compare, in this regard, the different treatment of family and non-family personal representatives before  
the European Court of Human Rights; contrast Scherer v. Switzerland, Application no. no. 17116/90 and 
Thevenon v. France, Application no. 2476/02 with Malhous, Dec. Application no. 33071/96. 
175 A reflection which can be compared to reflections on testimonial autonomy, see Monk (2011 & 2014), 
Douglas (2014), Hacker (2014), Leslie (2014). 
176 Further reinforced by references in interviews to the fact that even if estranged/out of contact, family 




non-adopted daughter and the missing wife (Vignette 1), the girlfriend (Vignette 2), the mother, 
biological father and the new partner (Vignette 3) and the long lost sister (Vignette 4).  
Routinisation and typification 
Vignette 1 provided particularly revealing answers in relation to the role of law in approaches to the 
next of kin, with some references to the law noting that the missing wife was still legally next of kin.  
However, all interviewees answered that the non-adopted daughter would be likely to be involved in 
a significant way, even possibly, through negotiation, taking precedence over the wife: 
(Coroner) I think the daughter would be entitled to disclosure and probably would be 
entitled to the body but the wife has precedence and I would expect reasonable steps to be 
taken to try and chase down the wife. What happens on the ground really is that there is 
then a conversation between the wife and the daughter, they say I have never seen him, I 
am quite happy for you to take the body.  That is what really happens on the ground in this 
sort of situation, they speak to each other and people are very civilised, usually.   
This illustrates a common theme across all interviews that the non-adopted daughter would be 
accepted as next of kin despite the lack of formal relationship.  The answers re-emphasised the 
potentially critical place of the first contact in acceptance and precedence of kin; 
(Coroner) Well, the daughter at the moment is the only person who you have got, so she 
automatically becomes an interested person at the outset, by virtue of her being brought up 
as a daughter, other people may well emerge, and we will clearly be looking for them, and 
they may also be interested persons.  
The non-adopted daughter is thus automatically rendered an interested person and next of kin and 
ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞ ‘ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ?ĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐĞĞŬŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?  Alternatively, her role may not be stated to be 
automatic, but  
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?zŽƵǁŽƵůĚƚƌĞĂƚŚĞƌĂƐŚŝƐĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚǇŽƵ ?ƐŚĞŝƐŚŝƐĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ƐŚĞŵŝŐŚƚ
not be adopted by him, but she is still to all intents and purposes his daughter, you would 
treat her as his next of kin.  
The length of time is important,  
 (OfĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐŚĞ ?ƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƐŚĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝŵĨŽƌ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐƐŚĞ ?ƐŶŽƚĂǁĂƌĞŽĨĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ, we 
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚƐŚĞ ?ƐŶŽƚůǇŝŶŐƚŽƵƐ ?
And in relation to their investigation 




(Officer) If she was able to give them, I would just like to know, I mean, legally speaking his 
wife is still the next of kin, and I mean, I guess there would be some sort of duty down the 
line somewhere for her to be informed that he had died, and we would ask the police to do 
ƚŚĂƚŽŶŽƵƌďĞŚĂůĨ ?ďƵƚŝĨƚŚĞĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŬĞƐŽŵĞŝŶƋƵŝƌǇǁŝƚŚ
the police to see if they can find this individual, but I think we would tend to stick more with 
the daughter to be totally frank.  
In these responses, it is clear that what is at stake is not an application of the technical legal 
principles, but rather an amalgam of those principles with other considerations, and an insistence on 
considering the context in which the relationship arose.  Crucially, central emphasis was placed on a 
long standing assumption of the role of daughter, and the instrumental use of that relationship in 
ƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĨŝĐƚŝǀĞŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ů,Ăũ ? ? ? ? :ĂĐŽď ? ? ? ? ?.  As with the test for interested 
person status (discussed in Chapter 7), the question is one of the whole of the relationship and it 
was relevant that the relationship mirrors a familial relationship.177  
The importance of context was illustrated in another exchange I had with an officer in relation to the 
biological father in Vignette 3.  The opening information given by the mother in the scene set in the 
vignette was key to the way in which officers and Coroners would engage with him, but importantly 
ŝŶƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƚŚĞďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂů interactions with the officer would also govern the way 
in which he was enabled to engage in the inquest.  I asked if the officer would take steps to seek the 
father, and the officer stated no, but if he turned up 
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?tĞ ?ĚŚĂǀĞƚŽ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ǁĞŝŐŚup the pros and cons, because, but you know, we 
would cross that bridge when we come to it.   
(Ed) So weighing up the pros and cons, what sort of things would you be wanting to find out 
or wanting to know in that? 
(Officer) What if he came to us?  He would have to come to us, we would not go to him, 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇǁĞĂƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚŚŝŵƚŽůĚ ?ǁĞůů/ŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚŝƐĂ
matter for her, nothing to do with us, but he is going to find out that his daughter has died, 
unless he is in AntarctŝĐĂŽƌƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŝƚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŚĞ
is going to read it, and he may well then make approaches to us, for information, and that is 
when we would then have to consider his ex-partner.  When I talk about weighing up the 
                                                          
177 See Z ?ǀ ?ŽƌŽŶĞƌŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ,ŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚĞǆƉĂƌƚĞAl Fayed (2001) 58 B.M.L.R. 205; [2000] Inquest L.R. 50 
and Platts v. HM Coroner for South Yorkshire [2008] EWHC 2502, but noting that these are cases relating to 




ƉƌŽƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐ ?ǇŽƵũƵƐƚĐĂŶ ?ƚƐŝƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŐŽǁĞůů, / ?ĚůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĂƚĂŶĚ/ ?ĚůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚŝƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
every case has its different merits and different difficulties, so you have to look at it in 
isolation at the time, I think in the long run you would talk to them, you would certainly start 
off by talking to the chap, and then you would be taking things on from there but for me to 
ƐĂǇŶŽǁǁŚĂƚ/ǁŽƵůĚĚŽ ?/ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐǇŽƵƐĂŝĚƚŽŵĞ ?ǁĞůů ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐ
what he is like, what are you going to do now? 
This lengthy answer illustrates the emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness to the facts as 
presented to the inquest, but also demonstrates the way in which the actors can be framed as 
essentially reactive, responding to the presentation of events and information, and critically here, to 
the way in which the absent father presents himself.   
ĐŽƌĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨŵĂŶǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĨĂŵŝůǇŝŶŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚ
providing information to the inquest, and the special place of the family is constructed in the way in 
which the family are given responsibility for individualising the deceased; fashioning context and 
history, providing feedback on the process and setting out concerns.  As such, the family have a 
responsibility for reintroducing contingency in the investigation, and possibly providing a 
counterweight to processes of typification. 
In his work on decision-making, Hawkins argues a critical aspect of examination of holistic decision-
making is the need to pay attention to the role of typification, or the way in which routine decisions 
are made the same way (Hawkins 2002, 35-38).  Typification is a means by which individual decision-
makers can act more swiftly, ordering their work and sorting the routine from the complex.  This 
categorisation of routine decisions, relying on experience, can provide a defence against criticism 
and justify a particular course of action.  In this context, it is important that my interviewees all 
reflected on the importance of experience, with both Coroners and officers placing importance on 
the place of experience in being able to do the job properly.  In one example, ĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌ
illustrated the importance of experience and made clear that the very first engagement with family 
was key to the way in which they were framed, with, in this answer, a concern with families seeking 
to establish blame for the death; 
(Officer) From first point of contact you can usually get an idea of what kind of family you 
are dealing with, you can get quite a good idea.  The more and more you do it the more and 
more you get it. 
(Ed) Ok, so that is experience? 





family, including gathering information from them, and engaging them in the investigation.  
Experience enables the actors to reach decisions more quickly, and in their view, enables them to 
ďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?Žƌ to eliminate the risks which arise from a family 
expressing illegitimate concerns. In one example, I asked an officer whether they would act 
differently if they thought a family was seeking to place blame on someone else in an inquest  
(Officer) Yes probably to be perfectly honest.  There are certaŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚ “ƋƵŽƚĞ ?
you [made quote marks in the air], well you told me this and it might not even be in the right 
context, but yes, we are aware that people can take things you say and twist them a little bit 
to get, to get, what I am I trying to say, to get an advantage over you but yes, some families 
you would be aware of what you were telling them, obviously you would tell them what 
ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽďƵƚǇŽƵǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǆƉĂŶĚŽŶƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽ ? 
In this account, the risk posed by a family challenging the officer leads to an engagement of the 
family focused on providing the minimum required, rather than enabling them to play a more 
expansive role. 
Processes of typification can also mask aspects of a situation, as decisions are made that assume 
particular features of a case, drawing on information from referrals (Emerson 1991).  An example of 
this in the Coronial context can be found in the ethnographic study of the inquest system by 
Atkinson in the 1970s, and his observation that deaths on the road were not generally investigated 
as possible suicides (Atkinson 1978, 118).   
However, it is also important to explore how their own awareness of the impact of routinisation can 
affect decision-makers.  In the inquest context this awareness is reflected in the two discourses 
already discussed: the emphasis on the need to get and give information to the family to 
individualise the deceased and distinguish them from the routine, and the repeated emphasis on 
responsiveness to the particular facts of the case.  A doctor might say who the next of kin is, but 
could then say, 
(Officer) You might want to speak to the daughter rather than the wife.  Especially with very 
elderly people, a lot of the time it is not necessarily appropriate to speak to the wife, it may 
be better doing it with the children but it is all dependent on the situation, ascertain the 





(Officer) Sometimes if you get a next of kin, like if I have an elderly gentleman, really 
ĐŽŶĨƵƐĞĚ ?ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐƐŽǁĞƚŚĞŶǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ
someone else there or have you got a relative that we might be able to contact?  Then you 
would go through that person as well, obviously keep that person aware of what we are 
doing but just so that we are 100% sure that that next of kin knows exactly what the process 
is because you sort of get the idea that he may not be sure of what is happening so yeah, we 
would then take it to find someone else to give the information to as well. 
This important role of the family is amplified by another consequence of typification; the way in 
which it can produce administrative precedent, whereby organisational and administrative rules can 
take on the same force as legal rules (Hawkins 2002, 36).  As the priority list provided to me 
illustrates, administrative rules of unclear provenance can take on the force of legal rules, but even 
as they appear to be binding rules, the actors may not act as if they are bound by them, and instead 
seek to solve problems as they arise (Hawkins 2002, 40).  In this context, hard line rules can create 
particular difficulties and apparent injustices; 
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐŝƐ ?ŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ Q ? ?
odd years, not married and there are children, things like that.  Sometimes, depending on 
how the relationship went down with the family, that can be a bit of bother.  Obviously 
there are certain things  W common law marriage and cohabiting and other things like that  W 
but it is difficult if you have got someone who has been with someone for say ten years and 
ƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌŵĂƌƌŝĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŐŽƚĂĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƐŚĞ ?ƐůŝŬĞ ‘ŶŽ/ ?ŵŶĞǆƚŽĨ
kin ? but you are not married and it can be hard because obviously ƐŚĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĚĂǇŝŶĚĂǇŽƵƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇũƵƐƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĐŚŽŽƐĞƚŽŐĞƚŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐĂŶďĞŚĂƌĚ ? 
Hawkins observes that attention has to be paid to the way in which general rules are translated into 
decisions made on the periphery; such rules may be regarded unfairly binding or open to broad 
variation, as examples above have shown.  He argues that this does not mean rules are irrelevant, 
but that is important to explore, given such variety, how rules are engaged with at the periphery; 
perhaps through translation into simpler concepts (with the simplified list of next of kin), and 
perhaps through an engagement with rules as formal justifications for actions.  In the inquest, such 
engagements can be seen to be particularly varied because of the enthusiasm for competing 
approaches to conceptions of the centre and the periphery of the system; the centre could be 
variously, the High Court, the Chief Coroner or the local Senior Coroner, whilst the periphery moves 




In contrast to this variability, a positivist analysis focusing solely on statutory rules as basis for 
decisions would suggest that once next of kin was notified and those family members who expressed 
an interest were enabled to participate, the duties of the Coroner and officers would be fulfilled, 
with any other relationships exercised as a matter of individual discretion.  However, the systemic 
emphasis on family involvement generates additional requirements; including the exploration of 
whether the next of kin is able to contact other family members, and for some of my interviewees, 
direct notification of family members other than the next of kin as an apparent responsibility.  In 
these circumstances the jurisdictional tool of notification goes beyond a technical legal rule, and 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨůĂǁ ?ŝƚŝƐďŝŶĚŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƚŚĞ
character and authority of inquest law that someone is found to be notified, and that every family 
member who might be interested is engaged with the investigation, as far as is possible.   
Sequential decision-making 
This requirement to notify widely, and the ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞquote above highlights 
another crucial feature of the way in which decisions about next of kin are made; the role of 
sequential decision-making processes, and the importance of decision-makers outside the inquest 
system.  It was emphasised by many interviewees that the ultimate decision in relation to next of kin 
status was not a decision for the inquest system; that if family members disagreed about whether 
they were next of kin, they would need to go to court to get a decision.178  It was also emphasised 
that decisions taken within the inquest system would often rely on decisions taken by actors before 
the inquest system was engaged, and the role of the decision-makers in the inquest was 
consequently circumscribed.  For example, in relation to the missing wife in Vignette 1, officers 
suggested they could make some investigations themselves (with some noting that they could check 
marriage registers or use a company to investigate), and Coroners stated they would expect inquiries 
to be made, but most of my interviewees emphasised that,  
(Coroner) There is a limit, officers are not expected to go to unreal lengths to trace family 
and everyone else, so if she says to you there is a husband, it is not for the officers to go 
ƌŽƵŶĚƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚŝĞƐ ?ƚĞůĞphone directories or whatever.  
                                                          
178 Whilst there is no caselaw directly on this point, this assumption does not appear to be correct.  In the 
event of dispute, the courts have jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to determine how to dispose of a 
body (see Conway 2003) but the question of who is next of kin for the purposes of the inquest is not 






At this point in this interview, an officer came in, and the Coroner took the opportunity to ask what 
steps they would take.  The officer stated that they would ask the police, who would check CRIMINT, 
the police intelligence database. 
(Coroner) So the police do it, and if that comes up negative, we are not going to go running.  
WĞƐĂǇƚŽƚŚĞĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌǁĞůů ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚŚŝŵ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŵĂǇďĞĨŽƌǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ
statements something will come up, or very often when someone has died people come out 
of the woodwork.  
As this (and similar references to  ‘the woodwork ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ? illustrates, family can emerge 
as part of the inquest process, and it was clear that the interviewees were used to responding to 
ongoing situations where individuals sought to be involved as the investigation developed.  This 
quote also illustrates a common theme of the role of trust and expertise in systems of decision-
making.  As the fortunately timed interruption by the officer shows, my Coroner interviewees 
expected their officers to have expertise and to act on initiative, with perhaps some assistance or 
guidance: 
(Ed) You would just say to your officers I think you should try and find them and your officers 
would? 
(Coroner) Well that is their department, I mean we might brainstorm it together  W can either 
of us think of any other avenue we can explore. 
A positivistic analysis of decision-making presupposes that a final decision-maker is provided with 
factors and has a range of possible decisions, whilst a systemic approach seeks to explore how 
earliĞƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĐĂŶƐŚĂƉĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŽƌĂǀŽŝĚĂĨŝŶĂů ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞĞĂƌůŝĞƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƌĂŶŐĞ
from a formal explicit decision to implicit informal and unevidenced or hidden decisions and might 
mean that effective power to decide might thus be consciously or unconsciously exercised by 
individuals not granted the formal power to decide (Lukes 1974). 
Importantly, the Coroner and their officers operate in a system in which the police and other 
agencies have some responsibilities for the efficient conduct of the investigation; 
(Officer) As far as we are concerned, it is down to the police to track down next of kin, they 
ĚŽŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁŚĞŶ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƌĞĂůŝƐĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůŚĞĂƌ
through the grapevine locally that something has happĞŶĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ
things sort of unravel a bit or become clearer but initially we have the one point of contact 




&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ďŝŐ ? Wi.e. newsworthy  W cases in regulatory authorities (Hawkins 2002, 35), 
 ‘ďŝŐ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞƐĞƌŝĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽďĞƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇ
decisions taken in external investigations by, for example, the police or investigatory/regulatory 
bodies like the Independent Police Complaints Commission179 as with the long-lost sister in Vignette 
4; 
(Officer) In a case like this, she would probably come to us via the police.  PĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ
necessarily think to contact the officer first, if someone has died in police custody, they 
would ring the police first and then they would speak to the investigating officer who would 
get the details and often we would then get a call saying this woman has rung up she is the 
sister and give us the telephone number and we will contact them.  WĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƐŽƌƚŽĨƚĂke 
everybody on trust, but it generally pans out that they could make an inquiry and people 
ǁŚŽĂƌĞŶ ?ƚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ? 
The long standing relationship between the police and the inquest system has been the subject of a 
great deal of academic discussion and criticism,180 but they are only one in a range of actors who can 
make important decisions which affect the inquest as another officer emphasised; 
(Officer) a death in the community, in hospital, or an expected death we may have GP or 
hospital doctors contact us and we may be able to get the next of kin details from them as 
well, and a lot of time they might advise us who the best person is to talk to and who they 
would prefer to be our point of contact.181 
Furthermore, it is not only State agents, but the actors also regularly have to trust the family, as 
excerpts from four separate interviews illustrate; 
(Officer) unfortunately we have to trust what the police provide us as next of kin or Doctors 
or GPs, and just speaking with the people that you have got details for and trusting what 
they are saying to you. 
(Coroner) it is slightly a question for the officers what level of proof, I would take people on 
trust. 
                                                          
179 See INQUEST (2013). 
180 see, inter alia, Cowburn 1929; Thurston, 1962; Scraton, 2002. 
181 See, inter alia, on the relationship between doctors and the inquest system, Gilleard 2008; Tuffin et al 2009; 




(Officer A) The problem is with identification of next of kin obviously we can only do so much 
establishing who that is because we are not private detectives. (Officer B) And we trust 
ƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇƐĂǇ ?ǁĞĂƌĞŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶƚŚĞŶǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚĂƌŐƵĞ 
(Coroner) Well, we can ask who she is, but you ask who they are, you ask their contact 
details name and address, but there is good faith in this, you know. 
All of these answers illustrate the way in which the process is shaped by a range of other decisions 
made by individuals inside (and outside) of the category of family, by external actors including the 
police or the hospital, as well as by the officer.182  In relation to a decision about interested person 
status for example, a combination of prior decisions might force a Coroner to decide in a particular 
way, or alternatively might mean the decision is made before a Coroner ever needs to make a formal 
ruling.  An approach to analysis of the law recognising the contemporary role of family cannot ignore 
the multiple ways in which these actors act in reliance or in response to those earlier decisions; and 
the ways in which expertise and conceptions of jurisdiction are employed to respond in particular 
moments in that process.  This conception also draws attention to the ongoing nature of such 
decisions in a lengthy process  W that decisions can be revisited, affirmed, subtly reshaped or radically 
revised, but cannot be seen as separate from the processes which have created the circumstances 
which require (or obviate the need for) a decision. 
These answers also reemphasise the ways in which the actors perceive themselves to be responding 
to facts and to the family and reacting to their presentation of themselves and their concerns, as the 
following discussion between two officers about initial contact with the long lost sister in Vignette 4 
demonstrates, 
(Officer A) We tend to take people on face value 
(Officer  ?zĞĂŚ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĂǇ ?ǁĞůů ?ůŽŽŬ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵĐŽŵĞŝŶǁŝƚŚǇŽƵƌďŝƌƚŚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ŶŽǁĞ
tend to take people on face value, I mean, I think, once you start talking to people, you 
would pick up if there was something wrong 
(Officer A) If it was something dodgy, yeah 
                                                          
182 For example, in relation to the impact of decisions by the family on other decisions, see Tait & Carpenter; 
2014, 9-11, in relation to suicide verdicts.  /ŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŚŝĚĚĞŶ ‘ŶŽn-ůĞŐĂů ?




(Officer B) IĨƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇǁĂƐƚŽƌŝŶŐŵĞƵƉĂŶĚƐĂǇǁĞůů/Ăŵ:ŝŵŵǇ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐƐŝƐƚĞƌ ?/ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƚĞůůŚĞƌĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ, I might talk to her and try 
and establish just a few little facts, before I was to really relay everything to her 
As this answer also illustrates, these are not solely abstract considerations; they are bound up with 
material concerns; from attending the office with a birth certificate, and assessing credentials of a 
putative family member based on their telephone manner.  Exploring the place of materials is a vital 
part of examination of notification and enabling participation as technologies of jurisdiction, and is 
therefore a crucial part of an account of how a jurisdiction is created and shaped, who is engaged in 
that jurisdiction and how they are bound to law.   
Materiality 
Vignette 4 provoked interesting reflections on the role of the material, in particular in relation to 
what the long lost sister might need to produce to be recognised as next of kin.  One Coroner proved 
very willing to accept non-formal family relationships in earlier discussions of a case in which an 
informal adoption had occurred, but was also clear that evidence was needed to support a claim to 
be next of kin; 
(Coroner) She can presumably establish that she is the sister?  
(Ed) Well that was going to be a question, would you take any steps to seek to establish 
that? 
(Coroner) Yes, I would want her to establish the relationship.  
(Ed) What would you be expecting from her to establish that? 
(Coroner) I would want a birth certificate that shows she has the same parents or same 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?ĂƐŚŝŵ ?ŶĚŝĨƐŚĞǁĂƐƐĂǇŝŶŐǁĞůů ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁĞǁĞƌĞŶ ?t formal but 
ǁĞǁĞƌĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚƵƉƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŚĞ ?ĚŚĂǀĞƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƐŚĞ ?ƐũƵƐƚ:ŽĞ
WƵďůŝĐǁŚŽŚĂƐƉŽƉƉĞĚŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽŽĚǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƐĂŝĚ ‘ŽŚ ?/ ?ůůƉůĂǇĂŚĂŶĚŝŶƚŚŝƐ ? 
(Ed) So she would need to provide some evidence to persuade you that they were brother 
and sister? 
(Coroner) Yeah, whether real or defacto. 
The emphasis on evidencing the tacit, informal family reveals this Coroner ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
balancing the requirements of technocratic formal accountability and convivial accountability, and 




law is both deployed (in the request for evidence) and subverted (in the emphasis on non-formal but 
substantive connections) with the aim of engaging law with a contingent family construction.   
In relation to precisely what evidence might be needed, another Coroner suggested a letter from the 
sister would usually suffice, while a different Coroner stated they would want evidence, and when 
asked what evidence, stated  
(Coroner) I suppose what we tend to do, thinking about it now, is they ask them to write in, 
because we get phone calls, so we always ask them to write in, and probably we would take 
it very much at face value. 
The emphasis here is on a written record, not as a way of transmitting information but as a means of 
establishing truth in itself.  At one level, this is the material of law at its most abstract, with little 
attention to form as compared to some other documents, for example, consent forms (Jacob 2012, 
58).  The content and form of the letter are largely unprescribed and are relatively unimportant, as 
with the illegible tofes haskama or consent form Jacob found used in an Israeli transplant centre 
(Jacob 2012, 59-61).  However, unlike the tofes haskama, the existence of the letter is crucial, 
introducing a  ‘reflective pause ? (Jacob 2012, 54), and limiting flexibility and liquidity (Hogle 2003, 
87).  As with the evidence from the missing sister, the letter introducing the family thus represents 
ongoing endeavours to satisfy the demands of the convivial and the technocratic; where 
relationships are taken at face value in an endeavour to bring in the tacit community but are also 
subject to a minimum of law-type oversight, capable of being objectively justified and evidenced.  
Part of an ongoing process, and as such capable of reversal or reaffirmation, it is a moment at which 
the family is reified and perhaps otherwise tacit relationships are made concrete.  It is the moment 
at which family are identified as separate from the community, and it occurs through operation of 
legal writing, because a telephone call is not enough. 
It can therefore be seen as a vital moment in the process of family being called to law.  As Dorsett & 
McVeigh argue, legal writing calls people to law and inaugurates the power of law; from a claim form 
to a parking ticket (Dorsett & McVeigh 2012, 60).  Here, the letter from the family is part of a process 
of family being called to law; a process which, as well as the letter from the family, could include 
telephone calls and letters and official forms being sent from the Coroner to the family.  These 
material processes carry the authority of law, and it was revealing that I was told anecdotally that 
some actors in the inquest system felt the officially created forms (enclosed within the 2013 
Regulations) lacked official authority because of their layout.  In this context, I was told of some 




It is not only the letters and forms from the Coroner which carry the authority of the law  W in some 
respects the family have the authority to speak the law; to determine who is family, and as part of a 
law represented as having authority through combining accountabilities.  This combination requires 
the engagement of family, and reemphasises the importance of recognising sequential decision-
making.  As such, the role of materials in engaging family in making decisions in sequence cannot be 
ignored  W as the Coroner stated in the quote at the beginning of this Chapter, speaking to a family 
might be a better way of getting information across than writing long letters, but even then, 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚ ‘ƐŝŶŬŝŶ ? ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇŚĂǀĞĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůƌŽůĞŝŶshaping decisions, their 
response to the demands of the system is an important part of understanding the system, and the 
materials which transport and transform that information are crucial.   
Wider concerns 
Similarly, other systemic matters cannot be ignored.  Another criticism of positivistic decision-
making is the emphasis on making each individual decision independent of other organisational 
concerns.  In my interviews, it was clear that that converse was true and that in the inquest context, 
there is a great deal of attention to the implications of the current handling of a case for a particular 
way of handling other cases, and the relationship between an individual case and the wider context.  
One example of this was a Coroner ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶs with a wider community; 
(Coroner) in this area we have a large Muslim and Jewish population and quite often there 
will be representatives of the Muslim or Jewish faith who want to make representations to 
me about, for example, not having a post-mortem or releasing the body sooner, and I will 
regularly meet them. 
These comments, along with a range of other comments by Coroners about their caseloads and 
comparisons with the activities of Coroners in other districts, including decisions to hold post-
mortems, made it clear that decisions are regularly made which take into account the impact of a 
decision in one case on other cases.  This wider context, together with the implications of 
typification and serial decision-making, mean that an analysis of decisions in the inquest system 
which looks at individual cases without considering the broader systemic issues would be necessarily 
flawed, and it is for this reason that I turn to framing as a way of understanding how decisions are 
made.   
Framing and the Coroner ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ 
I use framing as an analytical tool to explore the ways in which my interviewees made sense of the 
situations we discussed in our interviews.183  The frames deployed by my interviewees reveal how 
                                                          




questions are understood, how issues are organised into or out of a particular decision, and how 
factors are classified and interpreted.   They were sometimes used strategically by my interviewees 
and sometimes engaged with apparently less deliberately, and the emphasis in them on combining 
accountabilities or a concern with risk links my empirical work to the themes developed in my 
historical and jurisprudential analyses.    ƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƌĚŝĞƵ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
activities of the state creates and recreates the family, framing can be seen as a method of 
subjective categorisation; part of the Bourdiesian cycle of the reconstruction of the objective social 
category of the family (Bourdieu, 1996).  In considering the individual experience in this cycle from 
objective social truth to subjective category and back again, Bourdieu argues that it is necessary to 
pay particular attention to the ways in which state agents uncritically and spontaneously employ 
reference to a familial norm to understand circumstances and justify their decisions.   
Importantly in the inquest, this family norm is not necessarily the family as constituted by the law.  
My interviews suggested that the family norm employed instead prioritised a  ‘wider and deeper 
ethics ? of care (Held 2006, 17), as shown by the contrast between the automatic involvement of the 
informal relationships in my interviews (the non-adopted daughter and the  ‘defacto ? sister  W who 
might have been missing for some years but was still entitled to be involved) and those with formally 
constituted relationships but circumstances which suggested a lack of caring ties (the missing wife 
who may not be sought and the biological father, who was only reluctantly permitted engagement 
by most interviewees).  Examination of the deployment of framing provides a tool for a critical 
exploration of those decisions, and the way in which the same factors, framed differently, can reveal 
differences in approaches.  To explore how framing operates in relation to factors, and how I 
reached my two core frames, I draw on answers to my initial substantive question in interviews with 
Coroners.   
My opening questions were designed to set the scene as I asked each Coroner about their previous 
experience and factual questions about their area, including how many deaths were reported to 
them each year and how many inquests they opened.  After this, I asked each Coroner  ‘ŚŽǁĂŶĚ
ǁŚĞŶĚŽǇŽƵĨŝƌƐƚŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚ ? ?dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ/ǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶ
which the same factors could arise, but be given opposite interpretations.  In these interpretations, 
two themes were clear; on one hand a concern with avoiding or mitigating risk, and on the other 
endeavours to combine the authority of law with effective engagement of the family, to enable their 
contribution and to make the investigation meaningful for them.  One answer emphasised the 





Where there is great anxiety, and lots of questions, it is helpful to the officer in the first 
place who gets beleaguered by requests and demands, to defuse worries, and if there is any 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?/ ?ůůƐĂǇƚŽĂůůŵǇŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐũƵƐƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ they are offered a hearing in court. In principle 
an independent judicial officer should not be speaking to interested persons outside court. 
Thus concerns arising from anxiety and worries could be averted by meeting the Coroner; but this 
engagement had to be done in court.  The frame adopted was one in which the Coroner sought to 
combine the technocratic authority of the general principle and formal courtroom with the convivial 
accountability which could only arise from recognising and being responsive to the concerns of the 
family.  Furthermore, in this account, adopting this approach was also an endeavour to avoid the 
risks which could arise from failing to properly combine forms of accountability, including the risk of 
disorder and demands.  Another Coroner adopted the same frame of focusing on the need for 
combined accountability, but perceived the role of the family as central to the meaning to be given 
to judicial independence  W for this Coroner, independence was a factor to be demonstrated to the 
family through direct early contact.  I asked whether this would be via telephone or in person: 
/ǁŝůůĚŽďŽƚŚŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ǁŚĂƚ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƐ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŵǇũƵĚŝĐŝĂůŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?
because the Coroner ?ƐũŽďŝƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƵŶƵƐƵĂůin that you are not an arbiter between two 
parties, you are an inquirer, and sometimes it is necessary to have hands-on contact with 
the family either on the phone or in person.  A lot of it is simply explanation, and sometimes 
the families like to see the person that they are actually going to possibly have the inquest 
ĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚ ? Q&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚI have just completed, I had to speak to the 
ĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƐĨĂƚŚĞƌǀĞƌǇƋƵŝĐŬůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞpost-mortem [raised questions over the quality 
of the emergency care received], which then introduced the topic of second post-mortems, 
and I had to explain the pros and cons of all this. 
The essential components of a convivial approach to the inquest, in which meaningful explanation is 
allied to an inquiry in which the family are enabled to play an effective part, are combined here with 
formal concerns to avoid threats to perceptions of judicial independence which might arise from 
ĨĂŝůŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚ ‘ŚĂŶĚƐ-ŽŶ ?ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂƚĂŶĞĂƌůǇƐƚĂŐĞ ?/ŶƐŽĚŽŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŝƐCoroner expressly 
rejects central aspects of the triadic form, demonstrating a concern with evidencing the 
independence of an inquiry to the family similar to that advocated by a Select Committee in relation 
to statutory public inquiries.184 
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In contrast, for another Coroner, judicial independence was a factor in the decision which was 
framed by reference to concerns about the risk of appearing to be biased: 
Usually, the first contact with the bereaved that I have personally will be in the courtroom. 
And that is because of the appearance of bias.  Because the bereaved is only one of any 
number of interested persons before the inquiry, it is inappropriate for me to have any close 
contact or communication with them before the inquest. 
Other interviewees emphasised the general nature of the rule:  
'ĞŶĞƌĂůůĞŐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝƐ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚĞƌ ƐƚĞĚƉĞƌsons directly, you do it 
through the officer, in that way you can never be accused of bias. 
As far as CoronerƐĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞ
inquest.  
These three answers did not start with concerns the family might raise or with attention to making 
the process meaningful for the family, but instead focused on judicial independence as a factor 
which meant they were obliged to keep their distance from the family.  The question was 
understood as a matter of general principle, in which an adherence to a general legal principle 
promised to control the risk of a perception of bias and reduced the Coroner ?ƐƐĐŽƉĞƚŽĂĐƚ ?
Alternatively it was framed as a discretion open to the Coroner, but interpreted through a desire to 
avoid the risk of bias through appearing too close to the family.  In this context, it could be that a 
combined form of accountability could be achieved through the role of the officer in engaging with 
the family, as suggested in another Coroner ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚere the emphasis was on the officer as 
responsible:  
As far as a lot of the contact is concerned it is through the officers, and of course putting the 
family central is partly reflected in the range of duties of notification by officers and 
explanations and we do our best to support the officers in meeting that. 
The officer is framed here as expert in engaging with the family, which was a common theme in 
some of my interviews.  The question of how best to engage is itself part of a wider organisational 
context, including issues of resource.  As one Coroner explained:  
I am fortunate in the sense that this is a reasonable sized jurisdiction, well resourced, so I 
doŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŽŐŽŽƵƚĂƐƐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚ-time Coroners do  W ǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?




For this Coroner, proper resourcing means that matters can be delegated to officers.  The 
implication, in contrast with other answers, is that there is no advantage to a Coroner being hands-
on at an early stage, and that there is little difference between what a Coroner and an officer would 
do at those early stages. In comparison, another interviewee emphasised the expertise of the 
Coroner: 
I may have contact with the bereaved family very shortly after the deatŚ ? ? ?/ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ
allow my staff to do these difficult conversations because sometimes I have to do them 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĂŵƚŚĞŚŽƌƐĞ ?ƐŵŽƵƚŚ ?ƐŽƋƵŝƚĞŽĨƚĞŶ/ǁŝůůŚĂǀĞƚŽƐƉĞĂŬƚŽĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌ
[the death] 
As with judicial independence, expertise is therefore a factor which can be interpreted in different 
ways depending on the understanding of the Coroner; it is either inseparable from the Coroner ?Ɛ
engagement with the family, or it is an aspect of the investigatory and administrative functions of 
their officer.  Both approaches can result from a framing of the issues which focuses on combining 
forms of authority, as this framing will focus on the question of whether initial engagement of the 
Coroner or their officer can best elicit the engagement of the family, facilitate the introduction of 
tacit knowledges and seek meaningful contextual revelation.  Alternatively, if the decision on 
engagement with family is made through a risk-oriented frame of perceptions of partiality or 
abdicated via a relianĐĞŽŶůĂǁ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĞĚƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƌŝƐŬ ?then a triadic form of 
accountability is prioritised, and the officer is called to act as a buffer between the system and the 
family.   
My interviews illustrated that the decision-makerƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝĚeal inquest is often one in 
which a combined form of accountability is fashioned, but that this combined accountability can be 
constructed in very different ways.  Where it is sustained, this framing supports a representation of 
inquest law as founded on a combination of technocratic and contextual convivial demands for 
accountability.  However, where there is a perceived risk to the delicate balance within this default 
framing, the frame can shift to assert the pre-eminence of technocratic forms of accountability, 
drawing on representations of the law grounded in expertise, distance, technocracy and neutrality.   
Importantly, as some of the responses from the officers above indicate in relation to quickly 
perceiving and responding to the  ‘kind of family ? in a particular case, the interpretation of the 
approach of the family can result in the frame shifting.  However, the approach of the family cannot 
be understood as independent from the way in which the inquest system both reaches out to and 
reacts to the family, including the physical ways in which the family is engaged; at home in person by 




facts of Brown v. Norfolk Coroner,185 a case in which the High Court dismissed a claim by Mr Brown 
that the Coroner had shown bias against him after he (the father of the deceased) raised concerns 
about the conduct of the case.  Paragraph 19 of the judgment states 
On 7 September 2011 Mr and Mrs Brown attended the Coroner's office for a pre-inquest 
review. They were waiting in a room alongside the Coroner's office when it became 
apparent to them that the Coroner was speaking to DCI Firm and DS Clabon in their absence. 
Mr Brown asserts that he could overhear DCI Firm describing the deceased as aggressive, 
suicidal and drunk, and describing Mr Brown as difficult. So incensed was Mr Brown that he 
entered the Coroner's room and informed the occupants that he and his wife could hear 
what was being said.  DS Clabon accepts that during their meeting with the Coroner DCI Firm 
explained that the deceased had had a drink problem and that Mr Brown had been a difficult 
man to deal with because he would not accept what he was being told by the police. The 
officers were concerned that he would use the opportunity at the inquest to question 
[individuals] with a view to establishing that they were in some way to blame for his 
daughter's death. DCI Firm accepts that he summarised the evidence relating to [the 
deceased] and that he may have used words such as  ‘needy ?,  ‘insecure ? and  ‘aggressive at 
times ? to describe her. 
At paragraph 20, the court held that  
It seems to me entirely understandable that Mr and Mrs Brown should, as a result of this 
experience, have felt marginalised by the process that was taking place. They were attending 
what they understood to be a meeting of interested persons preparatory to the inquest yet 
the officers with whose efforts they were, rightly or wrongly, dissatisfied were being given 
access alone to the Coroner, the Coroner knowing from Mr Brown's e-mail of 4 September 
2011 of their unhappiness. No doubt, as the officers were carrying out inquiries on behalf of 
the Coroner, this was merely a preliminary discussion of issues. However, the effect was to 
engender in Mr and Mrs Brown a concern that their interest was being treated as secondary. 
The court went on to  ‘unhesitatingly reject ? allegations of misconduct or dishonesty by the Coroner 
or officers.186  In my analysis, focussed on questions of risk, the investigating officers were concerned 
with a risk that Mr Brown might use (in their eyes, misuse) the inquest to seek to establish that 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌŚŝƐĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?,ĞǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘difficult ?; pushing them to 
investigate in particular ways, and was dissatisfied with their work, initiating various complaints 
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about them and formally informing the Coroner of these concerns in writing.  In contrast, the 
officers were informally briefing the Coroner in terms which maligned the family, while on other 
occasions, officers turned up to meetings with Mr Brown without being properly prepared to discuss 
the case and one officer was found to have intimidated Mrs Brown.187  The series of engagements 
with the family in this case thus made it impossible for accountabilities to be combined.  These 
engagements, from initial discontent with officers at a face to face meeting, to failures to disclose 
evidence, to emailed complaints, cannot be coherently separated from the physical context in which 
they occurred.  The comments about Mr Brown and his daughter are particularly disturbing because 
of the context; ĨƌŽŵDƌƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ perspective, an insight into the informal engendering of bias by 
privileged participants, overheard as he waited outside.   
The public space of the court room is held out as the solution to concerns of private bias and as the 
proper place to engage with the family and other interested parties.  The prospect of that space also 
acts to contain risk of the appearance of bias, ensuring the relationship is properly maintained, as 
HHJ Thornton held ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDƌƌŽǁŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂďŽƵƚemail correspondence ? ‘Even the use of 
first names may not look good to an outsider, particularly to somebody of the older generation. 
Coroners should only write letters (and e-mails) in the course of their work which will stand the test 
of looking fair and unbiased if and when read out in court in litigation ? ?188   
However, this public space is not easily available for all Coroners, and will depend on the physical 
and financial resources available in a particular jurisdiction (discussed further in Chapter 8).  A lack of 
resources can present other risks to the inquest process (Wheatley, 2012); and shows that 
perceptions of risk arising as a result of others (rather than the family) does not necessarily result in 
a shift of framing towards a risk-orientation and away from combined accountability.  In an example 
from my interviews, one Coroner expressed a concern at the possible implications of a common 
resourcing shift under which many officers have moved from police to local authority employment.  
It was important for this Coroner that for deaths in police and prison custody there was an 
independent investigator, and  
unless local authorities brought in an independent investigator for deaths in residential care 
homes etc, I would be greatly troubled to think that they would be employing the officers, 
because sooner or later there would be well, we pay you, what the hell do you think you are 
doing investigating and criticising or eliciting evidence that enables the Coroner to criticise 
etc.  In my view there is a real risk of lack of independence, and perception of bias. 
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This is not a risk which can be removed by meeting in a public space.  It is a risk to the triadic 
authority of the ĐŽƌŽŶŝĂůŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĐůĂŝŵŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
objectivity.  It also potentially poses a risk to the potential for the inquest to achieve convivial 
accountability, as it undermines the capacity of the actors in the inquest to engage in the creation of 
a space in which meaningful revelation can be achieved.  The framing by the Coroner recognises this 
delicate balance, as the concern with bias is a concern with demonstrating independence to the 
family.  Importantly, as these engagements show, risk is a mobile theme, which emerges in different 
forms in the construction of the inquest, and does not necessary solely serve to undermine the 
prospect of seeking to achieve convivial accountability. 
Conclusion 
The first engagements between the bereaved family and those investigating a death is crucial.  
Concerns by family members often begin with questions about discrepancies in the information they 
are given in their first few contacts, or with concerns about the way in which they were told of the 
death.189  This first contact is therefore key for the people involved in an inquest, and sets the tone 
for future encounters, but remains underexamined from the perspective of the relationship with 
law.   
I have focused on this first engagement in this Chapter for two reasons; the impact on the 
jurisdiction of the inquest, and to reveal and justify my methodological approach.  I argue that the 
notification of family is key jurisprudentially because it inaugurates a representation of law in which 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŽŝŶƋƵĞƐƚůĂǁďǇǁĂǇŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌŽǀĞƌƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌ ?
dignified, individualised conduct of the inquest.  As I argued in previous chapters, this representation 
relies on combined forms of accountability, and does so through an endeavour to enable the 
ongoing participation of the family.  As a result, the tone-setting undertaken in this first contact has 
ongoing jurisprudential implications, demonstrating the importance of engaging with the meanings 
and understandings of the actors in the inquest and of examining the inquest systematically.  This 
examination deepens my account of a jurisdiction built on combining accountabilities, as it 
demonstrates the place of family through material practices and efforts to notify and seek 
participation beyond the requirements of the law.  It also highlights how themes and framings of risk 
arise, and illustrates ways in which they impact on endeavours to craft a jurisdiction combining 
convivial and technocratic forms of accountability.   
                                                          




A key argument of this chapter is that notification illustrates the place of family in reintroducing 
contingency and resisting typification.  In the next chapter, examining the body in the inquest, I 





Chapter Six: the family, the body and dignity 
Introduction 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ/ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ through a 
key theme, that of dignity; the dignity of the body, the dignity of the family, the dignity of the 
inquest, and the relationships between these formulations of dignity.  This has two distinct but 
interlinked aspects: the relationship of family with a body under the control of the Coroner, and 
responsibility for disposal of that body once the Coroner no longer needs it.  Once released by the 
Coroner, law envisages a hierarchy of responsibility for disposal, but in practice, as my interviews 
revealed, this is a far more negotiated process, with family at the centre of those negotiations.  Prior 
to release, while the body remains within the inquest jurisdiction, the role of the family has 
significantly changed in the contemporary inquest  W a change which I argue amounts to a reimagined 
role for family as supervisor of the management of the body.  In relation to both aspects, I argue that 
dignity is the critical pivot around which the relationships between the inquest, the family and the 
body are constructed, but that dignity can be imagined in different forms.  Developing this insight by 
ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŵǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽ
questions of dignity in the inquest can be framed through a concern with the inquest as a public 
process, with family as office-holders with a range of rights and duties, or through a concern with 
morality and conscience, with attention to dignity as care, humanity and kinship.190 
My argument is in six parts.  I open by briefly expanding on my claim for the critical relationship of 
family with the body by describing the disappearance of the body from the inquest, before turning 
ƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐĞŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?/n the third section 
I develop my analysis of the role of the family in relation to the body in the contemporary inquest, 
before examining post-mortem examinations, narratives of how the framing of dignity can shift, and 
engaging with the release of the body by the inquest. 
The disappearance of the body 
By the nineteenth century, the gathering of the community around the body had been transformed 
into a fundamental legal requirement that the jury view the body of the deceased.  As Burney 
describes, in late Victorian Britain this requirement came under increasing attack on public health 
                                                          
190 For selected reflections on dignity in this context, see for example Partington; 2004; Razack 2011. 
Importantly, despite its centrality to the issues, dignity is rarely an express consideration in the law in this area, 
and there is a great deal of discussion of dignity in other scholarship, see (a very small selection) for some 





grounds. 191  Through these attacks, the body moved from essential evidential object to an insanitary 
and inefficient item which enabled juries to form judgments based on the inapposite external visage 
of the cadaver, rather than the expert opinion of the pathologist ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘>ŽĐĂůĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ?
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƵůĂƌ “ĞǆĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ŽĨŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐ ?ůŽŽŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
ĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĞǁĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨƐĐĂůŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƌŝƚƵĂů ? ?192 In response, some Coroners resisted 
abolition, focusing on the central place of the dead body in the authentication of their office but this 
opposition foundered by the 1920s, and the requirement to view the body was abolished in the 
1926 Act.193  In the contemporary inquest, in practice, the body under the control of the Coroner is 
never viewed by the jury, 194 and not always by the family.195  Photographs of the body are treated 
with great caution and Coroners are encouraged to share them first with relatives in a sensitive 
manner if it is necessary for them to be used.196  The body is now a matter for the Coroner and the 
family, who engage with the dignified management and disposal of the body away from the public 
space of the inquest.  In the context of this focus on privacy, sensitivity and caution, and drawing on 
Dorsett and McVeigh (2012), I turn to explore two jurisdictional conceptions of dignity. 
Jurisdictions of conscience and jurisdictions of civility 
Dorsett & McVeigh contrast approaches to dignity in jurisdictions dealing with assisted dying.  They 
differentiate betǁĞĞŶĂ ‘thin ? account of dignity, concerned with questions of office,197 civility and 
ƉƵďůŝĐƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘thick ? account which focuses on the complexity of the individual person, and on 
questions of morality and their humanity.198  In the examples they explore they first examine 
approaches to assisted dying which start from considerations of the concerns of the State as to who 
can act and how they can act, and establish links to public status and honour.  These approaches 
deliberately leave aside ethical questions of what it means to die well as concerns beyond law.  They 
contrast these jurisdictions of civility with a jurisdiction of conscience, in which the law explicitly 
                                                          
191 In relation to Victorian engagements with mourning, death and a nascent public health agenda see inter 
alia, Jupp 1999; White 2002 & 2003; Rugg 2013b, Amadei 2014; Lemke, T. 2014; Trabsky 2015).  Public health 
was a critical plank in the argument of the early cremation movement; Sir Henry Thompson, founder of the 
ƌĞŵĂƚŝŽŶ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚĐŚŽŽƐĞĨŽƌŝƚƐďĞůŽǀĞĚĚĞĂĚ ‘a physical condition that is 
neither repulsive nor injurious to others ? ? ?:ƵƉƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:upp links this to an Ariesian (1981, 614) concern 
with the invisibiliation of death, in which a focus on public health was to the detriment of bereaved families, 
 ‘ǁŚŽƐĞŶĞĞĚƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŽĨƚĞŶďĞĞŶŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚ ? ?:ƵƉƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƌŝŐŚts of the 
next of kin in relation to the choice whether to cremate (Jupp 1999, 24). 
192 Burney, 2000. 
193 Although could still see if a majority of the jury wanted, a right which was abolished in 1980, see Matthews 
2014, 257. 
194 Matthews 2014, 257. 
195 See in thiƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŝǆ ? ? ? ? ?KŶĞŽƌŽŶĞƌƚŽůĚŵĞ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞĂƚŚƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ? ‘The family are 
usually discouraged from viewing, aŶĚ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ŝƚŝƐƵƐƵĂůůǇŽŬ ? ? 
196 Dorries 2014, 157-8. 
197 See Condren 2006 for an extended discussion of office.  




engages with moral philosophy and a conception of dignity based in consideration of truth and 
autonomy, including addressing the meaning of a good death.  They argue that  ‘attending to the 
jurisdictional variety of the regulation of the end of life also complicates the ways in which we might 
understand authority and the authorisation of law.  To view such regulation simply as an act of 
sovereign will or reason is to impose more uniformity thaŶŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶůĞŐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Dorsett & 
McVeigh 2012, 95).  Taking up this call to attend to jurisdictional variety, the next section turns to 
explore different conceptions of dignity and the place of the family in relation to the regulation of 
disposal of bodies.   
Dignity: the body and the next of kin 
ŽƌƐĞƚƚ ?DĐsĞŝŐŚ ?ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƐĞƚŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ
aƌŽƐĞŝŶĐĂŶŽŶŝĐĂůůĂǁŚĂǀĞŶŽǁďĞĞŶƐƵƉĞƌƐĞĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂǁ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŚŽŶŽƵƌ ?ŵĂŶŶĞƌƐ
and ultimately, ideas of office.  In one example of the relationship between the two jurisdictions, 
they argue that the historic rule that there is no property in a body amounted to common law 
declining jurisdiction for the body in favour of the law of the Church, and the demise of ecclesiastical 
law left the dead body poorly bound to law.199  They note that one area in which ecclesiastical law 
continues to hold authority is in relation to burial, exhumation and reburial in consecrated 
ground.200  In contrast, burial, exhumation and reburial in non-consecrated ground is determined by 
the civil courts.  Once buried, it is a criminal offence to exhume a body without a licence (from the 
Secretary of State in relation to unconsecrated ground, and from the consistory court for 
consecrated ground201).  This jurisdictional division enables an instructive comparison of approaches 
to dignity, highlighted in two leading cases. 
In the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in the case of In Re Blagdon Cemetery202, heard in the Arches Court 
of Canterbury, the question was whether the court should permit the exhumation and reburial of 
Steven Whittle.  The Court set out general principles, emphasising the  ‘ĂƵƌĂŽĨƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ ? (para 
304D) associated with burial, and drew on a paper on the theology of burial by the Bishop of 
Stafford which contrasted  ‘commending, entrustiŶŐ ?ƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ? “portable remains, ? 
which suggests the opposite: reclaiming, possession, and reƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŚŽůĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ “ƐǇŵďŽů ? 
of human life rather than a giving back to God ? (para 305C).  As a result, the court approved the 
reluctance of the consistory court to grant faculties for exhumation and reburial, but still allowed the 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŝŶŐ^ƚĞǀĞŶ ?ƐĞǆŚƵŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞďƵƌŝĂů.  Critically, the decision of the court 
                                                          
199 Dorsett & McVeigh 2012, 44, 69-71, and see Troyer (2008) in relation to the body as a quasi-subject of law.    
200 Dorsett & McVeigh 2012, 77  W also noting that ecclesiastical law is now primary founded on the common 
law.   
201 See s.25 Burials Act 1857. 




ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ^ƚĞǀĞŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?ŚŝƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
teaching.  It was central to the decision that Steven had died suddenly when he was young, having 
expressed no opinion about where he would like to be buried and was buried in Somerset in a 
community he had no link to.  His parents, employed in the pub trade, had moved regularly and 
lacked a permanent home at that time, but had made it clear they wanted to move him when they 
had such a home, eventually buying a triple plot in Suffolk when they retired.  The court also 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŝůůŚĞĂůƚŚŽĨ^ƚĞǀĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽ travel to his 
grave) and the support of his other closest relatives for the move.  The fact that there was 
community support was not important; the court held that the amount of local support, whether 
clerical or lay, would normally be irrelevant. 
By contrast, there was considerable community opposition to the disinterment and reburial of 
Father Josef Jarzebowski.203  Father Jarzebowski was a priest who, according to the judgment, 
achieved almost saint-like status amongst the Polish Roman Catholic community in the UK, and is 
under consideration for beatification.204  He was a member of the order of the Marian Fathers, and 
was instrumental in developing a school and church at Fawley Court in Henley in the 1950s.  Upon 
his death in 1964 he was buried there on his own express wishes.  In 2008, the Marian Fathers sold 
Fawley Court and decided to move his remains to an unconsecrated site in a local authority 
graveyard, requiring them to make an application to the Secretary of State.205  The grounds for their 
decision were that moving his remains would mean he was buried with other Marian Fathers, and it 
would be easier for those who wished to visit his grave to do so.  Around 2,000 people wrote a letter 
ŽĨŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ&ĂƚŚĞƌ:ĂƌǌĞďŽǁƐŬŝ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽƵƐŝŶŽŶĐĞƌĞŵoved, Elzbeita Rudewicz (who, 
aged seven when he died, had never met him, but who had visited his grave on a number of 
occasions).  Nevertheless, the Secretary of State approved the order to disinter and rebury his 
remains, as the views of the next of kin were regarded as of particular importance, and in his case, 
ƚŚĞDĂƌŝĂŶ&ĂƚŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ?&ĂƚŚĞƌ:ĂƌǌĞďŽǁƐŬŝ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶŚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŽĨďƵƌŝĂů
were not relevant as the 1930 constitution of the Marian Fathers states that the decision in relation 
to place of burial is for the head of the order.  In addition, if his remains were moved they would be 
reunited with the brothers with whom he worked, and it would be easier for members of the public 
to visit his grave.  The Court noted that  
13. The Secretary of State did not ignore the counterveiling factors, which he identified as (i) 
ƚŚĞƉƌŝĞƐƚ ?ƐǁŝƐŚƚŽďĞďƵƌŝĞĚĂƚ&ĂǁůĞǇŽƵƌƚ ? ?ŝŝ ?ƚŚĞƐƚƌĞƐƐǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞĚƚŽŵĂŶǇ
                                                          
203 [2012] EWCA Civ 499, and see discussion in Hill (2013). 
204 See para 35 ŽĨƚŚĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐĞĞ ‘Priest's grave moved at night ?ŝŶƚŚĞ,ĞŶůĞǇ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 




ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇďǇƚŚĞƉƌŝĞƐƚ ?ƐĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŝŝ ?ƚŚĞ possible feeling of 
 ‘ĚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵŝŐŚƚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐƐŝŐŶĂůůŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ ‘ŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ŝǀ ?ƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝĞƐƚ ?ƐŶĞĂrest living relative.  Nonetheless the Secretary of State decided 
to grant the application. 
Elzbeita Rudewicz sought judicial review of the decision on public law grounds of mistake in law, 
irrationality and disproportionality.  While the Court did not expressly undertake a review of the 
merits of the decision, the judgment contains significant details, and the combined approach of the 
Secretary of State and civil courts can be contrasted with the approach of the consistory courts.  The 
decision finds that the theology of burial and permanence is irrelevant in the context of reburial in 
unconsecrated ground (even where the original burial may have been in consecrated ground206).  
The court held that the principles applied in the consistory courts were peculiar to that jurisdiction 
(in particular the theological emphasis on permanence), and could not be extended to provide 
interpretation for burials in non-consecrated ground simply because they were the same as the 
religion of the person buried.  With this move, the court shifted the frame away from questions of 
conscience to focus on questions of civility and the public sphere (Kennedy 1999; Conaghan 2014).  
Father Jarzebowski, in his office as priest, was under the direction of his Order, who as his next of kin 
had the clear right to decide where he should be buried.  His express wish to be buried at Fawley 
Court was overridden, with attention instead directed to his accessibility to the public.  The dignity 
of his burial was thus left primarily to be determined by the Marian Fathers,207 and concerns about 
disrespect to his wishes and the indignity of impermanence were noted by the Secretary of State 
and court but were outside the jurisdiction of the secular orientation of the Secretary of State and 
courts. Critically, albeit in passing, the decision notes that the church at Fawley Court was built at the 
expense of an émigré Polish prince, Prince Radziwill.  The prince was buried in the church, which was 
sold along with the rest of the site, and in relation to his remains the Secretary of State had refused 
an application to disinter and rebury following objections by his son.208   
/Ŷ^ƚĞǀĞŶtŚŝƚƚůĞ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚŚĂĚĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŝƚŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŽƐĞďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚ ?
exploring the autonomy (or lack thereof) of both Steven and his parents, forced into transience by 
their trade.  Central to the decision are questions of conscience and the competing demands of a 
                                                          
206 It was not clear whether Fawley Court was consecrated although the court treats the site as if it was 
unconsecrated, see para 34 of the judgment, and for discussion of cemeteries as secular spaces, see Rugg 
(2000). 
207 The judgment explicitly states that the constitution permits choice of burial site, but is silent on whether 
the constitution expressly deals with questions of exhumation and reburial.  In the absence of express 
reference to such a power, it must be presumed the constitution does not include such a provision.   
208 In line with stated policy, see R (HM Coroner for East London) v. Secretary of State for Justice & Susan 




form of dignity focused on the individual; the theology and dignity of a Christian permanent rest, 
and the humanity and dignity of the desire for family unity.   
By contrast, the decisions in relation to both Prince Radziwill and Father Jarzebowski emphasise the 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂ ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĨ
dignity, in which the determining factors are questions of status, and in which those with the office 
of next of kin are primarily responsible for determining what amounts to a good death and a good 
resting place, final or not.209  Where a jurisdiction of conscience picks apart the relationship of family 
and the deceased and examines their separate but interconnected humanity, here the status of 
kinship is conflated with the dignity of the body.  Attention is directed to establishing that status, 
and once established in the office of next of kin, the law both grants and draws authority from that 
status.  QƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚĨĂůůŽƵƚƐŝĚĞůĂǁ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?
while questions of the dignity of family and next of kin become questions of the ways in which they 
have upheld, denied or despoiled their office rather than focusing on questions of their humanity in 
the context of their bereavement.210 
Dorsett & McVeigh describe how modes of jurisdiction are overlaid in modern law so that it can be 
hard to pick apart distinct jurisdictional engagements with conscience or civility (Dorsett & McVeigh 
2012, 91) and the case of Father Jarzebowski also highlights this complexity.  In the judgments of the 
Court and Secretary of State a deeper consideration of humanity is engaged in the context of seeking 
to unite Father Jarzebowski with other Marian brothers.  However, even here, his personhood is tied 
up with his office, as moving him would mean that access to his grave would be unimpeded and 
 ‘would have the advantage of being combined, for those who wished, with visiting the graves of his 
former brothers ? (para 12).  
In their different approaches, these cases highlight contrasting ways to engage with the family and 
the body as persons subject to law, and I turn next to explore these framings in the contemporary 
inquest.  
The family and the body: from recipient to active supervisor 
In the historic inquest the role for the family in relation to the body was limited to receiving the body 
once the Coroner released it, and in the contemporary system family remain primarily responsible 
for the body in practice.  The responsibility for the body comes with a direction to maintain its 
                                                          
209 On which see Jassal (2015) on mobility aƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ŶĞĐƌŽƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?




ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ‘until it is properly buried ?211 and the formal legal right to possession falls 
on the personal representatives of the deceased, rather than on the family or next of kin (Conway 
2003). Where executors or administrators decline their duty, others can be granted responsibility 
(Matthews 196), with the local authority as ultimate backstop,212 but where a personal 
representative claims the body, their primary claim cannot be supplanted.213  In the contemporary 
system, delays in obtaining a grant of probate means that in practice, administrators are unlikely to 
be involved, and in most cases, arrangements will be made by executors or members of the 
family.214 However, the emphasis of my interviewees was on identifying family and one or more next 
of kin, not on identifying those with a formal legal right as executor (Hernandez 1999); an emphasis 
which is understandable in the context of the majority of people who die intestate.215 The 
implication of this is that ƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝĨŝĞĚĚŝƐƉŽƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇĨĂůůƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ to 
act216 once the body is released to them by the Coroner.217 
Prior to release of the body, the historical position was that the Coroner had a very broad discretion 
over the management of the body while it remained under the Coroner ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐ
of judicial decisions218 and legislative changes,219 the family developed enhanced rights in respect of 
the treatment of the body prior to the 2009/2013 reformulation of the inquest, and a doctrinal 
analysis of the contemporary inquest would note that the family now have a raft of rights in respect 
                                                          
211 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, cited with approval in Dobson v. North Tyneside Health Authority & Another [1997] 
1 W.L.R. 596 600E and see discussion in Haddleton (2006).  While the majority of bodies in England and Wales 
are now cremated (75%, Pharos 2014, 30) emphasis remains on proper and decent disposal, see inter alia 
Conway 2003, 426.   
212 Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, s.46(1). 
213 Conway 2003, and see Bremenstul 2013 for a discussion of the law in the US. 
214 Matthews 2014, 196, and note Note 20 that the family members and executor/administrator/person 
entitled to letters of administration might be the same person.     
215 Research varies, with one poll in 2014 suggesting 35% of UK citizens had a will (Dying Matters 2014), while a 
survey in 2014 suggested that 48% of the UK population had a will (Will Aid 2014). 
216 There is a wealth of scholarship on issues linked to autonomy and property in the body in the context of law 
in relation to human tissue, see inter alia, Hernandez 1999; McEvoy & Conway 2004; Vines 2009; Gallagher 
2010.  I draw on this work, but it is important that where some of this scholarship focuses on one-off decisions 
about disposal/ownership of body parts, my attention is on decisions specifically located in the ongoing 
inquest process.  My attention is also on the broader question of dignity, of which autonomy is only a part, see 
Woods, 2014, 336. 
217 However, this is an extra-legal responsibility, as once a body has been passed on, unless another individual 
with a responsibility to bury complains, there is no enforceable obligation to actually dispose of the body 
through cremation or burial, see Matthews 2014, 197-8, also see Metters, 2003; Leiboff, 2005. Contrast 
contrary opinion (with no contemporary caselaw) in Archbold, as discussed in McBain (2014).  It is however a 
criminal offence to prevent the lawful burial of a corpse, see R. v Hunter [1974] QB 95, R v Skidmore [2008] All 
ER 146.  
218 See for example R v. Bristol Coroner ex p Kerr [1974] 2 All ER 719. 
219 Including the right to be informed of and represented at the post-mortem examination and to reject a 




of the body,220 together with a significant narrowing of the discretion open to the Coroner.  For 
example, where the Coroner previously had a discretion to release the body early, the 2013 
Regulations have shifted this into a requirement to hand over the body as soon as is reasonable 
practicable,221 and if it is not released within 28 days, to explain the reason for the delay to the next 
of kin or personal representative.222  Notification and participation rights for the next of kin similarly 
arise in relation to keeping and disposing of material preserved or retained from the body,223 and the 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞ has become increasingly important in relation to decisions about the post-mortem.224     
This responsibility to notify, explain and engage with the family is a duty to account to the family for 
the way in which the inquest system has treated the body.  It is the family to whom transparency is 
particularly owed,225 and they are the only people who are able to hold the Coroner to account if 
those requirements are not maintained.  If the Coroner has not notified them, and thereby failed to 
meet the standards in the legislation, it is only the next of kin who would know and would be able to 
raise a complaint.226  Similarly, in the event, for example, that a Coroner had refused to release a 
body to an eligible individual or had breached the requirements in relation to retention of post-
mortem material, the family would be likely to be the only people who would have a sufficient 
interest for the purposes of a judicial review.  While both avenues of enforcement are highly 
circumscribed, the imposition of duties on the Coroner, allied with these potential avenues for 
recourse, frame the family as responsible for primary oversight of the way in which the inquest 
system treats the body.  It is important that the context in which these rules have been developed 
lies in high profile scandals227 in which families have suffered the distress of discovering after many 
                                                          
220 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐĞĞ ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇDĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ P ‘dŚĞŽƌŽŶĞƌƐ
 ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? QƵƉĚĂƚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŶƐ ŶƚŚĞŽƌŽŶĞƌƐZƵůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
emphasis on Coroners notifying bereaved relatives and other interested persons of developments with the 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
221 R.20, 2013 Regulations. 
222 Thus, even though as Matthews 2014, 197 notes, there is no right for the next of kin to receive the body 
they are entitled to an explanation for the delay in release.  
223 Contrast for example Dobson v. North Tyneside Health Authority & Another [1997] 1 WLR 596 where 
samples were kept and then disposed of, and there was no involvement of family members as they had not 
applied for probate so were not entitled to body parts. 
224 R.(Goldstein) v. HM Coroner for Inner London North [2014] EWHC 3889, and see Cowan 2014. 
225 Thornton 2012a.   
226 ^ĞĞ'ƵŝĚĞƚŽŽƌŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?WĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/363879/guide-to-Coroner-
service.pdf and see CJA 2009, Sch.3, para 13.  Although it is important to note that these possibilities are 
limited, and the procedures closely prescribed see the Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 
2013; s.115 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and note, as Matthews states, that recent examples of what 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐŵŝƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂƌĞ ‘ƌĂƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
227 See for example, the foreword to the Home Office Position Paper, which explicitly refers to the Bristol Royal 




years that body parts of deceased relatives had been retained. In these cases, indignity was engaged 
through the exclusion of the family, with organs and body parts nominally retained by medical 
professionals for the purposes of a wider public interest.  In the inquest, the framing of family as 
private interest in opposition to a public interest in the body is complicated by the ways in which 
family participates on behalf of a wider community interest.  In this account, family is a conduit to 
the community and represent a public interest in transparency and the proper treatment of the 
body, juxtaposed with the indignity represented by a body under the control of an opaque, 
paternalistic and inaccessible medical bureaucracy.228  
This account of the law re-envisages the relationship as one founded in dignity, under which the 
family, acting for themselves, the deceased and the wider public, uphold and enforce the dignity of 
the deceased whilst the body is under the Coroner ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?229  TŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛ
humanity and bereavement, on an ethical framing based on recognition of relationality and care 
(Held 2005, 9-28) ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛrole in what Partington (2004) hĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐĂůǀĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƐĂĐƌĞĚ ? ?230  The attention of the inquest, as a jurisdiction shaped by the technologies of notification 
and enabling participation, is on meaningfulness and understanding, and on the dignity of family as 
conscience.  I asked one interviewee why the family got involved in an inquest 
(Coroner) Well, there are several answers to that question at different levels, firstly because 
it is a legal requirement, because we have got to notify them, under the new Coroners 
Investigations rules. They have rights to express for example, about what happens to tissue 
and organs taken at post-mortem, so we need to ascertain their wishes with regard to that.  
Some families will take a keen interest and it is so variable, some families will want 
eveƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƐŽŵĞĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐǁŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƐŽŵĞĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĂƚ
all, I think it is important that they do participate because it is their loved one and it is so 
they can have an understanding of what happened to them. 
The legislation phrases this as an opportunity for the family, but from a systemic perspective it is 
important that they do engage, not only to exercise their rights, but to achieve understanding.  Thus 
notification and opportunity is translated into encouragement, enablement and a need to 
understand, and where decisions are taken about the body, questions of memorialisation and ethics 
                                                          
228 Contrast Mason & Laurie (2001).  
229 And the body here is not limited to the entire body but extends to a broader concept of remains, discussed 
further in Prior 1989. 
230 WĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŚĞƌƚƌŝƉƚŽ ‘ƌĞƐĐƵĞĂŶĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ?ŚĞƌƐŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƵŶĚĞƌ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŽŶĞƌ ?ƉůĂĐŝŶŐŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůŝƚĞŵƐǁŝƚŚŚĞƌďŽŶĞƐĂƐ ‘ĂĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽĂĐƚŝŶĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ





(Woods 2014), and the ongoing relationship between the family and the body (Drayton 2013; 
Leichtentritt et al 2014) are taken into account. 
The attention is on dignity as conscience, and the attention to nuance, context and meaning bring it 
into a framing focused on engaging with convivial forms of accountability.  However, my interviews 
also demonstrated ways in which this framing could shift to focus on dignity as public status, 
through concerns with risk and a desire to protect and hide.  As one Coroner put it:  
We have a dominant culture that is simply in denial, we do not generally discuss death of 
ourselves or our loved ones.  As a country we have the lowest incidence of ever seeing a 
dead body, whereas in Ireland for example, it is on display and everyone sees it, so people 
are deeply shocked when they come to a Coroner, theǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŚĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ? 
For some of my interviewees, this concern with a shocked family provoked a desire to put up a 
defence to protect the family from being upset (Dix 1999), and to protect the family from threats 
from outside.  In this framing, family becomes the protector of the private space around the body.  
This status was evident in some reflections on the role of the girlfriend in Vignette 2, and the role of 
family as gatekeepers.  One Coroner who was not sure of recognising the girlfriend as an interested 
person in the inquest stated that she would be encouraged to be in contact with the family, and in 
another interview, two officers discussed this together with explicit reference to the body, 
(Officer A) She is not his next of kin if that is what you are thinking about, we would treat her 
probably, as we would a next of kin - 
(Officer B) Well it depends what the family want you see. 
(Officer A) Yeah. 
(Officer B) If she is insisting on seeing him, we would have to ask his parents assuming they 
are still alive. 
There is no basis in law for a requirement of consent by the next of kin where another individual 
wishes to view a body.  It is for the Coroner to decide.  However, as this quote makes clear, the 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐŬĞǇ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐother 
formulations of kin from contact with the body.  The family is framed here as guardians of decency 
and dignity, determining the acceptability or otherwise of possible family members, and the 
possibility of their entry into the privacy of death.  Critically, this formulation, even as it is engaged 
with the private space around the body, is a focus on public status  W those in the office of family are 




negotiate with those in the status of family, not whether her bereavement needs to be recognised.  
It is only on her insistence that these concerns arise, and it is in this possibility of challenge that the 
framing slips from a concern with conscience to an engagement with risk.  This is a thin form of 
dignity, focused on avoiding risk, shielding the system from critique and providing protection for 
those confirmed in the office of family, and is thus an attention to the inquest as a public space 
separated off from the private space of family, with consequent attention to official duties and rights 
of family in those spaces. 
The impact of this formulation is that, in the public space for which the Coroner has responsibility for 
ordering, the family can also present as risk, provoking an engagement with dignity in which they are 
perceived to be failing to uphold their public office, and act to undermine the dignity of the inquest.  
The clearest example of this formulation was in reflections of some of my interviewees on post-
mortems and cultural difference. 
Dignity and the post-mortem examination 
ƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶ^ĐŽƚƚƌĂǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĂĚďŽĚǇŝŶ ?ŵĞĚŝĐŽ ?ůĞŐĂů
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŽƌŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĂĚŝŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ăƌpenter, Tait and 
others have published a series of papers on empirical work they have undertaken exploring the 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ‘ĂƉƵƐŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƌĂƉĞƵƚŝĐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶĂƵƚŽƉƐǇ ?ƐĞĞ
Carpenter et al 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015a).  Their research, along with other work (see inter alia 
Clarke & McCreanor 2006; Selket, Glover & Palmer 2014) highlights the tension between the 
treatment of a body as an object containing truth to be scrutinised, and the role of the body in 
grieving practices, but they also highlight a potential distinction between the coronial system, with 
ƐƚĂĨĨǁŚŽ ‘ĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽĞŵƉĂƚŚŝƐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐĞ
staff, who valorise scientific method. 231 Their research in relation to post-mortems in Australia 
suggests that where religious objections are communicated to the Coroner, less invasive techniques 
of investigation tend to be prioritised (2011, 334).  However, the communication of that religious 
difference, particularly profession of an Islamic faith, can engender distrust in a medico-policing 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ/ƐůĂŵŝƐŝŶǀŽŬĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƵŶǇŝĞůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚŽŐŵĂƚŝĐŝŶ
ŝƚƐĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƚŽĨĂŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŶĨĞĞĚƐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƌŽŶŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ‘ĂƐ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂƌǇƚƌƵƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? ? ? 
dŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞDƵƐůŝŵĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐĂ ‘ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĂůƐŽĂĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƌŝƚŝƐŚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ĐŽƌƌŽƐŝǀĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶDƵƐůŝŵĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ
                                                          
231 Even in light of evidence of poor practice, see NCEPOD (2006); Jones (2014), although for some reflections 




ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ? ?WĂŶƚĂǌŝƐ ?WĞŵďerton 2009, 662232).  Two Coroners reflected on their engagement 
with members of the Islamic community, with the first in particular reflecting on the ways in which 
the uncooperative suspicious Muslim family could be framed as a risk to both an individual case and 
beyond,  
(Coroner ?tĞŚĂǀĞĂĨĂŝƌůǇĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ
ƵƐ ?ǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐĨĂŝƚŚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŚĂǀĞDƵƐůŝŵĚĞĂƚŚƐďƵƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚ have as many as [somewhere 
else] where you tend to find with those kind of deaths, they are trying to push for religious 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂůƚŽƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚĂƉŽƐƚ-mortem and all 
that sort of thing, and when you have got that conflict between the laws of the land and 
their religious beliefs, it does bring about suspicion, and they do think that you are being 
difficult etc etc, and I think that then permeates out. 
(Coroner) We are increasing, we find particularly the Muslim ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƉŽƐƚ-
mortem examinations done, more than the Jewish, but some sections of that community 
will make complex complaints where they expect everything to be done the day before 
yesterday, but expect you to do that in a vacuum of no evidence, or making unsubstantiated 
allegations.  I have to have evidence, and that is a problem.  
The accounts are of families posing risks to the system, unfairly seeing the Coroner as difficult, 
resisting the necessary management of the body, pushing and complaining.  The response to these 
risks is an endeavour to protect the dignity of the inquest and an emphasis on the ways in which 
these families fail to uphold their office; charged with the status of next of kin, they are refusing to 
engage with the obligations of their office by prioritising private religious concerns over the  ‘ůĂǁƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞůĂŶĚ ? and failing to grasp the place of substantiation of evidence.  Suspicion is unavoidable and 
cyclical, permeating out and presenting a risk to the link between the Coroner and the wider 
community.  It also permeates downwards into the process, obscuring the caring links which give 
dignity and autonomy to the body,233 losing attention to the individual deceased in the suspicion, 
mistrust and miscommunication between system and family. 
In contrast, a focus on dignity as conscience emphasises a space for engagement with the family 
where the starting point was open to their contextual engagement.  Another Coroner ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ
on this demonstrated this endeavour, 
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(Coroner) We do our best but sometimes we have got to have PMs, and normally the 
families if they are explained, I mean it is, a lot of nonsense talked about this, Jewish and 
Muslim faiths have recognition and acceptance of this, what has to be has to be, if it can be 
avoided or limited so be it, that is what we do. 
Critically here there is no opening initial concern with suspicion, and the potential for conflict does 
not mean the decision is initially framed as a question of risk.  The approach engages them in 
discussion, opening space for reflections on questions of conscience and the dignity of both the 
family and the deceased.  In this role, the family are not intransigent exercisers of oppositional 
rights, but are an essential effective part of a process engaged in the dual goals of meaningful 
revelation and satisfaction of technocratic responsibilities.  The process is framed as participatory, 
and family opposition is not framed in absolute terms as necessarily destructive of their dignity or 
the dignity of the inquest.  The approach is open, and instead of a tension with the law or the 
conflict between the approach of family and the available evidence, the emphasis is on the 
possibility of avoiding or limiting if it can be done.  This Coroner discussed the possibilities of non-
invasive approaches to post-mortem investigation, highlighting that they were not appropriate for 
all cases, but with enthusiasm for their potential in providing a means of combining forms of 
accountability.234  This approach is therefore capable of shaping an outcome which recognises the 
legitimacy of difference, religious or otherwise, not from a potentially entrenched starting point of 
rights, office and status, but from a perspective of constructive dialogue.   
In a discussion about post-mortems which did not explicitly touch on religious or cultural 
differences, another Coroner also highlighted dialogue, stating that there were circumstances where 
people would request that there should be no post-mortem, or, 
maybe there is some element of uncertainty about the death, but the doctor is reasonably 
confident and then the issue with the family is going to be well, if you are content to accept 
some degree of uncertainty, I can sign this one up, if you want better information we can go 
to autopsy, and they will have some choice in the matter, in the end the decision is mine of 
course, but we will listen to their views. 
The scenario is reversed, but the emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness is the same, recognising 
that in some cases some families are willing to undergo invasive post-mortem procedures to 
establish the medical cause of death (Rankin et al 2002; Sullivan & Monagle 2011), while for others 
                                                          
234 For a less enthusiastic review of these possibilities, in the light of the Goldstein case, see Cowan 2014.  For 
some reflections on the possibilities of non-invasive approaches, see inter alia Brogdon 2012; PMFDI 2012; 




an autopsy causes additional distress (Biddle 2003; Robb & Sullivan 2004; Drayton 2011; Barnes, 
Kirkegaard & Carpenter 2014).  Critically, these framings of dignity are not fixed, and some Coroners 
and officers told me stories which illustrated the ways in which frames could shift. 
Shifting dignities  
In one interview, I read out Vignette 4 and asked two officers how they would respond to the 
appearance of the long lost sister: 
(Officer A) Fine 
(Officer B) OK 
(Officer A) Are you going to pay for the funeral then? 
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĂǇ ?ĂƌĞǇŽƵƚĂŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂů ? 
(Officer A) And they say, ŶŽ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŶŚŝŵĨŽƌ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ďƵƚ W and then the local 
council or his executors have to do all the arrangements 
(Officer B) But even if the environmental health people deal with the funeral, if she says she 
wants to be involved, that is fine, it dŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ. We get people really upset because they 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŶĂĚĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŚĞǁĂƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ŚĞĚƌĂŶŬ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ
ƚŽƉĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂů ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĞĂůůǇƵƉƐĞƚ ?ƚŽƵƐŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ
what is goŝŶŐŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚũƵĚŐĞ ?ǁĞũƵƐƚ
involve them as much as we can 
Here, the initial question of the dignified disposal of the deceased is for family to resolve, but 
crucially in this account, the dignity of the family in the process is severable from the dignity of the 
deceased because of considerations of conscience.235  The family, having justified their 
abandonment of office to the officers, are not judged, and are engaged with despite their failure.  
The upset fĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ Wthey were not in contact, he was difficult, they are 
poor  W is understandable, forgivable, and important.  Evidencing their (frustrated) care and 
humanity, and invoking a conception of dignity as conscience, they provide for a shifting of the 
frame from risk to combined accountability, meaning decisions about their involvement are framed 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞƚŚĞŵ ‘ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐǁĞĐĂŶ ? ? 
It is an account which reillustrates the crucial role of the approach of the family.  One Coroner 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐǁŚŽ ‘ĂĐƚǁŝƚŚĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŽ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŵĂŬĞĂĨƵƐƐĂŶĚƐŝƚĚŽǁŶĂŶĚƐĐƌĞĂŵĂŶĚ
                                                          





ǁĂŝů ?ǁŚŝůĞĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚ ‘ŐƌĂĐĞĨƵů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐŚĂƐƚůǇ ?ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌCoroner told a story about 
a scenario ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽďĞůĂĚĞŶǁŝƚŚƌŝƐŬ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝůůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐĂůŵĚŝƐƉůĂǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂƐƉƵďůŝĐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚ
honour and thereby fulfilled aspects of office, in particular, providing justification for conduct which 
the Coroner had otherwise found inexplicable; 
(Coroner) We do have such strange requests. We had one where a skull and the legs of a 
body was retrieved from the sea after months, and the lady concerned had been born, I 
ĐĂŶ ?t remember the country, somewhere in Africa. Her mother wanted to view the remains, 
ƐŚĞƐĂŝĚƐŚĞ ?ůůŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?/ƐĂŝĚǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚE ?ǁĞĂƌĞƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ?ŶŽ W she will do her 
own DNA test.  And she insisted, and we were very concerned, I mean we had two concerns, 
one was she using this as a reason to get into the country, to utilise that route as a means of 
getting access, but two, was she someone strange?  I spoke to my officer later and she said, 
she was absolutely quite cold and calm, and she smelt the bones and she said she was 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŚĞƌĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ
ůŽŽŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŐĂǀĞŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚƐŚĞƐĂŝĚ ‘ŝŶŽƵƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞǀĂŶŝƐŚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ
we find are the remains after leopards and lions and jackals and hyenas have been at them, 
it is not always possible to make visual identification, we smell them, they smell of our 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?EŽǁ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƚŽďĞƌĞůŝĞĚƵƉŽŶĂƚĂůů ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ
it is a load of ruďďŝƐŚ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚůĂĚǇǁĞŶƚĂǁĂǇƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŚĞƌ
daughter whose remains had been found and retrieved from the sea.   
(Ed) Did you have an inquest in that? 
(Coroner) I had to have an inquest yeah 
(Ed) Did she have questions, was she involved? 
(Coroner ?EŽ ?ƐŚĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĐŽŵĞ ?^ŚĞĐĂŵĞŽǀĞƌ ?ǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐǁĞŚĂĚ ?ĂŶĚ
went back to Africa, and took no further part, in fact we never managed to make contact 
with her again. 
(Ed) What happened to the remains?   
(Coroner) They were dealt with by the local authority I believe.  The local authority buried 
them or cremated them.  The officer was the only person at the funeral.  
The composed and politely insistent mother had engaged with office on her own terms, acting on 




dignified actions engaged the dignity of the remains of her daughter, creating a narrative shift from 
remains to personhood, with the conclusion that the officer attended the funeral.  Cultural 
difference is here framed as difference, but not illegitimacy; whilst initially presented as risk, 
ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĨĂůƐĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵƐƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞŝŶƚŽĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
humanity and her meaningful contingent revelation.  As such, it is another account of a way in which 
a frame of risk can move to a frame of conscience and combined accountability, through perceptions 
of dignity of the family.   
In contrast, another account engaged with a narrative shift of dignity from a conception of dignity as 
conscience to a concern with risk and conflicting offices: 
(Coroner) We had a body found on the rocks, and the evidence suggested he had been dead 
for some time. He was lying comfortably on his back, and had a hat he had taken off and put 
under his head.  The cause of death was impossible to determine but the pathologist view 
was that it had probably been hyperthermia, died of exposure.  He was a refugee from Iran 
or Iraq or somewhere, and he had a cousin in this country who was the sole point of contact.  
He was a medical doctor, and he wrote to me and said you have got to carry out extra tests 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨĚĞĂƚŚĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?/ƐĂŝĚƚŚĞƌĞ
ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƚĞƐƚƐƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚ ?ƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?ƐĚŽŶĞĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ŶŽŵŽƌĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĞĐĂŶŐĞƚ ? ‘ŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞůĂŝĚĚŽǁŶĂŶĚĚŝĞĚůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ
ŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ‘ŝƚĚŽĞƐŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?/ŚĂǀĞŚĂĚŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞĚŝĞĚŽĨĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?/ƚ
was a bit disturbing for a doctor who coƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚŝƐĂƚĂůů ?ĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ĂƚƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵŽĨŝƚ ?
he believed that because his cousin had been a refugee, he had been overlooked, 
mistreated, kicked about, police had a hand in it, all sorts of insinuations, not outright 
allegations but insinuations, that were just not supportable. 
(Ed) Did he attend the inquest? 
(Coroner ?EŽ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐůŽƐĞ ?ďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇĨĂŵŝůǇ
member here, apparently the burden fell on him, because that is their culture apparently, I 
think of course, he got stuck with the costs of the funeral and the whole expense over here.   
I found it disturbing that a doctor could be absolutely adamant that there must be more 
ƚĞƐƚƐ ?ǇŽƵĂƌĞĂĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƚĞůůŵĞǁŚĂƚƚĞƐƚƐ ? ‘ŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞƚŚŝƐ ?ŚĞ would not have 
ůĂŝĚĚŽǁŶĂŶĚĚŝĞĚ ? WƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŝŶƚĞŶĚŝƚƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ? “ŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƵŶĚ ? W why? He was out of sight, there was no-one, 





In this account, the body is portrayed as dignified, hidden and comfortable.  The actions of the family 
challenge this dignity, raising questions of foul play, racism and mistreatment, which the Coroner 
resists as misplaced, ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵƐŝŶ ?ƐŵĞĚŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵƐŝŶŝƐ
perceived to be reluctant to act, engaged because of the dignity and honour of his family.  The 
Coroner is sympathetic to a cousin who was not close to the deceased, who has been apparently 
compelled into an unwanted status and obliged to speak for the deceased.  However, the Coroner is 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĂƚĐŽƵƐŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƵƉŚŽůĚƚŚĞstatus of doctor; to mediate between the 
inquest and the wider family, and to approve the dignity of the corpse, and is ultimately left 
disturbed by a case which threatened the dignity of professional office.   
Dignity and disposal 
Often in my interviews these shifts in framing focused on crystallisation of disputes over who was 
entitled to receive the body and arrange the funeral.  The starting position for all of my interviewees 
was very similar; that it was a question for family to decide.  However, such answers revealed a 
complex interplay of considerations, with attention to both office holders and legal rights to 
possession, and considerations of conscience and the relationships within which the deceased lived 
and died.  As such, in relation to the non-adopted daughter in Vignette 1, as one Coroner quoted in 
Chapter Five demonstrates, the actors would be keen to pass the body of her informal father on to 
her, but there might need to be negotiation with the absent wife if she presented herself or was 
found.  Similarly, an officer would  ‘happily go along ? with the non-adopted daughter if she wanted to 
organise a funeral.  Thus answers emphasised the autonomy of family to determine the dignity of 
the deceased, with an emphasis on caring links, but also raised the possibility of the system 
intervening to protect the interests of the dead as provided by law: 
(Coroner) Yeah, I mean we try and get the family to tell us, do it that way round rather than 
us saying right the body is going to you, or whoever, and we do have circumstances where 
there is a dispute, and before, when I first started here it always used to seem to be 
whoever got to the funeral directors first to get the body, but we tend to insist that it is the 
legal next of kin, that is what we try to do, and then the onus is on them to say why that 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ? 
The emphasis on legal next of kin could be framed as a concern with office, but the attention of the 
Coroner is on protecting the body from arbitrariness and instead focusing on the substance of the 
relationships.  The next of kin is a rebuttable presumed recipient, but as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
potential malleability of the concept of next of kin leaves additional scope in this approach to engage 




deceased.  In these accounts, attention is directed to what people are willing to do, not in terms of 
their manners and status, but in demonstration of their humanity as expressed through relationships 
of care, with some interviewees describing circumstances when broader conceptions of kin would be 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞŽŶƚŚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂů ? ? 
However, unlike decisions where the body remains under the Coroner ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ
decision in relation to release of the body is not for the inquest system (Conway 2003).  This means 
that wherever a dispute crystallises, the frame shifts swiftly to focus on legal rights and risk, in which 
the decision-makers emphasise their lack of technical responsibility for the decision;   
(Coroner) One of the commonest disputes is, who do you release the body to?  And I get 
that at least every month here, and the answer is reasonably simple, I need to be satisfied 
that it is to somebody who has that right to receive it and usually there is more than one 
person, it is not for me to judge between them, it is for the family to sort out, and so 
unfortunately sometimes the body is sitting here while they sort it out. I am not intervening, 
ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŝŶŵǇƉŽǁĞƌŽƌũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚĐĂƵƐĞƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? Q/ƚŝƐĨŽƌǇŽƵ
to sort ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶ ?ƚŵǇũŽď ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƉůĞĂƐĞƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
the costs of storage, there comes a point where I might have to make a decision, sometimes 
I release it and then another next of kin pops out of the woodwork and we never knew they 
existed and they are up in arms and need an explanation, I am going to have to explain that 
we only have to notify the people that we know about and we are very sorry, there was not 
a preference for one person or another, we just did our duty. 
All of my Coroner interviewees emphasised their ultimate lack of capacity in relation to this decision.  
For this Coroner it is a common issue (it was not for others), and is not for them to decide, but 
importantly sometimes a decision has to be made.  When this happens, the too-late indignant family 
can present as a risk, to which the Coroner responds with an apologetic reliance on legal 
technicality.  The focus in these situations is on status, and on the right to claim the body, but also 
on avoiding litigation where possible, and many interviewees indicated that despite a lack of 
jurisdiction, actors in the inquest would seek to avoid the cost and indignity of litigation between 
family members; 
(Coroner) Try and see if you can come to some sensible agreement amongst yourselves 
because I am not empowered to decide for you, all I can do is give an indication of the 





It might not even get as far as the Coroner, as officers play a part in judging when a dispute has 
crystallised between family members which needs to be communicated to the Coroner.  The 
perspective of the officer is therefore particularly important, and all of my officer interviewees 
emphatically emphasised the autonomy and responsibility of family to decide, as one example 
shows where I had asked about a potential dispute between siblings, 
(Officer) I would send them away, and tell them to bang their heads together and sort it out 
 QdŚĂƚĚŽĞƐhappen and you have got to say to people look you have got to be grown up 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ ?ďĞĂĚƵůƚƐ ?ƐŽƌƚǇŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐŽƵƚ ? QǇŽƵŐĞƚƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚŽƉƉosing sides of families that 
the poor chap is resting up there in the hospital for weeks until they sort themselves out. 
(Ed) And your place would be to say to them, you have to sort this out. 
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?tĞůů/ǁŽƵůĚǇĞĂŚ ?ǁĞĂůůǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ĚƐƉĞĂŬƋƵŝƚĞĐƵƌƚůǇƚŽƚŚĞŵ
as well and say well, look, grow up, well I would, certainly I would. 
The indignity of the deceased alone and isolated in hospital is contrasted with his family members 
behaving like children  W eschewing their public facing responsibility to behave with dignity; they 
need to grow up, as their behaviour is affecting the dignity of their poor father.  The possibility that 
there might be a legitimate disagreement about how to respond to the body is dismissed, along with 
questions of conscience and ethics, because of the risk of disrespect to the deceased is framed 
through their failure to fulfil their office.  Similarly, one officer told a story of a body which had been 
in the  ‘freezer at the hospital ? for  ‘years ? because his mother believes he had been murdered,  
(Officer) He has had several investigations into how it was all dealt with and it is quite clear 
that he has taken his own life but Mum just refuses to believe it and refuses to do anything 
with his body. 
Refusing to let the body disappear, the mother is confronting the endeavour to manage her through 
an official emphasis on her responsibilities.  Her stance draws power from a law which does not 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŚĞƌƚŽ ‘ĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĚƵƚǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
form of dignity; critically, rather than not doing anything with the body, the something she is doing  W 
the act of resistance she is engaged in  W is perceived to be undermining her dignity, the dignity of the 
deceased and the dignity of the inquest process. 
Conclusion 
The potential paradox for the inquest as a site committed to caring for the dead (Matthews 2014 ix) 
is that indignity has been found to lurk in the strategies adopted to respond to the appearance of 




disappearance, the disconnection from memorialisation and invasion of autonomy represented by 
autopsy and the deep indignities and distress caused by ad hoc appropriation of remains in Alder 
Hey (Royal Liverpool Children's Inquiry 2001) and Bristol (Kennedy 2001).  The place of family in the 
contemporary inquest system is an endeavour to bridge this paradox, to explicitly situate dignity in 
the inquest as the recognition of the centrality of bereavement.  As such it looks to account for a 
form of dignity in the tie between people (Butler 2006), a dignity which does not start from liberal 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐŵ ?ďƵƚǁŚŝĐŚƐƚĂƌƚƐĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐĂƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?ŵŽƌĂůůǇĂŶĚĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ? ?,ĞůĚ ? ? ? ?    ? ?dŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨĂůůƐ
when the requirements of a public accounting invade the nuance and context of this dignity; when 
the tacit relationships of kin are transformed to status and called to the duties and rights of office, 
and in their transformation and potency can thereby pose a foundational challenge to the ordering 
of the inquest.  The challenge for the inquest system is the construction in each individual case of 
the delicate framing of a jurisdiction which avoids grasping the easy legal tools of status and office, 
and instead gently holds onto the openness, nuance and tacit relationships needed for a meaningful 
accounting.  It is to this task, the making of interested persons and the disclosing of evidence, that I 







Chapter Seven: Investigating  ? in the driving seat 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the apparently mundane and procedural questions of who is an interested 
person, and who is entitled to disclosure.  These questions are interlinked, and are critical to the 
shaping of the time of the investigation before the inquest, although my reflections on them also 
shift into the hearing of the inquest itself.  My focus is on the ways in which traditional legal 
concerns about status and rights do not play out in the ways in which law would expect them to, and 
that attention to them on their own will not capture the reflexive and reactive relationship of the 
family and the system.  This chapter explores these issues in two broad sections: firstly examining 
the management of the question of who constitutes an interested person, and secondly analysing 
the ways in which disclosure is undertaken. 
Interested persons  
Framing interested persons  
The only appearance of family members other than the next of kin in inquest legislation is through 
the lens of  ‘interested person. ?  As set out in Chapter 4, this category has expanded,236 as have the 
notification and participation rights attached to those deemed to be interested persons.  Legislation 
does not differentiate between the rights of interested persons, whether next of kin, family or non-
family:237   
(Coroner) The law requires that those who are interested persons have an opportunity of 
disclosure, have an opportunity to make submissions on the scope of the inquest, have an 
opportunity to participate.  So they are very much, all of them, in the driving seat, it is not to 
say that the decision is theirs, the decision is still the Coroner ?Ɛ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
an accountability  W I think is probably right  W ƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ? Q/ŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂůů
interested persons equally, it would be quite wrong of me to consider the family because of 
                                                          
236 A change which should be viewed in the context of legal and political engagement in definitions of family 
which has received widespread critical academic discussion, (see inter alia Buss & Hermann (2003); Glennon 
(2005); Pylkkanen (2007); Leslie (2014); Smart (2009) Cornford, Baines & Wilson (2013); Roseneil et al (2013); 
Douglas (2014)) as well as sociological critique of the usefulness and ambiguities of family (see inter alia, 
Bourdieu (1996); Roseneil & Budgeon (2004); Wilson (2007); Reimers (2011); Atkinson (2014)).  There is 
particular cross over with critical academic discussion of succession and inheritance law, and I draw on that 
work in this chapter, but have sought to avoid an over emphasis on that literature to avoid skewing my focus 
towards questions of the intent of the testator and crystallised disputes between individuals rather than 
focusing on negotiated relationships and systemic attention on the family (see Monk 2011 & 2014, Douglas et 
al 2011 & 2014, Hacker 2014, Leslie 1996 & 2014).   
237 Interested persons are set out in s.47(2)(a)-(m) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and includes specific classes 
of family member, beneficiaries of a life insurance policy, anyone who might have caused or contributed to the 
death and a range of other possible interested persons, with a final catch-all category of other individuals with 




their bereavement were primes inter pares, they are not.  Of course they need to be 
handled sympathetically. 
They may not have any additional formal rights, but the role of the family in practice is very different 
to other interested persons.  Many interviewees described active families expanding the evidence 
needed, while another reflected 
(Coroner) I see the family as driving the investigation, because with a hospital death, to you 
it may look natural, when you go to take the statement from the family, the family say well, 
ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞŶĂŶǇǁĂƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞŶĂŶǇĨŽŽĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶĞǀĞƌĂŶǇŶƵƌƐĞƐ
around, all the care aspects, the neglect aspects come out at that point, and of course then 
you have to go down a different route for the investigation, so we are reliant on the family 
to almost point the investigation down the right channels. 
The role of the family is central, and their participation fundamentally shapes the conduct of the 
investigation.  My interviewees all stated that family was more likely to be involved in the 
contemporary inquest than previously, and although legislation only initially requires notification of 
next of kin, all my interviewees emphasised that they had a responsibility to go further, to notify and 
involve a wider family.238  This involvement was necessarily enabled or restricted by my 
interviewees, and systemic frame-based analysis of their decisions reveals the role of these 
technologies of jurisdiction in the representation of the law of the inquest, as these decisions are key 
questions of jurisdiction; who can participate in the construction of law and how that law is given 
authority.   
An example of the implications of framing can be found in the different approaches of the High 
Court and the Coroner in the case of Platts v. HM Coroner for South Yorkshire.239  The case related to 
Madhi Al-Jaf, who died after he stepped in front of a lorry in April 2005.  In the days before his 
death, as he exhibited  ‘increasingly bizarre behaviour ?240, he had made a series of implicit or explicit 
suicidal statements in interactions with the police, medical services and other state agents.  Ms 
Platts had been in a relationship with Mr Al-Jaf, and sought to be involved in his inquest.  When the 
Coroner refused, she applied for judicial review of his decision.  In the High Court, she did not pursue 
an argument that she was his partner, and focused instead on the Coroner ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŽ
admit properly interested persons.  Wilkie J held that despite  ‘the caution with which this court 
                                                          
238 Including, for some of my interviewees, a requirement that they would seek to contact the absent father in 
Vignette 3, although others did not consider themselves bound to seek to establish contact with him.   
239 [2008] EWHC 2502  W a case which pre-dated the 2009/2013 reforms. 




should approach an invitation to interfere with an exercise of judgment which the rules impose on a 
Coroner, ?241 the Coroner had been wrong to exclude Ms Platts. 242   
The differences are stark.  The Coroner ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁŝƚŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ
legitimate formal categories and controlling the scope of the inquiry, and the first question was one 
of traditional family.  He found that Ms Platts had been the partner of the deceased for well over a 
year, but before his death he had  ‘ended the existing family arrangement between himself and Ms 
Platts. ?243  Critically, despite her protestations to the contrary, the Coroner found as a fact that the 
deceased and they were no longer partners and she was therefore  ‘a stranger to the inquest. ?244   
Having narrowly interpreted the meaning of partner in the context of a relationship which clearly 
subsisted in some form,245 the Coroner ƚŚĞŶĨƌĂŵĞĚDƐWůĂƚƚƐ ?ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĨŽƌǁĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?
and dismissed them as irrelevant and illegitimate; 
First, it seems to me that Ms Platts seeks to participate in this inquest because she is 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁ ‘ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂůůĞŐĞĚůǇůĞƚĚŽǁŶŚĞƌĨŽƌŵĞƌďŽǇĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ŝŶ
ŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƐŚĞŚĂƐ ‘ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĞŐƵŝůƚĨŽƌƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?tŚŝůƐƚŽŶĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ
sympathy with Ms Platts as to the latter point, I am not satisfied that she has any reason for 
guilt, but, even if she does have any reason for guilt, in my view that is not sufficient to 
enable her to participate in this inquest. 
,ĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĨĂŝůŝŶŐƐŝƐĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚĂƐĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐǇƚŚĞŽƌǇƵƐŝŶŐ ‘ƐĐĂƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ ? ?246 while her 
misguided guilt is doubly dismissed as unwarranted and insufficient.  Similarly, the second reason 
the Coroner identified  W the possibility that Ms Platts wished to gather evidence for a civil claim  W is 
                                                          
241 Para 43, and the extent of discretion is highlighted by the reluctance of the court to intervene, revealed by 
the fact that permission for judicial review of the Coroner ?ƐĚĞĐŝsion was initially denied, before the application 
was renewed, para 2. 
242 The Coroner also found that Article 2 was not engaged in the particular circumstances of the case, and Ms 
WůĂƚƚƐ ?ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?In relation to the Article 2 point, 
Wilkie J held that, even within the considerable breadth of discretion available, the Coroner had been wrong to 
hold that Article 2 was not arguably engaged.  See para 33-37. 
243 Quote from Coroner, Platts, para 40. 
244 Platts, para 42. 
245 Mr Al-Jaf had moved out of her home five weeks before his death but he and Ms Platts continued to speak 
ŽŶƚŚĞƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŝŶƚŚĞǁĞĞŬƐďĞĨŽƌĞŚĞĚŝĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽŚŝƐ ‘ŐŝƌůĨŝĞŶĚ ?
(presumably Ms Platts) in the witness statements of the various professionals who engaged with the deceased 
in the hours before his death, see para 17-32.  As with some of my interviewees, the judgment suggests the 
Coroner may have conflated cohabitation with partnership (see discussion of this point in relation to the 
previous test of  ‘enduring family relationship ? taken from adoption legislation & caselaw, discussed Sloan 
2011, and see inter alia Re T (Adoption) (2010).  




further evidence of the threat she posed, and the resulting need to protect the limited, technocratic, 
blame-free inquest.247  
In contrast, the Court emphasised the need to look at the whole of the relationship between Ms 
Platts and Mr Al-Jaf, including their very close connection, as well as the connection between their 
break up and Mr Al-:ĂĨ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůĚĞĂƚŚ ?dŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĂƚ
relationship; where the Coroner saw bright-lines and leapt from partner to stranger, the Court 
ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŶƵĂŶĐĞ ?tŝůŬŝĞ: ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƚŽƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞůĂǁǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
practices and complexities of kinship248 rather than a superimposition of the strictures of formal 
relationships.  This framing is also attentive to purpose, removing the scare quotes and emphasising 
the genuineness of her concern with systemic failings.  It was legitimate for her to want to be 
involved, and any potential compensation claim does not make those concerns any less reasonable 
and substantial.  Paying attention to judicial directives to exclude those with only trivial, contrived or 
idle curiosity meant Ms Platts should be involved, and the Coroner ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
unreasonable.   
Answers in my interviews similarly demonstrated the divide.  Where actors understood their role as 
combining technocratic and convivial forms of accountability, they adopted an expansive approach, 
attentive to the realities of emotional connections and the need for meaningful outcomes.  Effective 
participation was elevated, both in its own right and as a way of ensuring the inquest reached a 
better outcome, and they focused on the substance of inclusion, not on the formality of an 
obligation to include.  Where decisions to include were inevitable, the framing meant attention was 
directed to why and how such individuals ought to be involved.  In relation to disclosure and 
participation, a combined accountability frame meant actors focused on explanation, understanding 
and interaction.  This framing is of an account of law given authority through a blend of forms of 
accountability, including the crucial effective participation of those closely connected to the 
deceased. 
In contrast, where endeavours to combine forms of accountability were challenged or frustrated, or 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƌŝƐŬĨƌĂŵŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ ?ĂŶĚůĂǁ ?Ɛ
authority thinned out, derived solely from a technocratic emphasis on neutrality and objectivity.  
Where risk gave meaning to the situation, decisions focused on office and status, emphasising 
                                                          
247 The judgment of the Court is generous to the Coroner on this second point, accepting evidence from Ms 
Platts that the Coroner overstated her desire to be involved in order to seek compensation, but finding that 
the  ‘slip ? by the Coroner cannot be criticised.   
248 I use kinship in this chapter drawing on Butler ?Ɛ (2004) emphasis on practices of kinship to distinguish 




formal legal categories, as well as a concern with protection and pre-empting.  Interested persons 
were engaged with where required, and actors were concerned with privacy and limits to scope.  
Attention on who could assist the inquiry was narrower, with sole focus on relevant evidence, not on 
whether their participation was effective and integral to constructing a meaningful narrative.   In 
relation to questions of disclosure, a risk frame could be preoccupied with protecting the family 
from the risk of hurt, distress or indignity, or could emphasise minimum requirements and a 
presumption of family initiation.   
Platts demonstrates these sharp differences, but critically, it was a case in which someone 
representing kinship sought to be involved, meaning convivial accountability was possible.  The real 
challenge for the system arises when there is no family or family do not respond as required, making 
impossible the construction of a participative, meaningful inquest.   
Making it work: the need for family 
Without an interested family, as the Coroner quoted in Chapter Six states, an inquest is a bit sad, 
and it is unclear who is to be satisfied.  Two other Coroners reflected on conducting an inquest 
hearing without family: 
(Coroner 1) It feels somewhat daft sitting there, either nobody in court or one tedious 
reporter. 
(Coroner 2) There are quite often occasions when I am sat in court with just me and the 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ/ĂŵƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?
(Ed) How does that feel? 
(Coroner  ? ?ďŝƚŽĚĚ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵŐĞƚƵƐĞĚƚŽŝƚ ?/ƚŝƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƐǁĞůů ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐ
recorded, but now under the 2009 Act it is required, and a copy of the recording is available 
to interested persons, so the basic requirement for the inquiry and the inquest takes place 
even though there are no bereaved as such, no family and no-one present. Of course it is not 
expanded any more than that unless I obviously have concerns.  
While a  ‘tedious ? reporter may not combat the  ‘daftness ? of an inquest without family, the oddness 
of the empty room may be partly countered by the role of technology, extending the public space 
into the future.  In either case, it is a diminished space, narrowed by the absence of the bereaved to 
participate and to hear the law, and where the proper place of family to oversee the process is 
vacated, the Coroner is left trying to fill the gap.  Crucially, this gap is not simply in the public 





(Coroner) Then we have to almost step into their shoes and look deeper.  You may have 
some medical notes there and the doctor has given you a statement to say that they died 
from bronchopneumonia, due to immobility, following a fall, and if there is no family, then 
we may spend more time on the notes, just checking that we are happy with them, that 
everything was as it should be. 
This scrutiny by family is not the forensic examination of the expert, but the contextual scrutiny 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵĂĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?&ĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐůŝĨĞŝƐŚĞƌĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ
into death, and the Coroner cannot fully take their place, but will be forced to do so if necessary.  
However, it is a better investigation if the Coroner does not have to rely on medical notes or almost 
step into their shoes, and when it gets to the inquest, where the audience is not the tiresome media 
or an imagined future lisƚĞŶĞƌ ?ƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƐŽĐŝĂů ŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
generating and buttressing a narrative of relationship resistant to themes of isolation and 
abandonment.249  If there is no family, the system is forced to turn elsewhere.  One Coroner told me 
they would not recognise the girlfriend in Vignette 2, and in response I asked if this would be 
different if there was no other family  
(Coroner ?/ĨŚĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĨĂŵŝůǇŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ?ďƵƚ W in a case like this, goodness 
gracious you would want someone there. This is the sort of case that can run for years, it will 
be subject to loads of inquiries, and I would like to have somebody represented, to 
represent the interests, so I would be looking for, someone, even if it was a cousin or an 
uncle or something like that, we would want a next of kin for this, and if there is absolutely 
no-one else then I would consider it, but you do have to have some contact. 
Another Coroner said where there was  ‘absolutely no family ? and a longstanding friend of 30 years 
wanted to participate, they would normally exercise their discretion.  There does have to be some 
connection,  ‘a closeness ? or  ‘a genuine interest, they are not just nosy parkers or interfering 
busybodies ? as other Coroners put it, but the system will search for someone to represent kinship 
and connection.250  Importantly, this connection is not necessarily founded in legal status, and the 
way in which the system shapes this ability to speak does not necessarily flow from legal rights.  
Instead the critical question is one of framing, as demonstrated by one Coroner ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ
missing sister, who would have an automatic right to be an interested person  
(Coroner) I would be very happy for her to be involved, she is not going to be able to give an 
awful lot of information to help us, but she has every right to ask questions as the only 
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representative. Indeed it is always difficult to do an inquest with nobody representing the 
family, unless I have reason to believe she has other interests if you see what I mean, on 
behalf of someone else or some other interest.   
This quote neatly demonstrates the shifting nature of framing; the Coroner is very happy for her to 
be involved, uŶůĞƐƐƐŚĞŚĂƐ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞŝƐŚŝĚŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞeking to gain 
entrance to the inquest by stealth.  The frame then shifts to one of risk, to concern with protecting 
both the inquest and the idea of kinship from opportunists seeking to misuse the forum and the 
office of family.  The critical issue in framing this decision is therefore not the question of law  W does 
she fulfil the necessary criteria to cross the threshold of interested person  W but is a concern with the 
perceived purpose of her involvement. 
Thinking about purpose 
Prior to the implementation of the 2009 Act, there were two categories under which family could 
participate, either automatically, or at the discretion of the Coroner ĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?
or PIP.  Chapter Three notes that it was common for all participants to be described as PIPs, even 
ĂĨƚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞĂĚĚĞĚǁŚĞŶ ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ŽŶůǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ
categories.  The requirement for propriety thus bled through to all participants, illustrated by the 
above response to the missing sister  W she may be an automatic entrant, but the properness or 
otherwise of her interest remains relevant.  Many answers in my interviews reinforced this point, 
that whilst it is no longer an explicit factor in the formal exercise of coronial discretion or a revealing 
ƚĂŐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂŶŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ
and central concern of the inquest system.   
My interviewees consistently indicated that a perceived interest in the therapeutic possibilities of 
the inquest  W seeking closure, explanation and certainty  W was proper, and encouraged actors to 
make decisions and interpret engagement through a combined accountability framing.  More 
challenging were questions of liability, blame and compensation, perceived by some interviewees as 
improper,251 and encouraging a shift to focus on risks, resulting in an emphasis on excluding 
individuals and narrowing issues.  This approach was clearest amongst the officers I interviewed, 
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who all mused on the impact of a perceived compensation culture.252  As one officer volunteered, 
contrasting the biological father with the rest of the family in Vignette 3, the 
(Officer) Family may be satisfied with an explanation, father might say, chi-ching253, you 
know, speaking callously.  
The distinction is stark; a bereaved family might be entitled to compensation, but do not seek it, 
whilst the biological father is only interested because of the distasteful pursuit of money. 254  In such 
an account, the interest of the family in proceedings is closely connected to accounts of dignity.  The 
family demonstrate the human dignity of close emotional ties through refusing to prioritise financial 
reward, while the separated father is to be tolerated as an office holder whose actions have 
undermined the dignity of his office.   
However, blame is not necessarily improper; it can be wholly legitimate to seek blame and 
compensation and it can be a crucial part of accountability.  One Coroner told me  
I think it is unhelpful to simply trot out that the Coroners court is not a court of blame [as] 
questions as to whether an act or omission caused or contributed to the death will properly 
ĂƌŝƐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƵƚĂĐŽƌŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚĐĂŶŶŽƚŵĂŬĞĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ
apportioning blame to an individual. 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ‘ǀĞƌǇĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐŽƌŽŶĞƌĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ
technocratic accountability, arguing that if there is litigation ongoing at the same time, the inquest 
can promote cost-savings and settlement in civil proceedings.   
Even where there was acceptance of the role of blame, there was caution about seeking individual 
or systemic fault, and some Coroners expressed particular aversion about the role of campaigning 
organisations in this context.  One Coroner related a situation in which they were asked to approve 
an interested person who had been assisting the deceased in a care home, but who was also 
involved in a campaign group which had raised ongoing concerns about the institution.  Describing 
their decision-making process, the Coroner reasoned that  
(Coroner) if there is no other next of kin and she is the next best thing, then she would be an 
interested person, but if I have got a next of kin who is engaged, who is asking the questions 
on behalf of the famiůǇ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŶĞĞĚEKƚŚĞƌ ?dŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂŶ
interested person is about having people who are involved in it by virtue of the nature of 
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ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? QdŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůƐŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƐƵĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĂƐŬŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚ
know the extent to which having this other interested person is desired or requested. 
Crucially, this was a fine judgment, and once again, the key to it is whether there were any engaged 
relatives.  If there were not, and an individual was able to show they had caring links, the Coroner 
would grant interested person status.  There is a hierarchy, with family at the top, but the system 
ǁŝůůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚďĞƐƚƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĨŝĐƚŝǀĞŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ?ŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?255  In a risk-framed 
scenario, reliance on proper connection to the deceased may be a way of excluding someone who 
presents as a threat to the system.256  However, it is also important for a combined accountability 
framing, because the role of kin is to make convivial accountability possible, and unless there was a 
relationship with the deceased, the interested person cannot be part of generating a contextual, 
nuanced and meaningful account.   
This Coroner also highlights the possibility that the friend might raise questions the family do not 
want asking.  ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝƐŶŽƚĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĂ
friend raising blame with the tacit or explicit approval of a family raised far fewer concerns, as 
another Coroner reflected 
(Coroner ?/ƚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ QƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐĂǇĨŽƌĞǆĂŵple, well I visited him in hospital on a regular 
ďĂƐŝƐ ?ŚŝƐĨĂŵŝůǇůŝǀĞĚĂůŽŶŐǁĂǇĂǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǀŝƐŝƚ ?ďƵƚ/ŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶŚŝŵĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐƐŽ/
ǀŝƐŝƚĞĚŚŝŵŝŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚǀĞƌǇŚĂƉƉǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĞŶƵƌƐĞƐŵĂŶĂŐĞĚŚŝŵ ?Žƌ
something.  You have got the family in court, they are clearly properly interested, they have 
come from miles away to be there on the day, but the friend was actually the one that was 
in the hospital and has relevant questions to put, so yeah, sure. 
In both accounts, the connection with the deceased is central, with both emphasising a link founded 
on caring, but framed through concerns with combined accountability, both demonstrate the 
importance of engaging with a broader tacit community and recognising the possibilities of non-
family kinship.   
In the second account, the friend is critical in constructing and combining forms of accountability, 
while the family play a more passive role.  Other Coroners reflected on an apparently quiescent 
family, and  W at the opposite end of the scale from a concern with blaming  W the potential risks 
posed by such a family failing to live up to their proper role.  Their purpose is again critical, as 
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decisions here are concerned with avoiding the risk the inquest will not achieve a therapeutic 
outcome, and actors expressed disappointment with family who frustrate endeavours to combine 
accountabilities, as one Coroner described 
(Coroner ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞǁŚĞƌĞǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵĞŶŐĂŐĞƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?
ŐĞƚĐƌŽƐƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ QĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŵǇŽĨĨŝcers often say to them unofficially look, have you 
ƐŽƵŐŚƚĂŶǇůĞŐĂůĂĚǀŝĐĞ ?tĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞŵƚŽĂŶǇďŽĚǇ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵŐŽƚŽ
anybody, but there are cases where families just want it finished, it is their way of getting 
ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚthis running on for ages. 
Similarly, the focus can be on creating opportunities for an uninvolved family to participate, as one 
officer demonstrated, in an account of a father who was separated from the rest of the family, 
(Officer) suddenly two months after the death the father appears on the scene and he is 
saying, what should I do?  I said, you are making representations on behalf of your son, you 
are seeking assurances that this event is likely to have caused him to have done what he did.  
Then I say, have you had an opportunity to speak with the rest of the family? He said yes.  I 
said, they have sought representation.  He said, do you think I should?  I said, it is a choice 
for you, but you should be reassured that that could be your best course of conduct, now 
there is nothing more that I can say. 
(Ed) And so is he now-? 
(Officer) He is going to see a solicitor 
The emphasis in this account is on responding to a direction-less father to prompt him towards his 
proper role, endeavouring to make his engagement as full and as meaningful as possible.  By 
contrast, a framing focused on the risks of an overly suspicious family does not actively seek to 
extend their role,  
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ŝƚŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŚĂƐŶ ?ƚŐŽŶĞƋƵŝƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŽƵƌƉůĂĐĞƚŽƐay 
ƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ĂƌĞǇŽƵŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŵŝŶƵƚĞǇŽƵƐĂǇ ‘ĂƌĞǇŽƵŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌ ?-
 ‘tĞůů ?ĚŽ/ŶĞĞĚŽŶĞ ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĨŽƌƵƐƚŽƐĂǇ. 
Solicitors create more work, and with a linked concern about families who are  ‘looking at pound 
signs ? in the words of another officer, this account presents a thin form of family autonomy in which 
their engagement is founded solely on their own resources.  The role of the family may not be 
restricted, but it is not promoted, and as family are responsive to the actions of the officers, the 




therefore an endeavour to resist the illegitimacy of compensation which flows from the involvement 
of lawyers.  It also demonstrates the ways in which involvement of the family is a series of decisions 
about how they are involved.  While statute law focuses on status and associated rights, the legal 
approach in the system ignores or defers questions of threshold, preferring to deal in contingency, 
equivocation and informality. 
Making and not making decisions  
There is no requirement that decisions about interested person status are publicly announced and 
my interviewees all emphasised the ways in which their general approach is rarely explicit and 
determinative.  Instead, decisions are taken without formal rulings unless  ‘there was any argument 
ĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚƵƐƵĂůůǇ. ?  One Coroner described the decision about interested person status as 
 ‘usually blindingly obvious right from ĚĂǇŽŶĞ QĂƉĂƌĞŶƚŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌŽƌĂƐƉŽƵƐĞŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?, 
while another stated that  ‘very often, in 90% of cases, it is obvious who the interested persons are. ? 
257 
One demonstration of the blindingly obvious was the unanimously positive responses of my 
interviewees to the claims of the non-adopted daughter in Vignette 1.  She was automatically an 
interested person because of caring links and reciprocity258 despite lacking the legal status of 
daughter.  Her implied and unchallenged relationship with the deceased echoes the tacit 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽDŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĐŽŶǀŝǀŝĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŚĞƌĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ
ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
kinship.259   
Vignette 3 also revealed insights into framing and sequential decision-making.  The vignette was 
deliberately designed to provoke reflections about the treatment of a violent absent and otherwise 
unconnected biological father, contrasted with an informal father.  Many of the answers reflected 
this, framing the biological father through a risk-lens, and adopting different approaches to the new 
partner.  In a common approach, one Coroner reasoned that the new partner would see the papers 
anyway, going on to note that granting him interested person status would serve to antagonise the 
biological father.  This risk-focused framing positioned the new partner as engaged in the public 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞCoroner decided that he would be allowed to ask 
questŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂůĨ ?dŚŝƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƉƵďůŝĐƌŽůĞƐ
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enables a gesture of justification towards a biological father unhappy with the involvement of the 
new partner, but simultaneously denies the substantive relationship between the new partner and 
the deceased child.   
Another Coroner likewise felt there was no need for a formal decision about his status: 
(Coroner) Well now, there is no rush. Firstly, as they are partners, they are not in a situation 
in which she would want all the disclosure to be duplicated, it is going to go to her anyway, 
so I would expect my officers to just say further down the line we have got a PIR and 
inquest, we can deal with these issues then. We would explain to her what rights she has 
and if what she is actually saying is she wants the father, the partner to be asking the 
questions of the witness rather than her, I have no problems with that at all, because she 
has asked for that, to be a representative, and it is likely as not that that will be in 
consultation with her. And therefore I would give him that status, but we may not come to 
that because if they are both going to appear in court, and I am helping them out, it may be 
he will give advice to the mother who will ask questions, and he will not need to be an IP, as 
he will have sight of the prior disclosures to the mother.  
This Coroner initially appears to be focused solely on questions of status and legal rights, only to 
dismiss them as unimportant.  Instead the emphasis is on enabling the effective participation of the 
family.  This framing was even clearer when the same Coroner went on to explore the substance of 
the relationship between the new partner and the child, and reflected on the difficulty if the 
biological father objected to the new partner being involved 
(Coroner) which he is entitled to say. I am somewhat reluctant to allow other people to 
prevent others from becoming interested persons if it is around emotional personal reasons 
of their relationship, it needs to be on the relevance to the inquest.  And if this has 
effectively been the father, it might be what we want to know for example is, how 
independent the child was, what were the circumstances in which she was allowed to walk 
home, well the real, the partner is far more likely to know that and ask relevant questions 
based on his knowledge of her character and behaviour. 
This response to a legitimate challenge by the biological father is not a reliance on legal status but is 
instead an engagement in the substance of the relationship between the new partner and the child, 
with a telling near-ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂů ? father.  dŚĞŶĞǁƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ




which combines forms of accountability, but decisions about it will be avoided if possible, and if 
necessary, will be taken incrementally without rushing. 
In contrast, risk-framing adopted by other Coroners focused on a concern to keep order and prevent 
the new partner and the mother  ‘both chipping in simultaneously ?,  
(Coroner ?,ĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĂƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŚĞŝƐĂĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ǁĞ
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽŶĞ ?ŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ƐŽ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
want to use the word superfluous, but he is not needed, I mean I have got no problem with 
him sitting next to her, and providing her with questions to ask if it is appropriate 
(Ed) And if he sought to ask the questions? 
(Coroner) I would ask him on what basis he feels he needs to ask questions when she can.  It 
ŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŝĨƐŚĞŝƐƐŽĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƐŚĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƚŚĞŶ/ ŵŝŐŚƚĂĐĐĞƉƚŚŝŵ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŽŶ
her behalf, not him as a properly interested person. 
Where decisions employed a combined accountability frame focused on the relationships of the new 
partner and the child, instead attention here is on the mother.  This focus on risk, and therefore a 
concern with controlling the inquest, does not look to any judicially mandated test for the possible 
involvement of tŚĞŶĞǁƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƌĞƐƚƐŽŶƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵĂŶĚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌĂƚƚŚĞĂƉĞǆ ? 
The hierarchy of family 
In 2006, in evidence to a Commons Select Committee, Victor Round, former Honorary Secretary of 
the Coroners' Society and HM Coroner for Worcester, was asked how Coroners dealt with a number 
of potential interested persons.  He stated that  
We have the natural emotional hierarchy in a family, which tends to elect a boss, a leader, a 
family spokesman, and if it is a split family maybe two of them, but we cope with that 
regularly.260 
                                                          
260 See Oral evidence attached to report of Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, 8th Report of Session 2005-





As well as this natural emotional hierarchy, Mr Round emphasised associated legal regimes,261 and in 
the context of a proposed extension to include friends of long standing,262 argued that this emphasis 
on a hierarchy is important  
Otherwise you do, I am afraid, particularly with mental patients, have friends of long 
standing popping up all over the place, and nowadays we say to them,  ‘Look, the family are 
in charge here, not you ? and I would have hoped we would still be able to say that.263 
The approach is bound up with concerns about risk, and seeks to deal with challenges through 
reliance on status.  As Mr ZŽƵŶĚ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇďĞŝŶŐŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞŵĂŬĞƐĐůĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ
is necessary to exclude and control risk.  Critically, although the framing emphasises family 
autonomy, it suggests it is a matter of nature and fact where family stops.  It ignores the ways in 
which family practices enact and simultaneously construct264, and the recurrent cyclical interaction 
of that construction with both law and the range of informal decisions being made by officers and 
Coroners potentially deploying uncritical state thinking about the shape of family.265  One Coroner 
reflected on this, stating it was a question for the officers how far family extended, and officers 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽŶŝƚ ?ƚŚĞǇũƵƐƚ 
(Coroner ?ŬŶŽǁĞŶŽƵŐŚĂďŽƵƚĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?ƐŽŝƚŝƐĨƵŶŶǇŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŽĚƌĂǁƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ?ƐŽŵĞƐƚĞƉƐŽŶŽƌ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?some great aunt or something like 
that. 
To gain entrance to the inquest, the crucial factor is not necessarily a question of legal status, but is 
rather whether the individual falls within a negotiated social category of family.266 This factor will be 
framed by reference to a concern with accountability or with risk, and crucial shaping decisions will 
be made before the Coroner engages with the case.  An example is the risk-framed hierarchy of 
                                                          
261 Citing the Administration of Estates Act 1925, which deals with priority in relation to probate rules. See 
critical discussion of the application of the probate rules and the way in which they can make will writing a 
political act in Monk (2011). 
262 dŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚŝůůǁĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĨĨĂŝƌƐ^ĞůĞĐƚ
Committee during pre-legislative scrutiny, and was removed from the Bill as introduced, see para 139 of the 8th 
Report of Session 2005-06, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/902/90208.htm#a27 
263 See Oral evidence attached to report of Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, 8th Report of Session 2005-
06, response to Q114, 13 June 2006, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/902/6061302.htm 
264 See eg Morgan (2011). 
265 See Bourdieu (1996); Maclean and Eekelaar (2004); Cornford, Baines & Wilson (2013); Atkinson (2014).   





importance demonstrated by one officer in relation to scenarios like the new partner in Vignette 3.  
The idea of him asking to be granted interested person status  
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĂƌŝƐĞ ? ?dŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ?ƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŚĞĐĂŶĐŽŵĞ
along as it is public but why would he need to be treated as the father? 
The framing is a limited conception of the inquest, with the dismissal of any substantive emotional 
connection between the child and the new partner who, presented with an officer who did not see 
any purpose in his involvement, would be excluded from interested person status without any 
coronial involvement.  It would appear naturally as if the family had elected a spokesperson.  In such 
circumstances, the role of the officers is key, and as another officer explained, the 
Coroner ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǀĞƌƐĂǇ ?right who is the mother, who is the father, at an inquest.  It 
would just be, we would just say, the mother is sat here, she will be the one asking 
questions. 
Similarly, this officer will have managed the question of interested person in advance.  In this 
context, it is important that some Coroners were suspicious of the possibility of perceived family 
overreach, emphasising that it was for the Coroner to determine who was an interested person, but 
the operation of serial decision-making means that a formal decision may never be required by the 
Coroner, and where a decision is needed, it will be inevitably framed by information provided by 
family and decisions taken by family (see Davis et al 2002, 29 for a critical reflection on this).  Family 
thus have a critical part to play in determining their own formation, in particular when decisions are 
ĨƌĂŵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƌŝƐŬ ?ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚǁŽŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ
the girlfriend in Vignette 2 demonstrated  
(Officer A) If they had a child together then we would probably treat it a bit different 
because they are joined by that child, so I would give them a bit more, but again you would 
liaise with the family.  We wouldn't be giving out information to people without the family 
beŝŶŐĂǁĂƌĞ ?ďƵƚŝĨǇŽƵũƵƐƚŚĂĚďŽǇĨƌŝĞŶĚĂŶĚŐŝƌůĨƌŝĞŶĚůŝǀŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ- 
(Officer B ?tĞǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞďŽǇĨƌŝĞŶĚĂŶĚŐŝƌůĨƌŝĞŶĚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚǁĞ 
(Officer A) Yeah, a lot of the time we hope that they speak, touch wood, the majority of 
family would be aware of his girlfriend and they would be in contact  
The separation of the girlfriend and family, and the emphasis on liaising with family, even in a 




illustrates the application of a natural hierarchy and the potential role of family in policing its own 
edges, as also suggested by another officer  
(Officer) I would say that we contact the family and ask them if they would like to contact 
the giƌůĨƌŝĞŶĚ QǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽŐŝǀĞŚĞƌĂŶǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ
ƌŝŐŚƚǁĞ ?ůůĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚŝĨǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŚĂƉƉǇĨŽƌƵƐƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇǇŽƵƌĚĞƚĂŝůƐƚŚĞŶ
ŚŽƉĞĨƵůůǇƚŚĞǇĐĂŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǇŽƵĂŶĚůĞƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?267 
Similarly, a Coroner who was not sure of recognising the girlfriend in Vignette 2 as an interested 
person stated that she would be encouraged to be in contact with the family.  This hierarchy also 
places family in a critical position in relation to managing privacy and communicating with those 
deemed outside family, as illustrated in a story told to me by another Coroner about a young man 
who had  ‘taken his own life in unusual circumstances, and we had a letter from someone who went 
to school with him for many years, they had been very very close and had heard he had died in an 
accident, and would I write and tell him what the circumstances of the accident were? ?  The family 
were embarrassed by how he had died, and the Coroner  ‘felt justified in the circumstances saying 
you are not a properly interested person ? and told him he had to contact the family.  The family 
informed the Coroner they would not attend any hearing, and when the inquest was held, nobody 
else attended.  Sympathetic with their discomfort, this Coroner passed responsibility to the family 
for deciding how to engage beyond their own circle, and it was unsurprising that the investigation 
was able to be closed  ‘on the basis of a written statement, in a public setting. ?    
Resisting the natural emotional hierarchy 
In contrast to this narrow risk-framing of family-as-gatekeepers, some interviewees reflected on 
situations where, although they perceived family to have a key role in delineating their own  ‘edges, ? 
they would seek to subvert the natural emotional hierarchy, as with the girlfriend in Vignette 2; 
(Officer) Say you have got someone, they have barely been going out with each other for any 
time at all but their relationship was very intense, and quite often, they are more distraught 
than the immediate family because they have got more invested in the relationship. We still 
have to go through the next of kin and what the Coroner says, but anyone can go to an 
                                                          
267 In addition, it is interesting to note that in relation to the responses by officers in this section, I also 
interviewed Coroners in those areas, who stated that the girlfriend would be granted interested person status.  
This illustrates the importance of serial decision-making, as it is possible that steps taken by the officers in this 
scenario might make it less likely that the girlfriend would have an opportunity to become an interested 
person.  However, it should also be noted that some of the officers interviewed stated they would be likely to 
approach the Coroner with questions in this case, and in any event they would act with particular caution and 
sensitivity, not least because as some officers and Coroners noted, it was not unusual in their experience for 




inquest and as a final resort that is, we can keep in touch with them, and we can tell them 
when the inquest is going to be. 
Rather than focusing on the risks presented by the distraught girlfriend, the officer is attentive to the 
substance of the intense relationship, and seeks to resist her exclusion and the perceived 
impositions of law.  They remain bound by the dual dictates of the family and the Coroner, but 
sympathy arising from recognition of the investment in the relationship frames their endeavour to 
seek to engage them, and, at the last resort, enable their attendance at the inquest.  A similar 
attention to the substance of the relationship was evident in the reflections of a Coroner in relation 
to how they would approach this vignette 
(Coroner) Would she be counting as a partner within the meaning of section 47?  It depends, 
I think at first blush I would probably say yes, I will call you interested if you really have been 
his girlfriend for ten months, if his parents popped up and said this woman led him astray 
etc and there is no way you should regard her then I might hold a pre-inquest hearing to say 
now come on, tell me why you think you should be interested when the parents say you 
have been a bad influence on him. 
The initial approach, oriented towards a broad tacit conception of kinship, is made provisional by 
family challenge, in which case the Coroner will be obliged to make an explicit decision about her 
status.  Critically, the basis for that challenge reveals the Coroner ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
relationship built on reciprocity, because when it is queried, the relationship is evaluated against an 
ethics of care.268  It is an account of the Coroner building and negotiating family, making decisions 
about status, but importantly the considerations are not those of law; the fact of a family 
relationship, or a reasonable and substantial interest.  Instead it is directed towards practices and 
the qualities of the relationship, exploring the wider context, reaching a decision accessible to non-
technocratic knowledges, and making possible the construction of a contingent, individualised, 
convivial space.  The Coroner does not acknowledge the potential dangers in this delicate 
construction, including the danger of legal challenge, but rather than adopting a risk framing and 
resorting to the protection of law, the approach gambles on reconciling the participants, or at least 
reaching a decision which is comprehensible and acceptable to them.   
ŶŽƚŚĞƌŵŽĚĞŽĨƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽůĂǁ ?ƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƌŝƐŬǁĂƐƚŽƐĂďŽƚĂŐĞƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
of the central interested person:  
                                                          




(Coroner) I probably wŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞŚĞƌĂƐĂW/W ?ďƵƚŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ
of disclosure, and of course there will be sensitivity because of the army, there is not going 
ƚŽďĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŽŬƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĚĂǇƚŽĚĂǇĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƌŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? 
but they would be advised of the hearing and she could come to the hearing, in fact we 
would suggest she comes to the hearing, we would go that far. 
In going as far as suggesting she comes to the hearing, the importance of interested person status is 
dismissed.  The only significant difference in this account relates to disclosure, and with this in mind I 
turn to consider the place of disclosure.   
Investigating and disclosing 
A key criticism of the pre-2009 Act was a lack of a requirement to provide disclosure to families,269 
and a consistent theme in my interviews was that the centrality of the family in the contemporary 
inquest is reflected in the new disclosure regime. Another was that the Coroners I interviewed had 
always provided disclosure anyway.270 
Viewed through a jurisdictional lens, disclosure is an essential part of enabling the effective 
participation of the family, and as such, it is a critical part of understanding representations of the 
authority of law.  Interviewees emphasised the reciprocal nature of disclosure, that they  ‘have got to 
make sure communication is exchanged ?, and in that process it is again possible to distinguish the 
deployment of the two different frames. 
The distinct place of family 
One Coroner reflected on disclosure, stating there was an  
(Coroner) entirely unsatisfactory state of affairs previously where they would turn up and 
hear this evidence about their loved one for the first time, sat there with everyone else, I 
would think that would be quite distressing in certain cases. 
Hearing the evidence for the first time, the family could thus be caused double distress, not only 
hearing distressing facts, but hearing them in a public forum with no time to prepare.  Critically, they 
would be sat there with everyone else and not singled out for special separate treatment.  
                                                          
269 Although caselaw emphasised the need for as wide disclosure as possible in cases where Article 2 was 
engaged, see inter alia R (Smith) v Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire [2008] EWHC 694 (Admin) at 37.  
See Scraton & Chadwick 1986, 95, for a critical reflection on lack of disclosure in relation to deaths in custody. 
270 although one went on to state that disclosure was wider now, and rather than selectively disclosing, they 
now disclosed everything.  Also see discussion in introduction about selection of interviewees; as a 




Disclosure in this framing is thus directed towards recognising and constructing the distinctly 
different place of family; with a focus on dignity and their primacy in grief. 
As well as emotional preparation, decisions about disclosure are focused on procedural preparation, 
as one Coroner explained;  ‘/ĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚĚŽŶĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŽƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǇŽƵũƵƐƚďƵƐŬŝƚŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇ
then you are going to end up with egg on your face. ?  Officers were clear that  
ǁŚĂƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚŝƐĂŶǇŶĂƐƚǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ
inquest leaving people feeling that they have missed their chance. 
Disclosure gives families a chance to go through the papers carefully  W  ‘they do go through them 
with a fine tooth comb ?  W and a combined accountability framing of decisions in relation to 
disclosure and communication aim to ensure a more effective and meaningful investigation, with 
Coroners better able to focus the evidence collection process on the concerns of the family.  In the 
contemporary inquest, interviewees suggested communication by email and telephone were 
common, and a recurring theme in my interviews was an assertion that electronic communication 
meant that  
it is much easier for there to be an informaƚŝŽŶĨůŽǁŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ QŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŚĂǀĞĂ
lot more contact with the family day to day.271 
Coroners and officers also discussed who this might exclude and how those people might be 
engaged, with positive reflections on the new possibility of differential approaches.  One Coroner 
described a recent case in which they offered institutional interested persons inspection and 
disclosure on request, but gave the family disclosure, without their request,  
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞĂƚĂĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶtage, even though the law says you 
ĐŽƵůĚ ?ǀĞŝŶƐƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚŚƵŐĞůǇĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ƚŚĞǇ
probably needed to take it to people to get advice on its significance. 
Questions about accessibility in relation to electronic communication also focused attention on the 
possibilities of broader meaningful engagement: 
(Coroner) there is certainly much more of a team effort now than was once the case. Some 
more mature family members may not be computer literate, which will now engage their 
younger family, who can prepare detailed letters or statements or queries or questions to be 
                                                          
271 Although electronic disclosure was a particular issue for some interviewees who felt they had inadequate 




answered, so it is much more of a team effort now, and I would encourage that, because I 
ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐtanding will be different. 
Thus disclosure enables and encourages the participation and sharing of different understandings 
which are central to convivial forms of accountability.  As argued above, a combined framing 
includes knowledges built from a tacit community grounded in a wide conception of kinship.  
However, the material of disclosure can act to crystallise that community, foregrounding pragmatic 
concerns with practicality and cost.  Combined framings recognise this and emphasise the ways in 
which disclosure is capable of being shared, as one Coroner reflected in relation to the new partner 
in Vignette 3,  
(Coroner) what you would do is keep all the liaison with her, and if she chose to share it with 
the new partner, that is fine, but if he wanted to ask questions at the inquest I would say 
fine, he has bƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌƵƉŚĂƐŶ ?ƚŚĞ ? 
Liaising with the mother is a question of practical provision as the new partner had a caring parental 
relationship with the deceased child which legitimates his involvement.  In an interesting 
comparison, this Coroner took a harder line to all the other Coroners I interviewed in relation to the 
involvement of the absent father.  Where others considered themselves bound to recognise the 
ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨĂƚŚĞƌĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽn that he is the father, this 
Coroner would not accept this as sufficient  
(Coroner) It would be for the natural father to prove paternity, because he is not on the 
birth certificate. 
(Ed) But if [the mother] has said to you that he is the father, although he is not on the birth 
certificate, would you be telling your officers to take steps to-? 
(Coroner ?EŽ ?EŽ/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ?ŶŽƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞŝƐŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞďŝƌƚŚ
certificate, if he was it would be a different matter. 
While this Coroner went on to confirm that if the biological father was able to prove paternity 
otherwise, he would be entitled to interested person status, the deployment of legal technique to 
deny his engagement is in stark contrast to their framing of the decision in relation to the new 
partner.  Where one scenario is understood and organised in relation to concerns with risk, engaging 
in questions of order and status, the other is framed through a concern to create a meaningful 




The response also demonstrates the central place of materials in the processes by which law 
reflects, shapes and influences family practices.  For this Coroner, the absence of his name from the 
birth certificate was key, and enabled the coalescence of family practices and law, a result which 
avoids the discordant inclusion of the unconnected biological father.   
Disclosure, engagement of the family, and the community 
Family participation also has a critical relationship with the constitutive materials of the inquest, as 
Coroners and officers272 described seeking additional reports and evidence arising out of family 
questions and concerns.  This development carries the potential for the inquest to mirror settlement 
practices in civil litigation, as for some interviewees, identifying questions arising out of disclosure 
provided an opportunity to answer queries in advance of the public hearing.273  One Coroner stated 
that questions which were  ‘not too wide or difficult ? could be answered before the inquest  ‘and that 
saves the need for the witness to come to court. ?  An officer described how, in  
straightĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶ ?ŽŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ
to come to the inquest.  I would say we get less families coming now that we do the advance 
disclosure.  They have seen all there is to see. Some people come just as a mark of respect or 
to get a bit of closure [if the Coroner decides there is no need to hear any evidence].  But if 
the family come back and say, actually I have got some questions, the Coroner is very good 
and will try and get a witness if the family have a burning desire to, but it all runs a lot more 
smoothly now because they see they can, you know ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝĞƚŽŽƵƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? 
This response illustrates the range of reasons for family to attend, and the crucial role of disclosure, 
with the system responsive to their needs, whether that is seeking to close off the investigation or to 
interrogate the circumstances of death.  Critically, such a central place for the family, with emphasis 
on resolution in advance, dramatically illustrates the changed nature of the inquest as a public 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĐŽŶĚƵŝƚƚŽƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐ ?ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞĞƌĞĚƚŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚƌƵƚŚ
and banish deceit, the family act to ensure transparency and oversight on behalf of the wider public.  
The framing is also revealed in the reflections of one Coroner in relation to non-family attendees at 
an inquest 
(Coroner) What sometimes happens is you have got some people with the family who think 
they are being helpful by asking a question to clarify something and the problem is they 
                                                          
272 For example, in one account told me, an officer described how they had acted on their own initiative 
without consulting the Coroner in relation to a natural causes death which involved a previous period in 
detention - they had sought additional reports in response to concerns and questions raised by the family.   
273 Many of the Coroners I interviewed suggested that endeavours would be made to resolve questions before 




ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ƐŽƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚǇƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇŚĂƐŶ ?ƚ
asked it, do you know what I mean, so that can be quite difficult to manage. 
In such a scenario, attention is not directed towards general public revelation, but rather towards a 
form of explanation which is meaningful for those engaged, excluding those outside that advance 
engagement.  Non-family attendees seeking to clarify matters actually make them more difficult, as 
ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽƉĞƌƉůĂĐĞŝƐƚŽďŽƚŚƌĞůǇŽŶĂŶĚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂĐǇŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌ
Coroner reflected on how to respond to the risk of public misunderstanding through exclusion, 
describing how they would hold informal pre-inquest meetings which interested persons attended 
but which were not open to the public.274  Their concern was with evidence which might never be 
needed at the full hearing, and that  
(Coroner) if we had a whole hearing and the press and Joe Public have the right to attend 
they may ask why I am not hearing from Joe Bloggs, because Joe Bloggs says such and such, 
and there might be a good reason why Joe Bloggs is just not relevant, it might not be 
necessary for the purposes of the inquest.  But of course Joe public or the press go away 
thinking oh it was important. 
In contrast, the family, who would have had the disclosure and would have seen why Joe Bloggs was 
not relevant, did not present such a risk.  The concern with risk is central, as disclosure presents and 
prevents risk, and the process must be managed to respond to that risk.   
Disclosure and risk  
As well as managing the community, disclosure is a way of seeking to manage family expectations, 
but as such it is a technique with limitations as people  ‘will perhaps read them but not really digest 
them or understand, so they will come expecting me to do an inquiry into everything ? ? Framed 
through concerns with order and control, disclosure could also present significant risks to the 
Coroner ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŽŶĞCoroner reflected  
(Coroner) what I do is I write to say, look this is made known to you on the basis that it can 
only be discussed with a legal representative or member of the family, it is not published, it 
is not copied or distributed, strictly it should be returned to me on closure, unless you wish 
to retain it at that stage and you should contact me then. 
Similarly, officers expressed concerns with privacy and preventing family members from  ‘gaily 
transmitting medical information around. ?  Another Coroner stated that they did not  ‘like emails 
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from non-professional email addresses. ?  Web-based email was  ‘just unreliable ?, after all  ‘how would 
you like it if I was to give information about what happened to your mother to anybody who emailed 
in with initials and a yahoo address? ?  The central concern is with dignity and protection and the risk 
of challenge if privacy was to be breached. 
Risk framing could also focus on protection of the family from harm caused by contact with death,275 
with, for example, interviewees emphasising that post-mortem reports were not sent out 
automatically  W (Officer)  ‘it is graphic and very medical ? (Coroner)  ‘it can be very distressing, so I wait 
until someone requesƚƐŝƚ ?  W and demonstrating the shaping role of the officers, 
(Officer 1) if they are asking about other things then we would mention that the pathologist 
ǁŝůůƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂĨƵůůƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚ/ĐĂŶƐĞŶĚƚŽǇŽƵ QŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŚĂƐŶŽŝĚĞĂĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĂůŬ
in a waǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞǁĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŬŶŽǁĂŶǇŵŽƌĞƚŚĞŶǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞŵ
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? QKƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ĚďĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞǀĞƌĐŽƉǇŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƐĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐŽƵƚ ?ďƵƚ
ultimately if they did request more information it would be down to the Coroner whether or 
not he would release that.  
(Officer 2) Post-mortem reports do not go to families unless they request it.  So yes, unless 
ƚŚĞǇĂƐŬĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐĞŶĚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƌĞĂůůǇ ? 
(Ed) How would they know if there was something that they could get?   
 ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ? ?dŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƚŽďĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇŚŽŶĞƐƚǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞǇ ?tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŽĨĨĞƌŝƚ ?EŽƚƵŶůĞƐƐ
we feel it might help them, but otherwise no.   
Conclusion 
My central endeavour in this chapter has been to reveal and complicate the way in which the family 
are engaged in the inquest before the public hearing.  Decisions (and non-decisions) tacitly and 
sequentially made by both themselves and the key actors in the inquest shape their appearance and 
their role, as the system seeks to call the possibility of convivial accountability into the law, and 
frames the family as primarily responsible for establishing the connection of the inquest to a 
meaningful context.   
Mirroring and reimagining the possibilities of the deodand, the system emphasises the need for 
accounts which tie the individual death to law, and creates a space for family to construct a 
contextualised contingent account within the law.  Where the historic inquest had little in the way of 
process before the hearing, the contemporary inquest is inseparable from that process, and cannot 
                                                          




be understood without it.  Similarly, as with the abolished deodand, it is the material which lends 
authority to the law and simultaneously acts to constrain it.  Where the deodand gave power to the 
community, it is the disclosure in advance of the hearing which acts to empower and limit in the 
contemporary system.  The material possession of documentary evidence by the family underpins 
the possibility of critical engagement and opens a space for resistance to injustice, but it also acts to 
formalise and privilege the family, shaping the proceedings, and potentially narrowing the possibility 
of the inquest as a site of wider meaningful public revelation.  However, critically, it is not solely the 
material of disclosure which acts to contain risk and bring contingency into the law, it is also the 
physical appearance of the family in the inquest hearing.  Whilst their engagement in the process 
before the hearing gives meaning and authority to the law, fusing privacy and kinship with 
transparency and oversight, it is their physical attendance and representation of kinship and 
connection which authorises the inquest as a public space.  Their absence, or their refusal to 
conform to the demands of the process or the hearing risks leaving the public hearing as remnant, 




Chapter Eight: the inquest hearing 
Introduction 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĨŝŶĂůĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ/ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŵǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
with the construction of the public space of the inquest hearing.  My contention is that a binary 
public/private model fails to capture the ways in which the hearing moves along a continuum, 
through a series of formulations of public in an individual case interpreted through a range of factors 
 W the physical space, the approach of the family, the decisions of the Coroner, officers and others, 
ƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽĚĞ ?ŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ ?ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?and the identity of the person who died.  These 
factors interact with decisions about whether a jury is called, how disclosure affects the hearing, 
how much information is given out and what information, what is said in a public forum and what is 
not, how people gather and who gathers.   
My attention is on the space of the hearing itself, rather than on the conclusion of the inquest, 
although I come to consider this at the end of this chapter.  The conclusion or verdict receives a 
great deal of attention, and particularly in doctrinal law, on the appropriate legal tests for particular 
verdicts, as well as empirically based concerns with inconsistencies between areas in verdicts.  It is 
undoubtedly often important for the family, but as DaviƐĞƚĂůŶŽƚĞ ‘ĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐĂƚĂĐŽƌƌĞĐƚǀĞƌĚŝĐƚŝƐĂ
small part of whaƚŐŽĞƐŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?Ăǀŝs et al 2002, 60).  Drawing on Scott Bray ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ ?facts ? found by CoronerƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƵŶƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ
in their wider social and legal context, my endeavour here is to reflect on that wider context and in 
particular on the questions of how those facts emerge from a public hearing, and how family fit into 
that public hearing.  
A public hearing  
One of the aims of the 2009/2013 reforms was to have fewer inquests, with the ability to 
discontinue an investigation before the inquest where, for example, the death was a result of 
natural causes and there were no other concerns.276  Where an inquest was to be held, the Chief 
Coroner has emphasised that the  ‘ŵŽƌĞŵŽĚĞƌŶůŽŽŬ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵis based on fewer delays 
and more hearings being held in public (see Chief Coroner 2013-14, 11).  Inquests must now be 
opened in a public hearing wherever possible and dates for any future hearings must be 
announced.277  Any pre-inquest hearings must be heard in public, and there must be a final hearing 
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277 R.11 Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616.  If the Coroner does not have access to a court, then 




within six months.278  When it arose in my interviews, my interviewees were unanimous in their 
perception that no-one (including family members) attended the public opening, and while many of 
them supported the idea of listing cases at that first hearing, some had difficulty with this.  One 
Coroner summarised the problem 
I am lucky because I have got access to a court whenever I want one. The biggest problem is 
court access, so I can settle and run my own diary because I know when my court sessions 
are going to be. 
Of my eight Coroner interviewees, four did not have a purpose-built courtroom, while the others 
had a court, in some cases attached to their offices, in some cases elsewhere. 279  These differences 
in provision are longstanding,280 and Hurren (2005, 240-248) describes the battle of the late-
Victorian Coroner for Oxford to get his own court.  His arguments, founded on grounds of morality 
and public health, were unsuccessful.  At the same time in the 1880s, his counterpart in Melbourne 
was having more success in obtaining a purpose-built court, a space which Trabsky (2015) argues 
was an exercise in community memorialisation, bringing the bodies of the living and the dead into a 
forum of law (Trabsky 2015, 18).  In the contemporary hearing, as Chapter Six reflects, the dead 
body has disappeared from the space of the inquest, and for some Coroners, the space for 
considering the circumstances of their death can vary considerably, as one told me 
(Coroner) I personally have held inquests in a police club, where they switched off the bandit 
and put a cover on the snooker table, and in the loft space of the community centre. My 
predecessor held them in what was not much more than a large broom closet at the old 
hospital. We hold them still in the lecture rooms of the hospital.  I make use of the 
magistrates court where they have a court which is relatively redundant, so I usually use that 
                                                          
278 R.8 Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616.  In addition, where inquests last for over 12 months, the 
Chief Coroner has to include details of them in an annual report to the Lord Chancellor (s.36 CJA 2009).  
Lengthy delays between the death and a final hearing has been a longstanding criticism of the inquest system 
from the perspective of the bereaved (see inter alia Davis et al 2002, 26; Biddle 2003; Samuels 2011; Hawkes, 
2014; Sense about Science 2014), and many of my interviewees expressed support in principle for the six 
month rule, describing concerns about Coroners in other areas who were not progressing inquests quickly 
enough, but many also emphasised that it could be difficult to meet this timescale in practice, particularly in 
complex cases when other inquiries were ongoing. 
279 The legislation now provides that Coroners must have accommodation that is appropriate to their needs: 
S.24 CJA 2009  W and some of my interviewees stated that a purpose built court was in the process of being 
arranged. 
280 See for example the discussion in Richardson (2001) of the picture of an inquest held by Thomas Wakley, in 
which he sat at a table surrounded by the jury.  Also, in relation to Coroners courts and use of other buildings 




one without too much problem. Last week because it was a major one, I used a court in the 
crown court complex, which was very good. But otherwise I have to go all over the place. 
As the major case in the crown court indicates, the variety in space was not solely about availability, 
but was also a question of perceived suitability.  As another Coroner stated,  
80% of cases are the straightforward you could do it round a table, in fact I do do it round a 
table in certain cases, there is no point bringing an 80 year old lady into a court room to hear 
ŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚǁŚĞŶŝŶfact it is not disputed. 
At the other end of the scale, as a quote below illustrates, where there was a risk of disorder, a court 
room would be preferable.  Further research on the staging, spacing and placing (Carlen 1976) of the 
contemporary inquest is needed,281 but these responses show the potential adaptability of the 
public space of the hearing, and perhaps demonstrate the ways in which the ordering of this space 
can bring matters into the reach of the family or put them out of their reach (Keenan 2009, 187).  
These are accounts of a hearing partly shaped by, anticipating, or in response to a bereaved family, 
but also by tensions between resourcing and concerns with dignity and effective participation, 
forced to remake cupboards and loft space into spaces for law and to situate dignity alongside the 
covered snooker table and unplugged one-armed bandit.  Such flexibility also risks unforeseen 
distress to families, as with one account I was told, about a Coroner who shared a space with the 
wedding registrar; 
Another Coroner was telling me a while ago that it never really came home to him until a 
ǁŝĚŽǁŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨŚŝŵƐĂŝĚƌĂƚŚĞƌǁŝƐƚĨƵůůǇ ‘ǁĞůůƚŚĞůĂƐƚƚŝŵĞ/ǁĂƐŝŶŚĞƌĞǁĂƐǁŚĞŶ/ǁĂƐ
ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ? WĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƐĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚďƵƚĨĞĞůƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ
lady she has to say, been in this room twice, once to marry her husband and once to be at 
his inquest. 
The account is affecting, the circularity of events and restraint of the widow no doubt leading the 
Coroner to repeat it to me (the only story I was told of another Coroner ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶĂŶ
inquest).  In retelling it, and highlighting the role of the other Coroner in previously failing to 
appreciate the impact of the use of space, it gave emphasis to the importance of the room as an 
unanticipated actant.  At the same time it gives weight to an account of the inquest as a place of 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ?ĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƚŽĂǁĞĚĚŝŶŐĚĂǇ ?ďƵƚůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞƚŽƵĐŚĞĚďǇůĂǁ ?ƐƌŝƚƵĂůĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?
                                                          




It is the combination of these contrasting moments of dignity in the same public space which gives 
the story poignancy, evincing particular sympathy from this Coroner.   
One Coroner reflected explicitly on the public nature of the space of the public hearing, stating that  
/ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞ/ŚĂǀĞĞǀĞƌŚĂĚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŵĞŝŶĂŶĚƐĞĞǁŚĂƚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐ
on, I have had people there who are properly interested persons or who have a link of some 
sort with the deceased, a friend or work colleague or something of that nature, member of 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůŝŶŬ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚŽŶĞƐƚůǇƚŚŝŶŬ/ŚĂǀĞũƵƐƚŚĂĚ a general casual, I 
have an hour or two to kill, I will pop into the Coroners court. 
It is thus, in the majority of cases, a public space populated by those linked to the deceased, those in 
selected offices of the state  W Coroner and staff, pathologist, police officer, doctor  W and perhaps the 
media (Davis 2002, 72-3).  Of the three publics identified by the Warwick Inquest Group (1985, 51) in 
the inquest into the death of James Davey  W the jury, the press and the public gallery  W in most 
contemporary inquests it is only the media who are likely to attend.  I asked one Coroner if they had 
a lot of press attendance, 
Surprisingly little.  If they know of some particular death, they will say can you keep us 
ĂĚǀŝƐĞĚŽĨƚŚĂƚ ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŝƐƐƵĞĂŶǇƐŽƌƚŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶique to the press saying this week I am 
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ&ƌĞĚůŽŐŐƐĂŶĚhŶĐůĞdŽŵŽďůĞǇĂŶĚĂůů ?ŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƌŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĂƐŬƐǁĞ ?ůů
tell them where and when. 
In such an account, the press are not prevented from attending but their help in creating a public 
space was not actively sought, instead reliance was placed on the family to determine who, if 
anyone, ought to be aware of the proceedings.  In apparent contrast, other Coroners made 
information more readily available to the media, including details of their lists on websites; 
There is a lot more information out in the public domain now, I have got a website, we are 
trying to upgrade it, we have got a list of our cases, we have got procedures. 
However, this Coroner went on to note that this was so that people could take an interest, and 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĂĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂůĂĐŬŽĨƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨďŽƚŚŝƐŽŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐĂŚĞĂƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĂďůĞĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
had a connection to the deceased to attend and participate.   
In addition to creating awareness of the inquest, the family are key to media representations of the 
death.  Butler describes the role of the media as critical in deteƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽĂ ‘ŐƌŝĞǀable 




the case study of the social welfare inquests in Chapter Three reveal the intimate relationship 
between the construction of a grievable death in the public forum of the inquest and the media 
reporting of that hearing, while the interaction between the media and the inquest process can also 
play a key role in a death being not grievable, in particular in relation to deaths in custody (see inter 
alia Scraton & Chadwick 1986; Pemberton 2008; Erfani-Ghettani 2015).  In both cases, the 
individualising, personalising account of and by the family plays a critical part in the framing of that 
narrative by the reporters in attendance.   
Where the media is not in attendance, or where they are but strategies are deployed to limit their 
engagement (discussed further below), and where there is no jury or public attendance, there is no 
audience unconnected to the deceased, and the inquest moves from  ‘ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ? ?tĂƌǁŝĐŬ/ŶƋƵĞƐƚ
Group 1985) to  ‘ŵŝŶŝƐƚĂƚĞĨƵŶeral ? ?Ăǀŝs 2002).  Rehearsing the rhetoric of a still-public hearing in 
cases where  ‘ƚŚĞůŝƚƚůĞŽůĚůĂĚǇŝƐĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŽŶŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽďŽĚǇ
ĞůƐĞƚŚĞƌĞďƵƚŵĞĂŶĚŚĞƌ ?ŵŝƐƐĞƐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƐƵĐŚŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ are intimate and ceremonial, a 
mixture of the eulogical and the investigative.  Critically none of these potential formulations are 
fully realisable in the absence of family, and, if framed through endeavours to combine 
accountabilities, without their effective participation.   
An enabled family, in an orderly hearing 
Most families in inquests are unrepresented, and I asked Coroners about their experiences of 
unrepresented family members asking questions in the hearing, including the purpose of family 
asking questions.  In discussion with one Coroner, I asked whether the objective of family asking 
questions was to assist the Coroner in answering the four questions of who the person was, and 
how, when and where they died.  The Coroner responded,   
I would like to think that I was going to get there by myself unaided, but they may have 
ƉŽŝŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚ/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƐĞǇĞƐ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŽĂƐŬƚŚĞŵ ?ďƵƚŽƚŚĞƌ
than that, no, the principle reason for them being there is to ensure they leave satisfied that 
the system has operated properly. 
Adopting a risk-framing, in which the law of the inquest promises to control risk through 
categorisation and attribution of danger, this Coroner saw a limited role for family as responsible for 
oversight and maintaining public confidence in the system.  They might assist in establishing the 
facts of a case, but the Coroner was not primarily focused on the quality of their participation.  
Critically, an absence of family in such circumstances would not affect the outcome  W as the same 




ŬŶŽǁŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŽĨĂŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ‘/ŵĂǇǁĞůůƌĞŽƉĞŶŝƚ ?ǁĞ ?ůůŐĞƚƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂŶĚǁĞ ?ůůŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚ
again, but it is not going to changĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? 
In contrast a combined accountability framing focused ŽŶƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛ
engagement in the hearing.  This included encouraging them to ask questions, but also emphasised 
preparation and identifying concerns, in advance of the hearing or at the hearing itself, and the 
limits of the possibilities of preparation, 
(Coroner) Of course if you are skilful what you try to do, as it is an inquisitorial process, is to 
ask the questions in court before it is the turn of gets to the family.  
(Coroner) ^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐǇŽƵǁŝůůƚƵƌŶƵƉĂŶĚǇŽƵ ?ůůŚĂǀĞĂĨĂŵŝůǇǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƐĂŝĚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?
they will turn up on the day with a long list of questions or who want to ask about all sorts of 
things and you have no idea where it is coming from. 
All interviewees commonly described holding hearings with unrepresented families who needed 
ŚĞůƉ ?dŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ŶĞƌǀŽƵƐ ?ŽƌĐŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚŚĞůƉǁŝƚŚ ‘ƉŚƌĂƐŝŶŐ ?ĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŐŝǀŝŶŐ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘/ƐƚŚŝƐǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĂƐŬ ? ?Interviewees sometimes focused on managing the risk 
of the family overstepping the bounds of the inquiry but not always (Davis et al 2002), and I was 
particularly interested in the reflections of my interviewees on the difference between represented 
and unrepresented families.  As one Coroner stated in relation to whether questions put to 
witnesses had to be limited to the strict scope of the inquiry, the Coroner stated not necessarily, 
 ‘You do better with me possibly if you are a relative than if you are a legal representative. ?  I asked 
ǁŚǇ ? ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŝƌŽŶůǇŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĂƐŬƚŚĞƐĞƐŽƌƚŽĨƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ
I should limit it. ?  
One Coroner laughed when I asked this question, indicating it was almost a matter for some 
embarrassment, 
That is an inƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞǇŽƵƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚǇŽƵ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐǀĞƌǇ
interesting.  Well, I think I choose these words; that I probably give family representatives 
more latitude. Where I might pull up a lawyer and say, I don't think this is appropriate or 
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?/ŵŝŐŚƚƐĞĞǁŚĞƌĞŝƚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂĨĂŵŝůǇ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƉĂƌƚůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽ
create an image and a perception that I am unfriendly or they are inadequate, we need to 
build a relationship and a process.  But I must be fair to all IPs. 
The discomfort for this Coroner appeared to be a concern with the possible risk to their professional 




ůŝƚƚůĞůŽŶŐĞƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŬĞǇŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ the family, and the building of a meaningful 
account. 
Another Coroner emphasised the cost and effort of organising an inquest in support of allowing an 
unrepresented family a broader scope, and a common answer was that as long as questions were 
 ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůŝŶĞŽĨ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ŝƐĚƌawn was not clear 
(Davis 2002, 50), but my interviews suggested a shift of framing to focus on concerns with risk and 
restraint of the family might occur where they were concerned with issues of blame.  However, it 
might depend on how the questions were put, 
Obviously we are saddled with the fact that they should only ask appropriate questions and 
we should stop inappropriate questions but they are not lawyers, and I do always have in 
the back of my mind that they need these answers, so I would probably only stop it if it was, 
ǁĞůůŝĨŝƚǁĂƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŝĨŝƚǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚďůĂŵĞ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ĂƚŝƐƋƵŝƚĞǁŝĚĞŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ
ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵŬŝůůĞĚŵǇDƵŵĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǇŽƵ ?ƚŚĂƚƐŽƌƚ of thing I would stop. But 
ŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?ǁĞůůǇŽƵĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?/ǁŽƵůĚĂůůŽǁŝƚ ?ǇĞƐ ?/ĂŵŶŽƚ
strict, I am probably a bit soft at times, I have more of a luxury of time than some of my 
colleagues in some of the more busy areas. 
Appropriateness acted as control, saddling the inquest, but it was a soft restraint, only exerting a pull 
on the progress of questions when the family were hostile.  Critically, the framing of the 
appropriateness of the approach of the family cannot be separated from the context, and the 
actions of the other interested parties, as,  
if the hospital are fighting tooth and nail, that something is not relevant, then I am likely to 
take a slightly different line from if the hospital are completely relaxed about it, and I will 
give the family a greater degree of freedom and flexibility, so long as they are not getting 
silly about the boundaries of the inquiry. 
And the response of the hospital might depend on the family.  At one inquest hearing I attended, a 
lawyer from the mental health trust attended along with a witness, but had not sought interested 
person status, even though the circumstances suggested they might have been open to criticism.  I 
asked why, and they told me that as the family were unrepresented they had not felt it necessary.  
Similarly, as one Coroner reflected, 
if a family is represented and are seeking answers to difficult questions, it is bound to put 




Thus the place of representation is key in constructing the hearing and in the way in which the 
inquest is framed (see also, Warwick Inquest Group 1985, 47).  Whilst lawyers for the family may be 
asking the same questions, and are likely to be asking them so that a family can engage in the 
process, they will be held to a higher standard of relevance, and are more likely to be restrained 
from pursuing a line of questioning, than if the family was unrepresented.  This may be because the 
involvement of lawyers forces a narrower focus by all involved on technical questions, because of a 
concern with subsequent litigation, and because there is less need with lawyers representing the 
family to build a process and a relationship (although as highlighted below, some Coroners saw 
lawyers as part of a team generating a meaningful thorough inquiry).  It was also revealing that 
where there were lawyers, the possibility of blame and a  ‘difficult-not-difficult family, ? a risk framing 
could see the lawyer for the family deployed as ally, 
if you have got a particularly, difficult is not the right word for the family, but a family that 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚƋƵŝƚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚĂŶĚǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƚƌŝĂůĂŶĚŚĂŶŐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽƵƚƚŽ
dry, then it is helpful to have a lawyer who is familiar with inquest work who can help you to 
ƐĂǇƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇůŽŽŬ/ ?ŵƐŽƌƌǇƚŚĂƚƌĞĂůůǇŝƐŶ ?ƚĂŵĂƚƚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? 
The lawyer here acts as buffer  W a role which can also be helpful to the Coroner where the risk is not 
a risk to the proper scope of the inquest, but is where the approach of family present a risk of 
disorder.  In these cases, the risk- framing is more unambiguously deployed,  
sometimes family members can be quite abusive, quite personal, quite emotive, and quite 
adversarial  W that is not often, occasionally they can be  W and you have to protect the 
witnesses too, and I am trying to balance everything in court. 
Coroners described strategies for maintaining order when the cause of disorder is family.  These 
included anticipating the possibility of disorder and the risk that the inquest might not effectively 
combine accountabilities, and taking organisational and administrative steps to engage with the 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŚĂǀŝŶŐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ‘ƐŽŝƚŵĂŬĞƐůŝĨĞĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞǁŚĞŶŝƚ
comes to tŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĨŝůĞĚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? 
The court originally organized case files with all communications in one file, and I said no, 
you file separately the interested persons communications, because the Coroner needs to 
see them in conducting any hearing.  It is key to know what have they said and what have 
we said to them. And that is the backdrop to what you need to know in court; they have 




are in a better position of how to handle them in court. A coroner must consider 
submissions of IPs on how to conduct the inquest and what evidence to call.  
The possible attendance of the biological father in Vignette 3 prompted some of my interviewees to 
reflect on the possibility of violence and disorder in the hearing, with one Coroner stating, 
I would ensure that I had police presence.  I have had these situations where have had to 
keep people apart in case there is trouble. 
Another Coroner would emƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚĂŶĚĂŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĂƐ ‘ŵŝŶŝƐƚĂƚĞĨƵŶĞƌĂů ?
to counter unrest, ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ on an appropriate space for the hearing,  
We normally get the officer to go and meet them and say that, to respect the deceased we 
would want you to behave in an appropriate way.  If she was saying, look there are going to 
be real problems then we might have to get the police there.  Certainly we would have to 
think about where we are going to hold the inquest, we might try and arrange it in the 
ŵĂŐŝƐƚƌĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚ ? 
dŚĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŵĂŐŝƐƚƌĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƌŝŐŝĚƐƉĂĐĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
aura, in which it is easier to contain, separate and restrain.  The answer also highlights the key role 
of the officer in advance management, which was a theme another Coroner raised, 
dŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŚĞƌĞĂƌĞǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŐŽƚĂƉƌĞƚƚǇŐŽŽĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛ
concerns are and how they have been reacting , of when you are going to have issues to deal 
with , or indeed when they are going to be so quiet that you are going to need to be more 
proactive, and so I would know at the outset usually of how to handle things, and what has 
been said before and been explained. 
Crucially in this account, disorder and the need to handle the family does not just arise from a family 
expressing agitation, but also a family who are too quiet and who need to be encouraged.  Their 
engagement and understanding are essential, and if they are too passive or reticent, there is a risk 
that the inquest will lack the contextual and contingent, undermining the prospect of combining 
both a meaningful and expert explanation of death.  Finally, disorder was not limited to 
inappropriate questions, concerns with aggression and the risk of violence or the overly passive 
family; other accounts reflected on engagement, order, and control of a confident and potentially 
unruly family attending en masse, even where a spokesperson has been nominated to speak on their 




(Coroner) /ƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐƚŽƉƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĂƐŬŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǁŝƚŚ
schoolteachers for some reason, one of them acts as the main advocate and usually you 
ŚĂǀĞƐĞǀĞƌĂů ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵ ?ůůĨŝŶĚƚŚĞďƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?who is possibly another school teacher, still wants 
to ask queƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŵŝŶĚ ? 
(Coroner) If they come mob-ŚĂŶĚĞĚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ůŽƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĂŶǇůĂǁ ?
they can all start chipping in and if you are not careful you can lose control so you need to 
make clear, and I do this through my officers, make sure before they come that they know 
that they have got to choose a spokesman to put their questions. Then when you start you 
say right, and you take them through what an inquest is all about, it is a fact finding inquiry it 
is not a trial da-da-ĚĂ ?ĂůůƚŚĞƵƐƵĂůƉƌĞĂŵďůĞ ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵƐĂǇĂŶĚ/ŚŽƉĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵ ?ǀĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
ƚŽďĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƵƐƵĂůůǇ ?ǇĞƐŝƚ ?ƐŚŝŵ ?ďƵƚŽŶĐĞǇŽƵŐĞƚŐŽŝŶŐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇhŶĐůĞ
Joe, Uncle Bert and Aunty Joan and coƵƐŝŶŵĂŶĚĂǁŝůůƐƚĂƌƚĐŚŝƉƉŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĚ/ ?ŵĂĨƌĂŝĚ
sometimes you have to say I am sorry remember what I said I will only hear one of you, or if 
you are generous, and I try to be generous, I might say well I will come to you in a minute 
but one at a time, yoƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĂůůĐŚŝƉŝŶĂƚŽŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĞǁŝůůƚĂŬĞŝƚŝŶĂůŽŐŝĐĂůƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƚ
ĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĂůůďƵƚƚŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĚĐŚŝpping in at the same time. 
In these accounts of a nominated single spokesperson and the limited engagement of others, a 
common theme in my interviews, the emphasis is on family, and it is noticeable in the second that 
the Coroner refers to uncles, aunties and cousins, all of which are outside the automatic interested 
person categories.  Critically, the limits to their involvement do not flow from questions of legal right 
or their status in inquest law, but from a concern with ordering and management of the hearing.  
The endeavour of the Coroners is to combine order and the requirements of convivial accountability 
for meaningful effective engagement founded in a tacit community.  That task is easier for the 
Coroner if one office holder acts for that community, but recognition of dignity as humanity and the 
consequent potency of their demand for effective engagement makes their claims hard to resist.  
This task of management can be far easier when the office-holder nominated on their behalf is not 
one of their own, but is instead a lawyer, who can free up the Coroner to do their job, because, 
If I am representing anyone I am representing the deceased, and if no-one is there to 
represent [the family], I have to do my job harder.  I am more likely to be difficult, I 
adjourned quite a testy inquest relatively recently to take more evidence, because I was 
dissatisfied with the questions I was being given, and there was nobody there to fight for 




 ?ůĂǁǇĞƌĞĚƵƉ ?ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ 
Lawyers representing the family mean that someone other than the Coroner is going through 
records  ‘ǁŝƚŚĂĨŝŶĞƚŽŽƚŚed ĐŽŵď ?ĂŶĚwhere the Coroner is engaged in constructing a process 
which will combine forms of accountability and effectively enable family participation, lawyers can 
be a crucial part of the team.  One Coroner used other lawyers in attendance to check if there were 
any legal issues or advice that the ƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĨĂŵŝůǇŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?ĂƐŬŝŶŐ ‘/ƐƚŚĞƌĞĂŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚ
is not the interests of your client, that should ďĞĚƌĂǁŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? Another Coroner 
emphasised the importance of the perspective of lawyers for the family in a complex case, 
The best inquests in the more complex cases are in fact a bit of a team effort, the better the 
representation, the better the quality of the inquiry.  It may be impossible for me to see or 
recognise a particular issue or a piece of information which you may be privy to and which I 
may not be privy to. I have always thought, and this is a personal view, in what we might 
describe as the Article 2 cases, there truly should be no issue about means  W the family 
should be publicly funded if the State has any involvement, if not you are getting a 
completely unbalanced line of inquiry, and they always say well it is up to the Coroner, but it 
is just not fair because how are they going to participate properly? It is becoming more and 
more of a problem for those trying to seek funding. 
Without lawyers for the family in those Article 2 cases it is an unbalanced team; a situation 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇtĂůƐŚĂƐƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇ ‘ĂŶĂƌŵǇŽĨůĂǁǇĞƌƐǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇƐŝƚƐĂůŽŶĞ ?
(Walsh 2015, 1).282  Obtaining legal aid for families is increasingly challenging in the context of 
 ‘ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?,ǇŶĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐof errors in Legal Aid Agency decisions which could 
lead to eligible families not getting legal aid (Nicholls 2014, 24).  One interviewee highlighted that a 
potential civil claim can be a way of families obtaining legal representation,283 but, emphasising their 
experience, downplayed concerns with risk, suggesting that for most families this was a route to 
obtaining funding so they could meaningfully engage in the inquest.  In contrast, another Coroner 
framed the factor of subsequent litigation as a risk which undermined the inquest hearing, 
Quite often I have barristers in front of me, which makes my inquests last longer, makes 
them more complex, makes them cost more money, and you can tell there is an eye to 
                                                          
282 Palmer, the Chief Executive of AvMA, critiques a Ministry of Justice assertion that families do not need 
representaƚŝŽŶŝŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ QǁŚŝĐŚŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŽĨŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁĂƌĞǀĞƌǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶŽƚ ? ?WĂůŵĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
283 as lawyers can reclaim some inquest costs as costs preparatory for a civil claim if they are awarded inter 




litigation at the end, that is happening increasingly, cases that eight years ago I would have 
dealt with in an hour will now take half a day. 
It is the lawyers who make the inquest more complex, taking up more time and money, without 
improving that hearing.  The concern here is with good lawyers, but the risk of poor representation 
was a theme in many more interviews, with many Coroners stating that poor representation 
 ‘increases the pressure on the Coroner aŶĚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚwith one Coroner expressing concern with 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƌƵůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚĂŶǇŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĂ
lawyer, it could be the office cat if you want ? ? 
Whether the family has a poorly qualified representative or none, a concern focused on risk 
emphasises formal legal equality, and the difficulties that can arise for the Coroner, 
/ĨĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚǁŝƚŚĂůĂǁǇĞƌĂŶĚŝĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ?ŝƚƉƵƚƐƚŚĞ
family and the Coroner into a difficult position.  The Coroner is supposed to be neutral 
conducting a fact-finding inquiry, and yet is expected to assist the family to tease out the 
real issues in the case, and there is a real danger that he or she will be seen to be partisan by 
the lawyers for the police or the prison service or whomever. 
Partisanship on the part of the inquest system is a longstanding concern from the perspective of 
those engaged with deaths in custody (see inter alia, Warwick Inquest Group 1985, 43-44), but the 
emphasis in my interviews was more often a concern with the risk of appearing partisan in favour of 
the bereaved rather than the State.  One Coroner described how, 
I went to watch one of my assistant deputies and it made me step back and think about how 
I approached it because [they were] gushing all over the family trying to be nice, but for 
somebody watchinŐŝƚ ?ŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚůŽŽŬĨĂŝƌ ? 
Framed through a concern to avoid risk, this concern with the appearance of fairness is resisted 
through judicial neutrality, an appeal ƚŽƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?dŚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ? ‘ŐƵƐŚŝŶŐĂůůŽǀĞƌ
ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?ƌŝƐŬƐũƵĚŝĐŝĂůŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞCoroner went on to describe, 
It looked as though possibly there was some obvious bias towards the family, and I think you 
have got to be careful with that.  I know they are there to find out why their child or 
husband or wife died, and we are all there to support them in that, but I think people can do 
it, whilst still making them the focus, approaching it in a professional way as well.  
The professional way is balanced between risks; the risk of bias, and the risk that the family will not 




solution, but causes increased risk of an appearance of bias if there is no legal representation.  In 
contrast, a combined accountability framing is less concerned with the appearance of bias, but is 
rather primarily directed to a concern with making sure the family can participate properly.  In 
complex cases, this means they should have lawyers, but if they do not, there is an 
acknowledgement that while the family do not have any more rights than anyone else, their 
understanding of what is going on is a central concern of the inquest.  As such, this framing focuses 
on seeking to enable them to bring their account into the law:  
I will say to the family, this is the process in which you can make submissions about 
conclusions.  What I am going to do is to go to the lawyers first, see what they say, and then 
I will come to you  W so they see how it is done  W and I will say, you can make submissions, 
but what has been said by X seems to me to be the sort of things that you might be saying in 
this instance, and I might help them through with it, so that they understand. 
The family need to understand the process, they need to understand their role in the process, and to 
understand what the conclusion can achieve.  The emphasis on channelling their understanding 
might be framed as an endeavour to restrain them but is also a recognition of the need of the 
system for the family.  Thus the Coroner is going through the process of training and enabling the 
family because the system needs the family to be engaged with understanding how the deceased 
died.  Reflections on two further aspects of the inquest  W the role of the jury, and the place of the 
family in making the hearing less public  W further illustrate this theme.   
A more public hearing: the family and the jury 
In the contemporary inquest, inquests with juries are rare, occurring in around 1% of inquest cases 
(Chief Coroner, 2015).  A jury must be called in certain circumstances284 and there is also a discretion 
open to the Coroner ƚŽĐĂůůĂũƵƌǇ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ? ?285  One Coroner told me 
 ‘/ƚĞŶĚƚŽuse my discretion quite freely to sit with a jury. ?/ĂƐŬĞĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚey would exercise a 
discretion ǁŚĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞCoroner ƉĂƵƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŶƐƚĂƚĞĚ ‘/ŚĂǀĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚ
have been verǇŝŶĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚ ? ? Critically, where it is not obligatory, it is the family who will make that 
request,286  
There are sometimes applications, I mean no Coroner in their right mind would have a jury 
for fun, I know we have the discretion to do it, it is just so much work. 
                                                          
284 Detailed in s.7(2) CJA 2009, including violent or unnatural deaths or death from an unknown cause in 
custody or state detention, deaths resulting from an act or omission of the police in the execution of their 
duty, or from a notifiable accident, poisoning or disease (eg a health and safety breach). 
285 S.7(3) CJA 2009 




That additional work includes the need to take detailed notes for their summing up, but it is not only 
this, 
(Coroner) As soon as you make a case a jury case it takes three times as long, the amount of 
effort I have to put in is enormous. 
(Coroner) /ŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌďƌĞĂŬƐ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽƐŽŵƵĐh evidence in a day, I have to 
make sure they are understanding the issues. 
Critically, just having a jury is inherently risky,  
I have to be very careful that any statement I have made is supported, and that my 
directions are absolutely water-tight because I am going to be judicially reviewed if I am 
directing the jury wrongly, so there is a lot more work for me.  It is exhilarating, it is exciting, 
it is a huge challenge, it is exhausting, it is legally more risky. 
In relation to a risk framing, one Coroner was very clear that changes which meant that deaths in 
mental health secure units had to be heard with a jury would significantly undermine the inquest 
into those deaths, 
I am an expert in this field and I genuinely think I really ĚŽŶ ?ƚ need a jury and I am running a 
deeper, fuller and more complex inquiry without them because I can really explore the 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŽƐŝŵƉůŝĨǇǁŚĞŶǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂũƵƌǇ ?/ƚŝŶŚŝďŝƚƐŵĞ ?/Ăŵ
ƌĞĂůůǇƌĞĂůůǇĨĞĚƵƉĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ/ƌĞĂůůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞŝƚŝƐ going to deliver any better service 
in this jurisdiction. 
The framing is concerned with the specific risk that the shift undermines technocratic accountability.  
The necessity of making the information accessible to a jury inhibits effective expert interrogation, 
investigation and rule setting.  In contrast, Pannick (2010) argues that the presence of an inquest 
jury ensures public confidence in the rule of law, and, critically, opens up the case to public scrutiny, 
refuting possible allegations of a cover-up (2010, 31-32).  Another Coroner drew on this, but linking 
the family to that analysis, framed the role of the jury through a concern to create a space for 
meaningful revelation for the family, 
Where it is a matter of a public interest , and the family, and this is not one of the criteria 
under the Coroners and Justice Act, it just all comes within my discretion, I sometimes find 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂƌĞǀĞƌǇŚƵŶŐƵƉĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ?Ɛ




peers, and I know it is not judging is it  W but do you know what I mean  W the facts judged by 
their peers rather than from some perhaps case hardened Coroner. 
This Coroner told a story about a complex case which involved mental health treatment and multiple 
agencies, and concluded that it was 
a classic example of where the jury deciding on the facts, looking at whether or not there 
was systemic problems in the different agencies; to me it would have been an appropriate 
ĐĂƐĞŝŶĂŶǇĞǀĞŶƚ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨ/ŚĂĚŶ ?ƚŚĂĚƚŽĚo it under statute anyway. 
The complexity of the case and the concern with revealing systemic issues are factors in both 
accounts.  For the former, the need to achieve technocratic accountability organises public interest 
concerns in a very different way to the second Coroner, for whom accountabilities are combined by 
the engagement of the jury.  In a similar vein, another Coroner told me a story about a case in which 
a jury member asked a critical question that the Coroner and six sets of lawyers had missed, arguing 
that 
jurors have a quaint ability to see something afresh and ask something that is very helpful. 
Of course it goes the other way, and you may get irrelevant questions. 
The jury combine irrelevant questions with penetration through a fresh perspective, but they also 
require the Coroner to think more carefully about the exposure of evidence,  
(Ed) Do you prefer to sit with a jury? 
(Coroner) (pause) from a personal point of view it breaks it up a bit, but that is not a good 
reason.  It makes you think sometimes more deeply about the questions you ask, because of 
course, in the Coroners court as you know, the Coroner starts by basically dealing with the 
evidence in chief.  When there is a jury present, it needs greater attention to detail, because 
when they are not there, people know most of the facts in any event, but a jury has seen 
nothing, and I think in certain cases that is an area where Coroners could improve on. You 
get into a pattern of how you ask questions, and we need to turn it up a notch when it 
comes to dealing with a jury.  
(Ed) So is the implication of that that certain things would be assumed if there is not a jury? 
(Coroner) Yeah. 




(Coroner) YĞƐ ?ǁĞƉƵƐŚŽŶ ?ǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƉƵƐŚŽŶǁŝƚŚĂũƵƌǇ ?ŽƌŝĨǇŽƵĚ  ?ǇŽƵƐŽŽŶŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚ
it because the jury will then ask questions, because of course they can ask questions. 
 ?Ě ?ŶĚǁŝůůƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇƉůĂǇƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂũƵƌǇ ? 
(Coroner) The difference there is that the family have, now they have got disclosure, they 
have got an understanding about the case, so you know very often I will say to a witness, 
 “we are aware of the background, ? but a ũƵƌǇĂƌĞŶ ?ƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚ ? 
The role of the jury is therefore critical in bringing evidence out at the hearing.  An inquest might be 
heard in public, but facts can be assumed and evidence abridged unless the jury are present to force 
the hearing to go slowly and from the beginning.  The famŝůǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
hearing makes their role fundamentally different.  They are aware of the background, and disclosure 
to them is an integral part of enabling the inquest to abbreviate the evidence.  In a hearing without a 
jury, 99% of hearings, it is thus the family who enable the conjoining of efficient truncation of 
evidence with a narrative of public justice.  It is their meaningful interaction that matters, and as a 
result their actions can be critical in making the public hearing less of a public event.   
A less public hearing   
At the opposite end of the scale, Coroners discussed the possibilities of resolving concerns away 
from the public hearing, with the emphasis on the role of disclosure in answering questions, and in 
some situations the role of the Coroner reimagined as aiding the family to act on their own behalf 
rather than acting as proxy for them (a move which can be seen in the light of comparable shifts in 
civil litigation, see Dingwall & Cloatre 2006).  Two Coroners described their role in facilitating this: 
In this area we arrange for the hospital to meet with the family in advance of the inquest, 
and it is minuted.  Most of the problems in the hospital death are around communication 
and not understanding, and they suddenly feel that the hospital has buttoned down the 
ŚĂƚĐŚĞƐĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŚĂƐĚŝĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ?ƐŽǁĞǁĂƐƚĞĂůŽƚŽĨ
time at inquest, them finding out things that they could have easily found out prior to the 
inquest had the hospital been open with them. So we have this agreement with [the 
hospital] that they will meet with the family if the family want to, with the senior staff 
involved and as I say it is minuted. In 80% of the cases it does help the inquest. 
The focus is on time saving and efficiency, but an underlying concern with risk remains, leading the 
Coroner to emphasise the formality of the meeting, the minutes providing protection and holding 




contradictory understandings, and saw the meeting as a linked but separate pliant process, 
engendering flexibility and the possibility of a more amicable approach, 
I will often encourage families to have a meeting with the consultants beforehand if they 
want to or indeed afterwards so that they can sit around the table and actually have a 
slightly more friendly discussion and explanation, which sometimes can be terribly helpful to 
clarify things which they previously thought were set in stone which were never set in stone. 
In both cases, the effect is to take issues out of the inquest, and another Coroner also highlighted 
this possibility, stating that ĂĨĂŵŝůǇŵĂǇŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐďƵƚ ‘The thing to remember is, it may 
well be that all the concerns they may have had have been dealt with outside of the inquest 
process. ?dŚĞĨƌĂŵŝŶŐƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ĂŶĚalso 
emphasises the role of the pre-hearing decisions in determining the community around the 
deceased.  Instead of evidence and engagement in a publicly accessible hearing, the ability to engage 
is determined away from the public gaze, potentially reinforcing formal family ties, and so 
potentially excluding other forms of kinship (Reimers 2011), undermining the possibility of convivial 
forms of accountability. 
This is further illustrated by the role of family in enabling what one Coroner described as an  ‘ŽĨĨŝĐĞ
ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚno witnesses attend and evidence is read out by the Coroner.  One Coroner 
explained that they would write to a family who had said they did not propose to attend and tell 
them they would only be reading out written evidence,   
But if any other member of the family wants to attend, then will you please let me know 
because it may be necessary to set another date when I know I will have the physical 
presence of a witness. 
Witnesses introduce cost and can make arranging the date of an inquest more difficult.  They also 
introduce formality and ceremony, and the possibilities of surprise, revelation and spectacle.  Their 
presence makes an inquest a more accessible and substantive public event.  It is critical therefore, in 
the account of the Coroner above, that it is not simply the fact that family have concerns which 
provokes calling witnesses, but the very possibility of any family attending.  Another Coroner 
provided a specific account of a case in which it was suggested that had family been involved, 
witnesses would have been called.  The story related to an investigation into a death in a care home, 
when an elderly person had rolled out of bed when the side of the bed was down.  The Coroner 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ? ‘/ůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚƚŚĂƚĨŝůĞĂŶĚŚĂĚƐůŝŐŚƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŚŽǁ




ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƐƚĞƉƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚĂŬĞŶ ? ?ƐŽŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚƚŚĞCoroner read 
out the evidence and did not call witnesses.   
It is not solely the approach of family which determines the decision to call witnesses, and as with 
the Coroner ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŝŶƚŚĞcase above, one Coroner emphasised that in ĐĂƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĐĂůůĞĚ.  In other cases, the approach of family is key, 
particularly where the death was,  
ůĞƚ ?ƐƐĂǇĂƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ.  Husband is found hanging in the garage, we investigate it, we provide 
them with facts, disclosure if they want it, and then we do a summary and that is read out. 
Media reporting, particularly sensationalist or inaccurate reporting of suicides can cause great 
distress to the bereaved (see inter alia, Barraclough & Shepherd 1977; Harwood et al 2002, Biddle 
2003), and attempts have been made to reduce this distress with, for example, the Wright 
Committee (1936) recommending that the press should be prohibited from publishing an account of 
the inquest in cases of suicide, and that suicide should be replaced by a verdict that the deceased 
died by their own hand with no enquiry into the state of mind of the deceased (Wright Report 1936, 
65).  In the contemporary inquest an attending family may have the impact of reducing the prospect 
of a suicide conclusion (Tait & Carpenter 2013287), and in suicide cases, Coroners are often 
sympathetic to the desire for bereaved families to keep information from a prurient media (Davis 
2002, 33-34), with evidence of Coroners adopting strategic approaches to the management of 
publicly available information in suicide cases (Gregory 2014, 10-11).  As the above account 
indicates, one way in which the information which is available ĐĂŶďĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝƐŝĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ǁĂŶƚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĂŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?  
As well as a concern with privacy, ƚŚĂƚůĂĐŬŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞ
any need for the inquest, and one Coroner sympathised with that, 
In quite a lot of my cases, the family have said it is absolutely straightforward, there is no 
issues in the case, quite often they will say please Coroner get on and deal with it on the 
documents alone ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐŽŵĞ ?/ŚĂǀĞƋuite a lot of those.  Sometimes I sit 
thinking to myself this is a complete waste of time, occasionally because no-one is making a 
fuss, family is happy, but I have to do the inquest for technical reasons, what for? To what 
purpose? 
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The death is unambiguous and uncomplicated, the family are not fussed, and consequently the 
Coroner is left with a rump technical duty with dubious purpose, open but not accessible, public in 
only the most formal terms.  In such cases, it is the family who are unhappy and who are making a 
fuss who shift the inquest from perfunctory tedium to meaningful investigation.  One Coroner 
reflected on this impact of the family in relation to all of their cases;  
Families diffĞƌ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚĞǇ ?ŐƌĞĂƚůǇ ?ĂŶĚthe truth is, depending on the nature of the family, it 
can certainly influence the length and comprehensive nature of the inquest.   Apart from the 
family obviously I have a statutory duty to determine those four facts and I do that, but if it 
is a very active family who have got lots of questions, that can expand the nature of the 
evidence at the inquest, so it does make a difference.  If the family show no interest, have no 
issues, then it can be a more swift inquest. 
 dŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŝƐa  ‘ǀĞƌǇďŝŐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ĨŽƌthe comprehensiveness of the inquest for 
this Coroner, affecting the detail, the focus, the range and the length of the inquest hearing.  Where 
families want to engage, Coroners frame the inquest hearing as a place in which as far as possible, 
they will get understanding. 
A hearing with meaningful revelation, explanation, and closure?  
The need for family to understand was a key theme in my interviews (and see Davis 2002, 47).  My 
interviewees were keen for family to attend the hearing  W one stating since the new RuůĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐ
more common practice that people are almost encouraged to come to the inquest. ? If they are not 
there, it causes a problem for the inquest, 
(Coroner ?ǁĞĚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚĞĂƚŚƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇĨĂŵŝůǇ
ĚŽŶ ?ƚĞxist, but because of breakdowns in relationships and marriages etc, it may be that the 
family are there but have absolutely no interest in the death, for all I know they are 
organising a dance for the occasion, there can be that degree of antipathy.  It is a bit unkind 
but it exists. 
(Ed) Commonly? 
(Coroner) No, happily no, it is uncommon.   
(Ed) Is that something you have noticed any change? 
(Coroner) It has always been there, it is just a bit sad when we have to deal with it because it 




obviously the registrar wants to know, general records office have an interest, everyone who 
acts on the statistics we generate does. 
As this Coroner sees it, it is a bit unkind to note situations where a family has broken down and has 
no interest in a death, and happily, it is uncommon.  Where it does occur, families can be seen to be 
resisting endeavours to construct a frame of combined accountability, leaving the inquest asking the 
question of who, if anybody, it is seeking to satisfy.  Critically, in relation to questions of dignity, the 
actions of such a family leave the dignity of the inquest thinned out, falling back onto a framing of 
law-as-risk-avoidance, a technocratic formulation, focused on legal requirements and official 
statistics, and silent as to meaningful convivial revelation.  Focused on the public status of the dead, 
it  ‘is a bit sad ? to be separated from the attachments of an involved family, office holders refusing to 
take up their office, leaving the inquest dissatisfied.  If there is no-one there to represent the family, 
then, as one Coroner explained,  
I have got to think what is it that that person would ask, so that actually I am conducting it 
fairly, and it is more difficult with nobody there, at least I have got somebody who can ask 
those questions.   
The involvement of family makes the inquest fairer.  This Coroner was discussing the long lost sister 
in Vignette 4, and it was not her knowledge which is key, but rather her connection to the deceased 
and her resultant ability to help create a space where accountabilities can be combined, to think 
about and ask the types of questions which family need to ask.   
Where family do attend, all my interviewees emphasised that they sought to enable them to 
understand what happened to the deceased.  For one Coroner ƚŚŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐŽŵƉůĞǆ
evidence, and putting their own expertise to one side 
In court I am as naïve as possible.  I will ask the simplest of questions, because I need to get 
the family to understand it. 
As this quote re-emphasises, the production of family understanding is obligatory, a foundational 
requirement of the inquest.  This task was often expressed in therapeutic terms, with an emphasis 
on closure, and as above, often meant permitting questions which went beyond the question of 
cause of death.  One Coroner related how they would go further, and act in expectation of such 
questions,  
this is their opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses themselves, so it could be 
something as simple as, do you think he suffered before he died, and we have to anticipate 




certified death and I think they are sometimes, not lying to you, because that is too strong a 
word, but for the sake of the family they may be being a little economical with the truth, so 
ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƐĂǇƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐŽĨ ‘/ĂŵƉƌĞƚƚǇƐƵƌĞƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ
would have known ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐĂŶŝĐĞ
thing for the family to go away with, not worrying about that aspect. 
The anticipation of the Coroner ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽƚůǇŝŶŐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ĂƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
protection of the family from the risk of further distress.  They demonstrate the ways in which 
attention to risk can shift the inquest from a jurisdiction focused on enabling family engagement and 
understanding to a focus on a paternalistic well-intentioned granting of understanding.  The 
intention is pro-therapeutic but the impact can be anti-therapeutic and undermine therapeutic 
engagements with the law (Dix 1999; Freckelton 2007, 593).  As Davis et al note, for family members 
 ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĐĂŶďĞĂŶĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐƐǇŵďŽůŝĐƐŝŐŶŝĨ ĐĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇCoroners have 
to respond to a wide range of feelings from bereaved individuals (Davis et al 2002, 70).  However, as 
Howarth argues, rather than devising and imposing a model of grief, the engagement with grieving 
should recognise the differentiated experiences of the bereaved, with an aim ƚŽ ‘ĂŵƉůŝĨǇƚŚĞ
whispered communication across the boundary between the living and the dead that has hitherto 
been muffled by the noisy, dominant discourse and prescriptive professional rituals of modernitǇ ?
(Howarth 2000, 136).  A risk-ďĂƐĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĐĂŶĚƌŽǁŶŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ
whispered communication, whether the risk is perceived to be hurt to the family, or whether, as in 
the next quote, the risk appears to arŝƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
I have done well over a thousand inquests of all types and most people just want to know 
what happened.  Even if someone has done something dreadful, doctors are really good at 
this, they will get in the stand, they will say,  “I did this this and this, I am so sorry, I should 
have realised I wish I had read the notes better, I should have realised they were allergic to 
ƉĞŶŝĐŝůůŝŶ ?/ĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞ/ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝƚ/ĂŵƐŽƐŽƌƌǇ ? ?and that is often all the family wants 
actually. Doctors are really good at it, or even if they have not done anything wrong, they 
ǁŝůůŐĞƚƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƚƵƌŶƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƐĂǇ ? “excuse me, 
/ ?ĚũƵƐƚůŝŬĞƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?/ĂŵƌĞĂůůǇ sorry, I give you my sympathy for your loss, ? 
and it is devastating, it works really well in court. 
The apology is devastating, from the Latin devastare, to lay waste completely.  From the approving 
perspective of the onlooking Coroner the complete laying of waste is a martial move specific to the 
court, leaving any perceived family strategy in the room desolate and empty.  It is perceived as a 




and apparently destroyed (although it is important to note that the apology and the acceptance of 
that apology may be no less genuine for that perception by the Coroner). The interpretation of the 
apology thus frames the family as inherently antagonistic, despite just wanting to know, and a risk to 
be managed.   
The devastating apology here is an adjunct to the main business of the inquest, occurring at the end 
ŽĨƚŚĞŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ĂĨƌĂŵŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐ
forms of accountability takes the meaningfulness of the hearing as its focal point, creating space for 
the family to generate their own understandings, as one Coroner described,  
There are a range of simple inquests that I could just read, but I feel if an interested person 
needs to understand an explanation, it is right that they have somebody to ask the questions 
ƚŽ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝƚĂůů ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞƚŚ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƌĐĂŶ/ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ
what is down there.  Probably the best example is a cot death.  In many cĂƐĞƐ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽ
call a witness, the pathologist and clinician give the expected results and I could read the 
whole thing, but how terribly unsatisfactory is that for some families?  The family may want 
to ask questions like,  “did it matter that I put them on their side ? ?Ănd that is part of closure, 
so depending on the case I would try to call either the pathologist or the clinician, it depends 
a bit on the case and circumstances but I would try to have a witness for them to question if 
the family want ?KĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĂƌĞƚŽŽĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚĂŶĚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚŝƚ ?/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐŵǇďĂĐŬůŽŐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĂĚĚƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚŽƵƌ ?ĂďŝƚŵŽƌĞǁork, but I think 
that is right. 
These questions and answers may not be needed for the Coroner ?s purposes, but their exclusion, 
when they are desired, is terribly unsatisfactory.  This Coroner is again engaged in the language of 
ƚŚĞƌĂƉǇĂŶĚĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝƐŽŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ
of bereavement.   However, this space can be risky.  One Coroner described a road traffic inquest in 
which a child had been killed. The driver who had run over the child was very distressed at what had 
happened, and at the conclusion the family asked to say something.  The Coroner acceded to their 
request nervously,  
ĂŶĚŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇƐĂǇƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚ
ǇŽƵŵĂŬĞŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŽƚŚĞĚƌŝǀĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƌƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚďůĂŵĞŚŝŵŝŶĂŶǇǁĂǇĂŶĚǁĞŚŽƉĞ
he has not been adversely affected  W I remember being considerably affected by it  W they 




In addition, as the rise in narrative conclusions illustrates,288 it is the creation of a space out of which 
a contextual conclusion can be produced (Scott Bray 2010, 587).  Tait and Carpenter (2013, and see 
Carpenter et al 2015) have highlighted the role of the family in influencing conclusions, and while my 
focus was on the hearing and not on the conclusion, one Coroner did reflect on this in detail in my 
interviews, 
closure is important so that is partly about addressing the issues and worries as far as we can 
do it through the process of the inquest, and it is partly about reaching conclusions that 
seem appropriate to that.  One of the ways I do that is I have a lower threshold for doing a 
narrative conclusion.  If the family appear to need an explanation, or if there are 
complexities, my worry is if I provide a short form conclusion of natural causes, and button it 
all up, that it looks as if I have just dismissed everything.  I know in law I might be entitled to 
do that, but if there are recorded one or two relevant circumstances, I think that the family 
ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŚĂƉƉǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶůŝƐƚĞŶĞĚƚŽĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?dŚĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞŝƚ ?
/ĚŽŶ ?ƚknow if the chief coroner likes it, but I think that sŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? 
The concern is with dismissal of contingency and complexity, and the attention of the Coroner is on 
a meaningful conclusion which recognises the participating family.  As the Coroner notes, the rise 
has left statisticians concerned about accurately coding deaths (Hill & Cook 2011), but may be 
helpful for more nuanced contextual studies of death (see Brown 2014), and has to be considered in 
the context of other critiques of the accuracy of death statistics, particularly in relation to suicide 
(see inter alia Atkinson 1978; Cooper & Milroy 1995; Tait & Carpenter 2013; Palmer et al 2014).  
However, concerns about statistical accuracy and the function of death statistics are not limited to 
suicide (see Prior 1985; Pemberton 1988), and it was revealing that in another set of reflections on 
conclusions a Coroner demonstrated two sides of this debate.  Firstly, reflecting on the importance 
of statistics coming out of inquests in relation to deaths from asbestos, the Coroner stated that the 
ŬĞǇǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵĚĚĞŶůǇǁĞŐĞƚƐŽŵĞƌĞůŝĂďůĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽŶŚŽǁƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚŝƚŝƐ ?and this enabled action 
to be taken against widespread use of asbestos.  The same Coroner later stated that over the past 
ĚĞĐĂĚĞƚŚĞǇŚĂĚǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚĂ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƵƉůŝĨƚ ?ŝŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨĚŽĐƚŽƌƐǁŚĞƌĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŚĂĚ
undergone elective surgery which had gone wrong and resulted in death.  The Coroner ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ
ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞŵŝƐĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞǁŽƵůĚĐŽǀĞƌŝƚ ?ĂƐǁŝůůŝŶŐĂĐĐeptance of a known risk, but 
ŵŝƐĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝƚƚŽĂůŽƚŽĨďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁŚŽƚŚŝŶŬŵŝƐĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞŵĞĂŶƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
haƐĚŽŶĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?The attention of the Coroner was therefore not on the collation of 
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statistics, but was rather directed to making sure the outcome avoided the risk of blame.  They 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶƐƵĐŚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĐƌĂĨƚŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ‘ƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚĐůĞĂƌ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ
that the death was a result of medical intervention but the doctor was blameless.   
Conclusion 
The inquest hearing needs family; their attendance may arouse concerns with ordering, but the 
absence of kin poses a greater threat to the undertaking.  They may embody, connect and channel a 
wider tacit community, and they can precipitate the transformation of the hearing from formally 
public into a substantively public space, expanding the focus of the hearing, provoking the need for 
the presence of witnesses or a jury, and connecting the death to concerns of dignity and a narrative 
of an individual lived life.  Paradoxically, the need for family, expressed through a jurisdictional 
technology of disclosure as part of enabling their participation, can simultaneously act to limit the 
public nature of the hearing itself; meaning families do not see the need to attend, or enabling the 
curtailing of evidence made available in the public space.   
It is a public space ostensibly directed towards reaching a conclusion, but as Davis et al argue, the 
conclusion of an inquest is only a small part of the purpose of the investigation.289  However, it can 
be a very important part from the perspective of the family, and my interviewees highlighted many 
of those reasons, including a risk that families blamed themselves for the circumstances resulting in 
death.  One Coroner felt it was important that  
where someone is blaming themselves, by having an inquest where they are exonerated, I 
am not saying that an inquest is there to exonerate people, but where it is so clear and it is 
said to them that they would have died anyway, then it brings them that bit of closure. 
This quote encapsulates the wider ambiguity of the inquest; a space which appears required only to 
answer four limited questions and record the details required by the Registration Acts, but which, 
when viewed through a jurisdictional lens, can be seen to act in and through legal means to 
exonerate; to reveal, to explain and to require justifications; to uncover, attribute and obscure 
blame; to set standards; and ultimately to establish a responsive meaningful account of who 
someone was, and how they died.  
  
                                                          
289 For Davis et al (2002, 59-60), this is a point particularly powerfully made in relation to road traffic accidents; 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ŝŵƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŽƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶƋƵĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŽĚĞĂƚŚƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŽĂĚƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ
verdict, as they will invariable result in a conclusion of road traffic accident (now changed to collision, unless 




Chapter Nine: Reimagining the politics of death & kinship, and the 
possibilities of justice 
In my account, the critical rupture between the historic and the modern inquest is encapsulated in 
the abolition of the deodand, which had previously simultaneously represented, embodied and 
reaffirmed the connections between community, the dependant bereaved and the law of the 
inquest.  The replacement of the deodand with a fatal accident claim split these three, and a simple 
argument for this thesis might have been that contingency and community was lost to the inquest in 
this moment, never to return.  Continuing this line of argument, a rough caricature of the 
subsequent shift which I have described as the move from the modern to the contemporary inquest 
could note the growing but limited role of the family, involved at the behest of the Coroner as part 
of the governance of social responses to death.  Such an account might conclude with an 
examination of the ways in which the inquest system continues to restrain, control and discipline the 
family and exclude the wider community. 
However, such an account would require the assertion of two fundamental theoretical tenets, which 
I have sought to disrupt through empirical and jurisprudential analysis: the assumption of a fixed (or 
even fixable) category of family and in the presumption of a fixed bio-political focus for the inquest 
as part of a medically focussed politics of death.   
In contrast, my account has sought to enrich existing literatures on jurisprudence, death, family and 
kinship by integrating power, contingency and fluidity into an analysis of the contemporary inquest 
system and the law of the contemporary inquest.  Examining the ways in which notional divisions 
into public and private are troubled by my research, exploring the critical role of the process of 
investigation before the hearing, and responding to the key role of materials in the construction of 
the inquest, I argue that looking at the inquest through the negotiated category of family makes 
possible a fundamental reimagination of the politics of death.  Furthermore, I argue that this shifting 
response to death calls for a reconfiguration of the politics of family and kinship, and that an 
acknowledgment and engagement with the contingent co-constitution of kinship and death opens 
up questions of law and the possibilities of justice. 
In this conclusion, I set out reflections on these themes in three final sections, and argue that that 
the contemporary inƋƵĞƐƚ ?ƐƌĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇĂŶĚƌĞĨĂƐŚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŽĚĂŶĚ
 W those of contingency and community  W has recalibrated the politics of death, family, and the 




The politics of death: the conclusion of the inquest 
WƌŝŽƌ ?ƐŐƌŽƵŶĚ-ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ ?ŝŶĞůĨĂƐƚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ
for acknowledgement of the ways in which death remained visible throughout the twentieth 
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ďƵƚŽŶůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐůĂŶŐƵĂŐe which speaks of mortality, disease 
ĂŶĚĐĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚƐƉĞĂŬƐŽĨĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?WƌŝŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ?ƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶtĞďĞƌ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵĐŚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĞůůƵƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
world or of the objectƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚ ? ?WƌŝŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WƌŝŽƌ ?Ɛwork emphasises this with a division 
between public and private accounts of death.  The first section on public narratives discusses this 
medico-legal discourse, including extended focus on the work of the Coroner.  Family and the 
bereaved are entirely absent from this section, organised out of ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ? into the second part on 
 ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ? 
As my account above shows, the place of family in the contemporary inquest means such a stark 
divide is no longer coherent.  This is not solely  W as I have discussed at length  W the role of family in 
the investigation and public hearing, but also in relation to the conclusion of the inquest (until 2013, 
the verdict).  Critically, the 2009/2013 amendments, which turned the inquest verdict into the 
inquest conclusion, left the contents of that conclusion unprescribed, beyond a direction that 
 ‘ƐƚƌĂǇŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŝƐƚ ?ŽĨĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƐŚŽƌƚĨŽƌŵĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŝůůƵƐƵĂůůǇďĞƵŶǁŝƐĞ ? ?ŚŝĞĨŽƌŽŶĞƌ
2015, 6).  Coroners and juries can thus use a short-form conclusion of their own choice, or replace or 
supplement a short form with a narrative conclusion.290  Many of my interviewees described the 
conclusion as important for constructing ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛunderstanding of what happened, and the 
ŚŝĞĨŽƌŽŶĞƌĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƚŚŝƐ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? PĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ
ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐĂůŝŬĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽĐůĞĂƌĨŽƌ
ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?291 
My account takes this contemporary emphasis on understanding and explanation as foundational, 
and in exploring these themes, I argue for the need for a critical re-ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWƌŝŽƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ŝŶ
particular in relation to the ways in which a central family in the inquest impacts on ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?
aspects of systemic responses to death.   
                                                          
290 With some limitations and directions for the use of such conclusions, see Chief Coroner 2015 and Matthews 
2014, 311-347.  It should also be noted that even a short form conclusion will include ƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽ
ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚŽǁ ?ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĚŝĞĚǁŝƚŚĂshort summary of their findings of fact. 
291 Chief Coroner 2015, 6.  The Chief Coroner emphasises that thiƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞCoroners 
should conclude with a short-ĨŽƌŵĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚůŽŶŐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞǀĞƌĚŝĐƚƐŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ‘ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ




With a focus on how deaths get into the Coronial system and how they are classified,292 Prior points 
to the ways in which a public health/medical focus on pathology compels particular forms of 
knowledge ĂďŽƵƚĚĞĂƚŚ ?ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐĂŶĚ ?ĐĂƵƐĂů ?ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ?WƌŝŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?293  It is thus an account which links closely to Foucault-inspired 
reflections on risk as a method of governance (Ewald 1991; Castel 1991; Green 1999).  Crucially, risk 
has moved as a theme through my analysis; the need to combine accountability and the risks of 
failing to do so, and the risks which that endeavour is perceived to present to ordering or grieving.  
However, a critical distinction between risk in my account of the contemporary system and that of a 
more explicitly Foucaldian account is the role of pathology in promoting consciousness of risk, and 
encouragement to manage our own risk.  Where Prior argues that the inquest individualises death, I 
argue, drawing again on Butler (2006), that the inquest can reaffirm, refashion and reveal 
interconnectedness.   
As I note in my introduction and as I explore through the interview materials, the risks which can be 
identified in this reformulated inquest system are not only the risks bound up in identification and 
promulgation of statistically verifiable dangers and an encouragement to plan to avoid those risks, it 
is also the risks inherent in social connection, and the dangers to identity of a loss of that 
connection.  This is not a risk formulation in which risk is assessed, captured and provided for 
through reduction to numbers, but is instead a risk that the inquest will fail to engage in the critical 
interpretative task of opening up and exploring the meaningfulness of context and connection.   
It is my argument that it is in the contested space created by these competing and (potentially) 
complimentary narratives which a recalibration of the politics of death can be situated.  This account 
draws on the analysis of Burney (2000) and the productive interplay in the historic-modern inquest 
between narratives of scientific and legal expertise on one hand and popular sovereignty on the 
other.  In the contemporary inquest, this productive tension is between narratives of public health 
and a reinvigorated narrative of kinship.  It is the newly reinforced power of the bereaved which, for 
example, has forced the reopening of high profile historic investigations from Hillsborough to 
Deepcut barracks; inquests which give greater voice to family and open up possibilities of nuanced, 
contextual and powerful critiques of the State.294  Situated in an individually negotiated space 
                                                          
292 For some more contemporaneous accounts of the relationship between medical professionals and the 
inquest system see inter alia Gilleard 2008; Tuffin 2009; Barnes, Kirkeegard & Carpenter 2015. 
293 And see Buchanan & Mason 1995; McGowan & Viens 2010; Hill & Cook 2011; Hawton et al 2014 for the 
ongoing strength of this approach and consequent criticism of the mixed messages produced by the 
contemporary inquest, and see Annex A, Coroners Statistics 2012 for research on coding of narrative verdicts. 
294 I have not engaged at length with such high profile cases in this research.  While I contend that they merit 
far more academic research, in this analysis I have sought to focus on the more mundane and commonplace 




between the requirements of medical/legal knowledge and the engagement of a tacit community 
around the deceased, the contemporary inquest strives to encompass both the pathological and the 
relational.  Crucially, it is not the aim of this thesis to assess whether an individual inquest succeeds 
or fails on these terms, but rather to argue for an analysis that each is necessarily constructed 
through such an endeavour.   
Other research has identified this tension, and has highlighted, as some of my interviewees 
suggested, a prioritisation of understanding in the individual case over attention to governmental 
ĂŝŵƐ ?dĂŝƚ ?ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŽŶŝĂůƌŽůĞ ? ?dĂŝƚ ?ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚŽƌŽŶĞƌƐŚĂǀĞ
 ‘ĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƌŽůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶ ?ǁŚĂƚZŽƐĞƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĂƉĞƵƚŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ZŽƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Miller & Rose argue that this rise of therapeutic authority is enacted through a process of 
problematisation, diagnosis and intervention (Miller & Rose 2008, 142-3), and an analysis of the 
inquest founded on this would frame the Coroner as acting in a calculated way to resolve the 
psychological trauma caused by death.  Drawing on their interview material, which has close 
parallels to mine in many parts, Tait & Carpenter query whether the focus on closure means the 
ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?dĂŝƚ ?ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ďƵƚŐŽŽŶ
ƚŽĐŽƵŶƐĞůĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐŝŵƉůĞďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘dŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚŽƌŽŶŝĂůŝŶƋƵĞƐƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶ
equally complex relationship between its bureaucratic and pastoral functions, a relationship that has 
ǇĞƚƚŽďĞĨƵůůǇ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇ ?ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ? ?dĂŝƚ ?ĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
It is the ambiguity and openness in this negotiated relationship that creates the potential for a 
flexible response to death and a thicker form of accountability for death through the inquest, and, as 
part of this, a negotiation of kinship.  
The place of kin-family  
It is central to my account that the family in the contemporary inquest is constructed in the 
contingent development of the investigation and cannot be pulled away from that context and 
defined without reference to it.  There is thus no fixed category of family in my analysis, but instead I 
observe the concept of family as a critical template against which actors inside the system and 
 ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĂĐŝƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ? 
My research thus seeks to reveal the ways in which formal legal categories and rights diminish in 




through the inquest process through the negotiations which receive the family as other.295  In this 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞŝƚƐŽǁŶĞĚŐĞƐǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ ‘ĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĞůĐŽŵĞƐǁŚĂƚŝƐƚŽĂƌƌŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂ
tentative  W and incomplete  W ŵĂƐƚĞƌǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?WĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&ĂŵŝůǇŝƐƚŚƵƐƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶ
which the tacit community crystallises  W it is the way in which the inquest joins the need for a 
substantive connection to the deceased to the ordering of law.   
This negotiation is not unboundaried, and critically, the systemic need for the bereaved means the 
contemporary inquest necessarily engages with a more fluid conception of family, representing a 
shift in the politics of family in this context from formal licit relationships to a greater emphasis on 
ŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ?^ƵĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ŬŝŶ-ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? Winvolved by dint of a connection to the 
deceased which is made more important than formal family by the need for a meaningful 
investigation and outcome, but still inseparably connected to notions of formal family.   The 
potentially ambiguous relationship between the two is exposed in the sometimes uneasy slippage in 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚ ?,296 ƚŚĞĨŝǆĞĚĂŶĚĨůƵŝĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ‘ŶĞǆƚŽĨŬŝŶ ? ?ƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƐŵǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƚŽ
explicitly interrogate these categories in the abstract founders on a preference for assessment of 
individual facts and circumstances case-by-case.  It is here that the vignettes were particularly 
important for my research; demonstrating the contingent ways that boundaries are set  W by kin-
family themselves, and by actors in the system. The emphasis was on openness to kin-family, in their 
ŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂůŝŶŬƚŽĂǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
the inquest.   
My research argues that inquests may be public hearings, but they are also intimate and personal 
hearings, often with no-one there except for individuals connected to the deceased, and the 
methodological and theoretical questions which arise in relation to consent in such public intimate 
spaces is an area ripe for further research.  The contemporary inquest makes the kin-family complicit 
in the construction of this space; a paradoxical role in which their tacit network of relationships with 
the deceased and their willingness to engage is critical to the authorisation of that law whilst they 
are simultaneously crystallised as subjects of the law of the inquest.  This is because kin-family bring 
a texture of debate which resists typification and reinforces links to community (Morgan 2006, 259); 
acknowledging the wĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďŽĚŝĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂƚƌŝƐŬ
                                                          
295 ŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ ‘ďŽƵŶĚƚŽůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐ ‘ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐŽĨhistorically situated mastery and calculation are 
ƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞ ? ?WĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 




ŽĨůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŬŝŶ-family that they can provide 
this necessary contextual tenor, and examination of the process of investigation reveals the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƚĂŬĞŶŽŶƚƌƵƐƚ ?
seeking a tentative balance between an emphasis on relationality and the perceived reliance of law 
on formality and objectively verifiable status. 
As my analysis shows, this process is delicate and can be skewed when risk is focused not on the loss 
of attachment but on the dignity of the process, transforming the concern with connection and 
conscience into an emphasis on office and legal rights.  In an individual case, the impact is that kin-
family can give way to formal status, and that concerns with privacy and protection shut out 
alternative possibilities of kinship or close down the space for the bereaved. 
There are three critical moments in this construction: (1) the separation of kin-family from the wider 
community  W which takes effect through the use of legal writing and notification; (2) the enabling of 
the effective participation of family through disclosure of papers to the family; and (3) the form of 
ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞůĞŐĂůĚĞǀŝĐĞƐĂƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨĨĂŵŝůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƋƵĞƐƚ
as a jurisdiction which seeks to create an engagement with convivial accountability.  Where the 
abolition of the deodand demonstrated a reassembling of death and the family as legal subjects 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďǇŬŶŽǁĂďůĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƐƚƌŝƉƉŝŶŐĂǁĂǇŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ
construction of the kin-family in the contemporary inquest can be framed as a return to ambiguity, 
an endeavour to reimagine the politics of both death and family; reinserting identity, emphasising 
emotional connections ahead of formal relationships, and thereby re-engaging law with the 
unknowable and contextual.  This ambiguity and openness points to the prospect of a reimagining of 
the role of law and the possibilities of justice.   
Looking for justice: the possibilities of law 
The inquest in my account is a space in which the lawful place of family is key, constructed by a focus 
on effective participation without a determinant idea of what that effective participation is oriented 
towards.  My work calls for an attention on the form of the place for kin-family, a question which is a 
primary procedural issue for law, revealed by attention to a concern with jurisdiction.  In this 
account therefore, law is not a tactic of governance or an exercise of sovereign power, but is 
perhaps a place from which forms of justice can become, in a space created by the de-centering of 
technocratic accountability and expertise and the insertion of the indeterminacy and contingencies 
that the bereaved can bring.  It is a call for us to imagine justice otherwise. 
The inquest is not an obvious place to look for justice.  My interviewees did not discuss justice, and 




seeking a traditional notion of justice, and where they are seeking it, may find their search 
frustrated; as Razack (2015) shows, the inquest can be a place of deep and abiding injustice.  
However my research project has sought to explore the inquest as a place charged with going 
beyond the medico-legal to engage with a meaningful accounting of life and death.  My argument is 
that approaching the inquest through the place of the kin-family, an emphasis on legal process and 
jurisprudence, and a broad conception of accountability, is to approach justice tangentially.  I 
suggest that this approach is productive, resisting accounts of a determinate and closed approach to 
justice, and enabling me to seek out prospects of an open-ended justice, a justice which is instead 
 ‘ŶĞǀĞƌ ?ŶĞǀĞƌĨƵůůǇĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ ? ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ŝŶWĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĂƐWĂǀůŝĐŚŶŽƚĞƐ ? 
It is thus important to approach local calculations of justice with a sense of disquiet, 
remaining vigilant to their inevitable dangers and open to other possible computations. This 
underscores the importance of opening up to the arrival of unexpected events, ideas, and 
thereby preventing any image of justice from declaring itself as necessary, or as intrinsically 
better than any other. (Pavlich 2007, 110) 
WĂǀůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞǁĂǇŽĨŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞƵŶ ǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĐŽƵůĚďĞƚŽĚƌĂǁŽŶĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ
notions of hospitality, and suggests that this also offers a way of conceiving critical engagement 
without judgement (Pavlich 2005); a focus on the negotiation, and welcoming features of hosting 
the other as a means to engage with indeterminacy; 
The contingency of hospitality is crucial to an uncertain, undecided, set of negotiations that 
deliberate on how to be (how to live) with others.  And the negotiations are unique to the 
extent that they require the host to receive the other as other, without denying or yielding 
the mastery entailed by the role of law. (Pavlich 2005, 104). 
The legal techniques I identify are critical in this open negotiation.  The notification of kin-family 
separates them from a broader community, and enables them to co-construct their relationship with 
the system and speak for  W and to  W the wider community.  Where the deodand once represented 
ancient common law liberties and gave power to the jury, the material of disclosure transfers 
authority to the kin-family, while the second aspect of enabling their participation  W the form of their 
right to ask questions  W calls us to attend to the ways in which the effectively participating kin-family 
is now analogous to an effective investigation and to engagement of forms of the public.  The 
implication is that the openness to the unexpected  W the possibility of justice  W in an inquest is 
constructed through law, through engagements with the lawful presence and participation of the 
bereaved.  My focus has been the inquest process, and I do not seek to make broader claims, aside 




might be an opening up of conceptions of law outside the inquest, for accounts of the authority and 
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